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The Modern Divorce 
 
Joshua Viney 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This thesis sets out to explore divorce law and current reforms. It proposed five 
themes. Firstly, that no-fault divorce law could be adopted. Secondly, that voluntary 
mediation may pose several benefits. Thirdly, that the two main aims of the current 
law have not been met. The stability of marriage has not been buttressed and the 
current procedure is frequently unjust and may exacerbate bitterness, distress and 
humiliation. Fourthly, that the law could seek to avoid conflicted aims, focussing 
solely on providing an economically accessible process with minimum bitterness, 
distress and humiliation. Fifthly, that the current reforms of the law may be 
conflicted, repeating past mistakes. 
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This thesis seeks to explore divorce law, questioning the role of fault and what the 
aims of a modern divorce law could encapsulate, applying this analysis to current 
reforms and reform proposals. It postulates that the law should be concerned primarily 
with the termination of marriage and that conflicted aims, either between providing a 
process with minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation and protecting sanctity of 
marriage or coercing divorcees into mediation,1 may distort the practical application 
of the law, often with negative consequences or higher costs. A divorce is frequently 
referred to as a single event. In reality, however, it is many events. To illustrate this 
one may highlight the parties’ decision to divorce, a divorce petition, the obtaining of 
a decree nisi and absolute, ancillary relief and the property related consequences of 
breakdown and, where children are present, arrangements to settle residence, as 
separate stages in ‘a divorce’. This thesis will focus on the legal process required to 
acquire a divorce.  
 
Divorce is an extraordinarily relevant social phenomenon. As it stands, one in three 
marriages will end in divorce by its 15th wedding anniversary and in 2009 alone there 
were 113,949 divorces.2 In comparison, the average number of divorces between 
1901-1905 was 812 – a rough increase of 14,000% in slightly over a century.3 
Meanwhile, despite numerous attempts at reform, the current law is slightly under 
four decades old and has been subject to both procedural reforms and attempts at 
legislative reform.4 This thesis is particularly pertinent as divorce law is, once again, 
currently subject to both proposed and procedural reforms. In 2010 a Family Justice 
Review was initiated.5 After a call for evidence, it published its interim findings in 
March 2011 and will submit a final report in the autumn.6 The interim report 
suggested restructuring the current administrative procedure into an online 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Buttressing the ‘sanctity of marriage’ and providing a divorce with minimum ‘bitterness, 
distress and humiliation’ are two phrases used by the Law Commission - who set them as the 
first and second aim of the Divorce Reform Act 1969: Law Commission, Reform of the 
Grounds of Divorce: The Field of Choice (Law Com No 3123, 1966) para 15. They are relied 
upon extensively within the thesis. 
2 Office for National Statistics, Divorces in England and Wales 2009 (2011). 
3 O.R. McGregor, Divorce in England - A Centenary Study (Heinemann 1957) 51. 
4 The introduction of the Special Procedure in 1973, discussed in the second chapter, 
significantly changed the process of getting a divorce. Subsequent to this, divorce law was the 
subject of further investigations culminating in the failed Family Law Act 1996, discussed in 
the fourth chapter at length.  
5 Home Office, Family Justice Review - Interim Report (March 2011). 
6 ibid 3. 
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application.7 To date, no empirical research into the proposal has been conducted. 
Meanwhile, in February 2011, Practice Direction 3A, a ‘Pre-Application Protocol for 
Mediation Information and Assessment’, supplementing the Family Procedure Rules 
2010, was released.8 It came into force on the 6th April 2011. The Protocol requires, 
as a necessary pre-condition to divorce, that couples attend a meeting to consider 
whether they may be able to solve any disputes through mediation.9 Again, as this has 
been introduced so recently, there exists no empirical research on the scheme. The 
relevancy of a modern analysis of divorce law is therefore abundantly clear.    
 
To better comprehend the components of ‘a modern divorce’, this thesis will be 
comprised of the following sections. Initially, in the first chapter, it will outline the 
development of divorce up until the current law, found in the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 and the Special Procedure, also initiated in 1973, before outlining the current 
reforms. It describes this evolution through an investigation into the religious, 
legislative, judicial, administrative and, now, maybe a digital phase of divorce. In 
doing so it simultaneously provides both a foundation to the thesis, whilst also 
demonstrating how differing aims to divorce law, aside from the dissolution of 
marriage, have been included within the law and altered. Specifically, it identifies the 
changing priorities between protecting sanctity of marriage and providing a humane10 
and acceptable socio-economic process.11  
 
These changing priorities shall be further analysed in the second chapter, which 
contains a theoretical discussion of fault-based divorce. Within this it will consider 
arguments in favour of fault, which rely upon justifications relating to the sanctity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ibid 226. 
8 Family Procedure Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2955(L17).  
9 S 4.1. 
10 The thesis shall refer to the word ‘humane’. By this it means to depict issues relating to the 
divorce process itself. Specifically, providing a liberal process with minimum bitterness, 
distress and humiliation. 
11 This thesis shall also frequently use the broad term ‘socio-economic’. This is to depict both 
fiscal issues, such as the cost of the divorce to the divorcees and the subsequent economic 
position of the parties. With regard to economics, there is noticeable change within the 
development of divorce law between providing an accessible divorce and then a divorce 
which does not impact, fiscally, in a negative fashion upon one of the divorcees. It also relates 
to the social impact of the divorce such as on the community, relationships, employment and 
housing. 
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marriage;12 socio-economic benefits;13 contractual motivations;14 potential 
psychological benefits15 and tort-based arguments.16 It concludes that the arguments 
in favour of fault, evident in the current divorce law and previous legislation 
governing divorce, may be reliant upon outdated social conceptions and may have 
poor practical applicability. This allows the chapter to propose that fault could be 
abandoned in future reforms.  
 
The third chapter follows the observations reached in the preceding chapters with an 
analysis of the attempts to provide a no-fault reform. This includes an investigation 
into the Booth Committee and the Family Law Act 1996, and contributes to the 
conceptualisation of a modern divorce in two ways. Firstly, by suggesting the Family 
Law Act 1996 failed due to an unsuccessful attempt to merge the concepts of no-fault 
divorce with protecting sanctity of marriage, which resulted in theoretical and 
practical flaws throughout the Act. It allows the thesis to suggest that by convoluting 
its objectives in such a fashion, a divorce law may encounter practical difficulties. 
Secondly, through its analysis, it finds little reason to criticise no-fault divorce as a 
concept, reinforcing the belief that a no-fault model could be adopted by future 
reforms.  
 
With this conclusion in mind, the fourth chapter moves on to assess the aims of the 
current law, asking if the law has met the aims laid down and what the aims could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Report of a Group Appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in January 1964, Putting 
Asunder – A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society (Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge 1966); R.M. Redman, ‘Marriage Should be the Traditional Protected 
Relationship, Not the New Concept of, “I’ll Love you Until you Get Ugly”’ (1987) 10 Family 
Advocate 8; G. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus: Volume 1: Christian Moral Principles 
(Franciscan Herald Press 1983). 
13 R. Deech, ‘Divorce – A Disaster?’ (2009) Family Law 1049; S. Fitzgibbon, ‘Marriage and 
the Good of Obligation’ (2002) 47 American Journal of Jurisprudence 41; J. Eekelaar and M. 
Maclean, ‘Marriage and the Moral Bases of Personal Relationships’ (2004) 31(4) Journal of 
Law and Society 510; L. Weitzman and M. Maclean, Economic Consequences of Divorce – 
The International Perspective (Clarendon Press 1992). 
14 R. Rowthorn, ‘Marriage and Trust: Some Lessons From Economics’ (1999) 23 Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 661; L. Weitzman, Marriage Contract (Free Press 1981); M. Brinig 
and S. Crafton, ‘Marriage and Opportunism’ (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 869; S. 
Scheffler, ‘Relationships and Responsibilities’ (1997) 26 Philosophy and Public Affairs 189. 
15 S. Day Sclater, Divorce: A Psychosocial Study (Ashgate Publishing 1999); G. Davis and M. 
Murch, Grounds for Divorce (Clarendon Press 1988). 
16 T. L. Perry, ‘No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can Family Law Learn from 
Torts’ (1991) Ohio State Law Journal 55; P. N. Swisher, ‘Reassessing Fault Factors in No-
Fault Divorce’ (1997-1998) 31 Family Law Quarterly 269. 
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now entail with regard to a modern divorce. In doing so it evaluates the aims of the 
law as outlined by the Law Commission in its ‘Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: 
The Field of Choice’ Report published in 1965.17 These aims included buttressing the 
stability of marriage and providing a fair divorce with minimum bitterness, distress 
and humiliation. The Law Commission also included the subsidiary aims of avoiding 
injustice to an economically weaker spouse and circumventing a negative impact to 
any relevant children. This section argues that the current law fails to buttress the 
stability of marriage, whilst providing a process that is predisposed to create unfair 
situations that may cause bitterness, distress and humiliation not only for the parties 
but also for any relevant children. This also acts as a practical demonstration of the 
theoretical limitations of fault-based divorce. It concludes that future reforms may 
seek to avoid convoluted aims and focus on the dissolution of marriage, whilst 
providing a fair, economically accessible system that causes the minimum bitterness, 
distress and humiliation. However, whilst it does so, with recognition of the first 
chapter, it is also cognisant of why protections of sanctity of marriage are still evident 
within the law.  
 
The chapter then moves on to apply this conclusion to the recent procedural and 
proposed reforms to the law. It suggests that the reforms may be repeating the same 
mistake as the Family Law Act 1996, albeit from a different perspective: namely 
coercive mediation. Tentatively, it proposes that if the divorcees are coerced into 
mediation, then the implications of failed mediation may not be constructive towards 
achieving a divorce with minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. Given the 
conclusions of the thesis, mediation would appear helpful in some instances, however, 
making it mandatory for all cases would appear to be inappropriate.  
 
Following these observations, the thesis advances its overall hypothesis that a modern 
divorce law, with a clearly composed rationale, could focus on providing a procedure 
that is solely dedicated to the dissolution of a marriage through a no-fault procedure. 
This will hopefully minimise the laws contribution towards the naturally occurring 
bitterness, distress and humiliation. It aims to demonstrate that convoluted and 
alternative aims to the law are, as borne out of the thesis’ analysis, prone to creating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Law Commission, Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: The Field of Choice (Law Com No 
3123, 1966). 
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unsatisfactory practical implications. This is underlined, and perhaps explained by the 
need for a clearer theoretical justification within the law. Practically, this is further 
evidenced by the fourth chapter’s analysis of the aims of the law and investigation 
into the attempted reforms. This hypothesis may contribute to the dialogue 
surrounding divorce reform for the future.    
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Chapter 1. The Development of Divorce Law 
 
Synopsis 
 
This chapter outlines the evolution of divorce law in England and Wales, leading up 
to the current law and reforms. This will be investigated with regard to relevant 
legislation, case law and procedure. The chapter contributes both a foundation to the 
thesis and an outline of how the law has altered over time, providing the initial first 
steps towards the thesis - exploring how the law has wrestled with differing aims and 
societal concerns over divorce, rather than focusing on the dissolution of marriage. It 
suggests that the law has, unsurprisingly, been overtly influenced from two broad 
areas – religious motivations on the one side, and socio-economic concerns on the 
other. This will then lead onto the second chapter, which provides a theoretical 
analysis of fault within a modern day perspective.    
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1. Introduction 
 
The modern concept of divorce has developed over a considerable period of time, 
undergoing several stages such as a religious, legislative and judicial phase. Within 
the past half century it has adjusted into an administrative role and now, owing to the 
preliminary suggestions of the Family Justice Review, it may, in the future, take on a 
more digitalised character. Throughout the law’s development it is broadly possible to 
identify a consistent fluctuation within the purpose of divorce. This chapter will 
analyse the evolution of the law within these phases, up until modern day.  
 
The chapter contributes towards the thesis in two ways. Firstly, it provides a 
background to divorce law, outlining its development and the current status quo. This 
is both necessary and useful with regard to the analysis undertaken in the following 
chapters, especially with regard to the modern reforms, which may be contrasted with 
divorce law’s historical progression.  
 
Secondly, it broadly explores the changing emphasis behind the purpose and 
operation of divorce law; tracking the depreciating levels of protection accorded to 
sanctity of marriage and the advancing prominence given to socio-economic and 
humane arguments over the last two centuries. This analysis will lead onto a 
theoretical discussion in the second chapter, which will examine the strength of 
differing arguments concerning the purpose of divorce law and the relevancy of fault 
based provisions to restrict access to divorce. 
 
It concludes that Cosmo Lang, quoted in the opening pages of this thesis and an 
unlikely source of inspiration, given he led the minority against reforming divorce law 
in the Gorell Commission in 1912, unwittingly provided the best argument for 
removing the sanctity of marriage from divorce. Once the initial steps were taken to 
allow for an accessible divorce process through judicial means, the Rubicon was 
crossed and the question of whether a divorce should be allowed, on the basis of 
issues relating to the sanctity of marriage, was diminished. The chapter suggests this 
was due to increasing social accessibility and the growing prominence of arguments 
focusing upon the socio-economic impact of divorce and whether its procedure was 
acceptable or not. This dichotomy, between sanctity of marriage and socio-economic 
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concerns, has continued and developed up until modern day, providing fertile grounds 
for further analysis, allowing the thesis to query whether provisions protecting 
marriage are beneficial, constructive, or actually harmful. This gives the thesis the 
capacity to suggest a more modern concept of divorce.  
 
2. The Phases of Divorce Law 
 
When broadly assessing the development of divorce law, it is possible to isolate select 
phases, such as a religious, legislative, judicial and administrative phase. In truth, 
compartmentalising them in this fashion is an oversimplification; the religious 
processes continued well into the 19th century, overlapping what this thesis terms the 
‘legislative’ phase. However, a general evolution can be evidenced which is 
illuminating when identifying the changing influences upon the law. 
 
The religious phase of divorce was in existence up until the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1857.18 In the twelfth century, the Roman Church’s doctrine of Christianity had 
‘hardened into settled doctrine’.19 However, whilst McGregor may label it a settled 
doctrine, it was, in practice, anything but settled. With regard to the law of 
matrimony, those above the age of seven could marry without parental consent and, 
what is more, they could do so simply via a verbal agreement by stating ‘we are now 
man and wife’.20 However, whilst this may not have been legally formalised, Probert 
has recently cast doubt on the disorganised conception of marriage, arguing that the 
majority of marriages did accord to certain attributes, such as the use of a 
clergyman.21    
 
The sacrament that surrounded marriage meant that the modern concept of divorce 
did not exist and thus the only possibility was an ecclesiastical divorce, or divorce a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This is a general statement, there are still considerable religious elements within divorce, 
evidenced clearly in judicial decisions in the 20th century as per Sir Jocelyn Simon in Bull v 
Bull [1965] 3 W.L.R. 1048. However, as a general trend, the official role of religious 
institutions within the divorce process ended after the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857. 
19 N 3, 1.  
20 O.R. McGregor, ‘The Morton Commission: A Social and Historical Commentary’ (1956) 
7(3) The British Journal of Sociology 173. 
21 R. Probert, Marriage Law and Practice in the Long Eighteenth Century: A Reassessment 
(CUP 2009) 21.   
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mensa et thoro (divorce from bed and board), in circumstances of adultery, cruelty or 
heresy.22 In other circumstances nullity could be granted, pronouncing the marriage 
void.23 This could be due to either flaws in the marriage ceremony or within the union 
itself, examples of this include duress or if the marriage was within the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity.24 As Gibson notes, the laws of nullity were of ‘awesome 
complexity’.25 Any resemblance of a modern day divorce was therefore firmly 
controlled by the Church, which dogmatically upheld the indissolubility of marriage, 
albeit allowing for a practical solution in difficult situations, circumstances 
providing.26 One can clearly identify a schism between the Church’s belief that, on 
the one hand, marriage was an indissoluble bond and, on the other, that forcing 
individuals to live together was impractical or, in some circumstances cruel. Already, 
even in the twelfth century, it is possible to highlight a conflict within the early 
concept of divorce between religious perspectives and social necessity. 
 
Following the Reformation, Rome’s direct influence upon the concept of marriage 
was diminished, reducing the protections granted to it, signifying a bold move 
towards divorce.27 Despite this, England was ‘unique’ in the sense that it was the only 
Protestant country to not allow divorce.28 Arguably, stemming from this emerged the 
Parliamentary divorce model or as this thesis has termed it the ‘legislative divorce’ 
phase. This essentially provided what an ecclesiastical divorce, or divorce a mensa et 
thoro, would not – permission to remarry, which was naturally of great importance.29  
 
An early example of this can be seen in the Roos Act of 1670, granting Lord Roos the 
right to marry again. There is some debate over whether this was the ‘first’ divorce 
Act, as he was granted an ecclesiastical divorce beforehand, which naturally did not 
permit remarriage in itself.30 It was not until the divorce granted to the Earl of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 N 20, 172. In practice this acted in a similar fashion to a modern day judicial separation, as 
per section 17 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
23 C.S. Gibson, Dissolving Wedlock (Routledge 1994) 10. 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
26 That there was evidence of adultery, cruelty or heresy. 
27 S. Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century – A History (OUP 2003) 161.  
28 S. Wolfram, ‘Divorce in England 1700-1857’ (1985) 5(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
157. 
29 L. Stone, Road to Divorce – England 1530-1987 (OUP 1990) 301. 
30 R. Phillips, Untying the Knot – A Short History of Divorce (CUP 1991) 37. 
	   18	  
Macclesfield in 1698 that a divorce was obtained without a prior ruling from an 
ecclesiastical court, perhaps being granted the title of the ‘first’ divorce Act.31 Despite 
this, it became custom,32 and then a standardized requirement of the House of Lords,33 
to receive a divorce a mensa et thoro and damages for adultery from the common law 
courts before receiving a Parliamentary divorce. The common law claim, for ‘criminal 
conversations’ was undertaken by a husband, against a man who had committed 
adultery with his wife, despite ‘the fact that it was neither criminal nor a conversation 
in the usual sense of the word’.34 This predominantly occurred from 1760-1820 in the 
King’s Bench.35  
 
The move to a legislative model of divorce is largely of historical interest. Typically, 
they are remembered as being reserved for the elite,36 however, as Wolfram noted, in 
the latter stages of the phase, the Parliamentary divorce was not the sole ‘prerogative 
of the aristocracy’.37 Nevertheless, they were exceedingly rare; only 325 ever took 
place,38 of which merely four were obtained by women,39 the first of which was in 
1801.40 To put this in perspective, this was over a 187-year period, 1670-1857. As an 
aside, to claim that it was a legislative divorce is a slight misnomer. As mentioned 
above, a common law claim for ‘criminal conversations’ and an ecclesiastical court 
ruling were normally pre-requisites to a Parliamentary divorce. However, the title is 
fitting, as it was Parliament that legally dissolved the marriage. Given the 
requirements for a Parliamentary divorce, namely, an ecclesiastical divorce, a 
common law claim and an Act of Parliament, it is clear that the process was impacted 
upon by both religious and social influences.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 N 29, 317. 
32 J. Masson et al, Cretney’s Principles of Family Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008).  
33 N 20, 175. 
34 N 29, 233. 
35 ibid. 
36N 28, 162. 
37 ibid. 
38 There appears to be some discrepancy between the exact number of Parliamentary divorces 
granted, whilst Phillips quotes 325, the Morton Commission quoted 244, a significant 
difference – Home Office, Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce 1951-1955 (Cmnd 
9678, 1956) 4.  
39 N 30, 66.  
40 The first female divorce Act was obtained in 1801 – the Addison/Campbell Divorce Act 
1801. 
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The move towards a judicially administered divorce model began in the mid 19th 
century. A Royal Commission ‘to enquire into the law of divorce, and more 
particularly into the mode of obtaining divorces a vinculo matrimonii’ was established 
in 1850.41 It published its report in 1853, highlighting the extreme economic 
difference between a divorce in England and Scotland, which respectively cost 
roughly £700-800 and £20-30.42 Following this the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 was 
enacted, providing individuals with the ability to dissolve their marriages and obtain a 
divorce by decree through the newly created Court for Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes, which was subsequently transferred to the multi-talented Probate, Divorce 
and Admiralty Division of the High Court following the enactment of the Supreme 
Court of Judicature Act 1873. Under the 1857 Act the husband could petition for 
divorce on the basis of the matrimonial offence of adultery, whilst the wife’s petition 
had to include not only adultery, but be combined with desertion, cruelty, incest, rape, 
sodomy or bestiality.  
 
The change that the Act brought about was not therefore one of principle, as the 
Parliamentary divorce offered divorce on similar grounds to a judicial divorce. 
Instead, it changed the procedure. A Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes was 
established, transferring the duties of the ecclesiastical courts and replacing the 
concept of a divorce a mensa et thoro with judicial separation.43 At the same time 
common law claims for ‘criminal conversation’ were replaced by a claim against a 
co-respondent. Ironically, with the aim of making the divorce process easier on an 
fiscal scale, the Act adopted the, socially, more damaging adversarial methods of the 
ecclesiastical courts, requiring a high standard of proof in regards to adultery44 and 
even employing the skills of special investigators.45 The Act, despite being largely a 
procedural reform, was nonetheless a profound change. The move reflects a vital 
transition from the previously religious-legislative dominated process. Importantly, 
one can highlight both the strong socio-economic motivations behind the Act and the 
retention of elements of the previous phases, such as adversarial techniques, claims 
against co-respondents and investigatory practices. The socio-economic elements are 	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clearly evident with regard to the cost of a divorce and its accessibility. As mentioned 
previously, a Parliamentary divorce was essentially reserved for the elite. By 
judicialising the process, the economic requirements were lowered,46 widening social 
access to divorce to those outside of the aristocratic elite. However, it was not 
‘divorce for all’; as mentioned, there were differences with regard to gender, 
restricting petitions and perhaps exacerbating prevalent economic differences between 
the sexes, meanwhile, obtaining a divorce still had a significant cost, and as noted by 
Phillips, in a sample by the London Times between 1860 and 1919, working men only 
accounted for one sixth of divorces.47 Whilst the process was drastically altered, the 
retention of the ecclesiastical courts techniques would appear to reinforce religious 
principles.   
 
Summarily, the differential treatment within the Act, in regards to petitions by the 
husband and wife, such as requiring that a wife combine an adultery petition with 
evidence of desertion, cruelty, incest, rape, sodomy or bestiality, led to increasing 
pressure for reform.48 This was combined with the fact that the majority of the 
population still found the cost of the process inaccessible.49 However, this pressure 
was, as Stone noted: 
 
‘hampered by a series of accidents and miscalculations, bitter divisions in 
public opinion, suspicion or downright hostility by many women’s 
organizations, direct opposition by the clergy of the Church of England, and 
the lack of full support by any political party’.50 
 
Three separate unsuccessful reform attempts occurred prior to any substantial 
improvement to the law,51 namely, the Hunter Bill, the Russell Bill and the Gorell 
Commission. These are of note, as the pursuit of change naturally built up political 
pressure on the subject.  
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Dr Hunter stimulated the first reform attempt in 1892, introducing a Bill into 
Parliament to alter the grounds for divorce. His reasoning seemed to resurrect that of 
the 1853 Royal Commission, arguing ‘that intermarriage between the English and the 
Scots was so common that it would be sensible for the law of the two countries to be 
the same’.52 As Scottish law allowed for divorce for either spouse for adultery or 
desertion, this would have aligned the law in England and Wales as such, thereby 
removing gender-based discrimination. Hunter went on to highlight that this had not 
increased the rate of divorce in Scotland.53 However, he failed to convince Parliament 
that they would not be endorsing collusive divorce by consent. Subsequently the Act 
was not passed.54  
 
The second attempt was launched by the Second Earl Russell, who introduced a Bill 
into the House of Lords in 1902. The Bill made allowances for divorce to either 
spouse for adultery, cruelty, living apart for three years, living apart for one year with 
consent, sentence of penal servitude of three years or longer and incurable insanity.55 
It also aimed to make divorce more accessible for those with an income of less than 
£500, allowing these divorces to be tried in a county court.56 The Bill failed twice, 
arguably due to Earl Russell’s personal interest.57 Famously the Earl, his wife and her 
mother, had been involved in numerous legal disputes, culminating in the Earl’s 
imprisonment for bigamy.58   
 
A third attempt was launched by Sir John Barnes, the country’s senior divorce judge, 
an advocate of reform, who denounced the law as ‘full of inconsistencies, anomalies, 
and inequalities amounting almost to absurdities’.59 Following the election of the 
Liberals in 1906, Barnes, now Lord Gorell,60 stimulated the appointment of a Royal 
Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in 1909. However, the Commission 
failed to achieve consensus on religious and social matters.  	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The majority, led by Lord Gorell, put forward three points. Firstly, they passionately 
argued that there should be equal access to divorce, stating: 
 
‘We can conceive nothing more likely to produce a sense of injustice and 
hardship, nor more calculated to bring the law into contempt among the 
people, nothing more inimical to the morality and the best interests of the 
country than that a system of judicature should remain unaltered which affords 
opportunity of redress to those who possess the means to use it, but by reason 
merely of cost and inconvenience, denies it to those who… have less means of 
escape therefrom, without recourse to law, than their richer brethren’.61  
 
Secondly they proposed that ‘divorce should be regarded as merely a legal mopping-
up operation after the spiritual death of a marriage’.62 This was a pioneering concept 
at the time as it displayed a separation between the religious and legal conclusion to a 
marriage.  Thirdly, they asserted that ‘there is no necessary correlation between the 
number of divorces and the level of sexual immorality’.63 They proceeded to argue 
that marriage should be dissoluble on grounds of adultery and where there has been 
‘other grave causes’,64 such as desertion for three years, cruelty, incurable insanity 
after five years confinement, habitual and incurable drunkenness, and imprisonment 
under a commuted death sentence.65  
 
In contrast, the minority, which included Cosmo Lang, who was, at the time,66 the 
Archbishop of York, ‘seized on the absence from the Majority Report of any 
underlying principle which could justify the changes the majority recommended’.67 
The minority had two main arguments. Initially they believed that ‘any extension of 
the causes for divorce beyond female adultery was against the express words of 
Christ’.68 They further argued that the proposals would: 	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‘create a habit of mind… [which] would lead the nation to a downward incline 
on which it would be vain to expect to be able to stop half way. It is idle to 
imagine that in a matter where great forces of human passion must always be 
pressing with all their might against whatever barriers are set up, those barriers 
can be permanently maintained in a position arbitrarily chosen, with no better 
reason to support them than the supposed condition of public opinion at the 
moment of their erection’  
 
In hindsight, given the transformative reforms to divorce law over the past half 
century, the latter statement was extremely insightful, especially as Lang was the 
leader of the minority. Evidently, one can identify clear areas of tensions within the 
Gorell Commission. Most prominent are the arguments concerning the socio-
economic impact of divorce and sanctity of marriage.   
 
In regards to reform, Cretney notes that the fact that the Commission was divided 
‘furnished the Government with more than adequate grounds for refusing to introduce 
legislation’.69 At this point the history of the Commission transforms into a tragedy. 
Lord Gorell died in 1913, allegedly due to ‘the strain of presiding over the 
Commission’.70 His son, the Second Lord Gorell, introduced a Bill, but withdrew it 
due to pressure caused by Baron Braye, a Roman Catholic, who threatened to initiate 
wrecking amendment.71  
 
After the Great War, reform was to be found in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1923, 
sponsored by Lord Buckmaster, to allow a wife ‘equal footing’72 by allowing her to 
petition, solely, under the matrimonial offence of adultery without the need to evince 
an aggravating factor. However, as Probert highlighted, the motivation for reform 
went beyond providing equality. The double standards of the law meant it ‘was 
riddled with contradictions’.73 A specific issue concerned judicial interpretation. 
Probert argued that the success rates for husbands and wives petitions were ‘virtually 	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identical’,74 demonstrating that extensive levels of judicial interpretation were 
required to allow for the fact that a wife had to demonstrate aggravating factors. One 
may add to Probert’s analysis by questioning petition rates, asking whether the initial 
rate would be affected by the additional requirements placed upon a petitioning wife, 
refocusing the question back upon equality. Yet, despite this observation, there is a 
strong argument for the belief that equality was not the only motivation for reform.  
 
The reform movement continued with the enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1937, which allowed either spouse to petition on the grounds that the other party had 
committed adultery, deserted the petitioner for three years, treated the petitioner with 
cruelty or was incurably of unsound mind. 75  
 
The key points of the Act were the introduction of the provisions for desertion, cruelty 
and unsound mind. This was a development on the previous law, which focused 
solely on adultery. Sir Alan Herbert, the main proponent of the Act, had several 
motivations.  In the preamble of the Act it was stated that the Bill was: 
 
‘expedient for the true support of marriage, the protection of children, the 
removal of hardship, the reduction of illicit unions and unseemly litigation, the 
relief of conscience among the clergy, and the restoration of due respect for 
the law’.76  
 
During the passage of the Act, Herbert combined the rational argument that there 
were ongoing significant levels of collusion,77 with the compassionate argument that 
the law should facilitate a ‘humane and honest divorce’.78 Indeed his approach was so 
striking that Redmayne titles her article on the Act ‘The Matrimonial Causes Act 
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1937: A Lesson in the Art of Compromise’.79 Through these arguments he aimed to 
convince the neutrals and pacify his opposition, which included groups such as the 
Mothers’ Union, the Anglican Parish clergy and MPs with significant levels of 
Catholic constituents. In contrast to the Gorell Commission, Cosmo Lang, now the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, and William Temple, the Archbishop of York, retained a 
neutral stance, dividing the Anglican Church.80 This is pertinent with regard to the 
concept of what a modern divorce could entail. The following chapters will query 
whether modern divorce law should still be based on this compromise. Do both sides 
of the argument retain enough merit to warrant a compromise? Beyond Herbert’s 
political endeavours, it is also clear that there was growing social pressure for change; 
as Redmayne notes, society had evolved, women’s roles were changing, granting 
them more financial independence along with attitudes towards sex, marriage and 
birth control.81 So perhaps it is fair to argue that Herbert facilitated a compromise, 
which was further encouraged by changing social attitudes.  
 
With this in mind, one may highlight the numerous influences that went into the 
formation of the Act. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Herbert’s approach, from 
the modern perspective, is the concept that divorce law should facilitate a humane and 
honest process, introducing the notion of conciliation.82 Whilst Herbert’s model of 
conciliation was more in line with the modern day conception of reconciliation,83 the 
belief that divorce law could have alternative aims, and conceivably counteractive 
ones, is relevant to the current law and attempted reforms.84 This is also particularly 
appropriate to this thesis, as it demonstrates the shift in priorities between sanctity of 
marriage and providing a humane divorce. Furthermore, it shows the growing 
complexity of the motivations behind divorce law - an important theme for the thesis 
which is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.  
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The concept of conciliation was again targeted in 1937 by the Report of the 
Departmental Committee on the Social Services in Courts of Summary Jurisdiction.85 
The Committee argued that the role of conciliation/reconciliation was not a role for 
the courts.86 In turn this focused the debate on to informal methods of encouraging 
conciliation/reconciliation.87 The informal method received patronage from both the 
1947 Denning Report,88 which argued ‘reconciliation [procedures] should be 
attempted in every case where there is a prospect of success’,89 and the Morton 
Report,90 which advocated the expansion of skilled counselling to aid reconciliation.91  
 
The Morton Report, officially known as the Royal Commission on Marriage and 
Divorce,92 was a significant investigation and the third Royal Commission concerning 
divorce in a century. Its formation was motivated as a response to Eirene White’s 
introduction of a reform Bill,93 which would have allowed a husband or wife to 
divorce, provided they had lived apart for seven years, and had no prospect of 
reconciliation.94 The Commission’s objective was to inquire into the law and matters 
affecting relations between husband and wife and to consider whether any changes 
should be made to the law or administration.95 The remit of the Commission is 
significantly outside this thesis’ research topic, as it considered the law relating to 
property rights and marriage. However, it is noteworthy as it concerns divorce.96  
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The Report was of colossal proportions, taking four years to prepare and totalling 417 
pages. In short, whilst it covered ‘a considerable variety of topics and [dealt] 
extensively with a large number of technical problems’,97 it did not suggest any far 
reaching reforms to the law. Stetson identifies this result as a symptom of its 
‘apparent failure to understand the changes in marriage and family life in the last 
century’,98 highlighting that it was frequently ‘callous and strict’99 and had the modus 
operandi that ‘marriage should be monogamous and for life and that its mission was 
to strengthen marriage’.100 Given the above discussion on society’s evolution with 
regard to the Herbert Act, this was a surprisingly narrow minded approach. However, 
it would seem that like Herbert, the Morton Commission were balancing differing 
interests, of which the most powerful opponent to change was the Church of 
England.101 Therefore, like with the Herbert Act, one may ask is this balance still 
necessary?  
 
With regard to substantive reforms, the Commission concluded that ‘we are, with one 
exception, all agreed that the present law based on the doctrine of the matrimonial 
offence should be retained.’102 However, the Commission was divided upon whether 
an additional ground based on irretrievable breakdown should be introduced.103 Those 
against the introduction of the ground felt it would gravely detriment the well being of 
the Community.104 Therefore, rather like the Gorell Commission before it, the Morton 
Report produced a stalemate. It is notable that this equilibrium was reached, not due 
to religious concerns as in the Gorell Commission, but socio-economic ones. Indeed, 
whilst the Commission states that that it had considered evidence from religious 
institutions,105 it was primarily concerned with the profound impact divorce has upon 
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the ‘well being of the community and the happiness or misery of many of its 
members’.106 
 
Overall, there is evidence to support the argument that during the evolution of divorce 
law, there were fluctuations within the emphasis given to certain arguments. Of note 
is the emergence of both socio-economic and humane concerns to temper the weight 
granted to the sanctity of marriage. This is particularly evident within the judicial 
phase and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, 1923 and 1937. Of these, the socio-
economic elements of the 1857 and 1937 Acts stand out, equally so does the humane 
focus of the 1937 Act and the following Morton Commission. It would seem clear 
that the sanctity of marriage was by the 19th century no longer the sole focus of the 
law, however, it would appear fair to conclude that the role of the Church of England 
was still prominent with regard to reform. This is evident within the Gorell 
Commission, the creation of the Herbert Act and the Morton Commission. As 
mentioned above, this poses the question – should this balance still exist in a modern 
divorce and what would be the merits of abandoning it?   
 
3. The Current Divorce Law 
 
The modern law on divorce was created by the Divorce Reform Act 1969 and then 
consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which governs divorce today. 
Within the Acts one can clearly identify a divide between protecting the sanctity of 
marriage and providing a humane system. This is evident both in the reform process 
prior to the enactments and their provisions.  
 
The motivation for the introduction of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 is generally 
linked to the 1966 Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury who, after appointing a 
committee, published ‘Putting Asunder’.107 This favoured the removal of the concept 
of ‘matrimonial offence’, instead focussing on ‘irretrievable breakdown’.108 It 
suggested that there should be an inquest into the breakdown of the marriage and, as 	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an analogy, compared the proposed system to a ‘coroners investigation’.109  This 
stimulated the newly created Law Commission to issue a Report titled ‘Reform of the 
Grounds of Divorce: The Field of Choice’, which argued that the law should aim: 
 
“(i) To buttress, rather than to undermine, the stability of marriage; and  
(ii) When regrettably, a marriage has irretrievably broken down, to enable the 
empty legal shell to be destroyed with the maximum fairness, and the 
minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation.”110 
 
The Law Commission went on to suggest that a petition should be granted on the 
proof of a period of separation.111 The two bodies are evidently approaching the 
question of divorce from differing perspective. Whilst both retain clear religious 
elements, the Law Commission placing buttressing the stability of marriage as its first 
aim and Putting Asunder requiring a ‘coroners investigation’, it would appear that the 
latter is more concerned with protecting marriages. This was highlighted by the Law 
Commission which, in contrast to ‘Putting Asunder’, argued that the: 
 
‘basic weakness… of the proposals [of Putting Asunder]… is that they call for 
an elaborate, time-consuming and expensive investigation to satisfy the court 
that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The realities of the situation 
are that unless the marriage has broken down the parties would not be before 
the court’.112  
 
It was agreed, between the Law Commission and the Archbishops committee that 
breakdown should be the sole ground for divorce and that this should be inferred from 
establishing one of five facts. The result of this was the Divorce Reform Act 1969. In 
accordance with the earlier focus of the current chapter and as a statement of the 
modern law and with a view to conceptualising a modern divorce in the following 
chapters, one may immediately highlight the split within the Act, between the sanctity 
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of marriage and a humane divorce. The sanctity of marriage was given priority as the 
first aim of the law over the second objective – a humane divorce.  
 
The Act outlines that divorce shall be granted, only after the expiration of three year 
of marriage – subsequently amended to one year,113 on the sole ground of 
‘irretrievable breakdown’.114 This is demonstrated by one of the five aforementioned 
facts being established by the petitioner - adultery,115 unreasonable behaviour,116 
desertion,117 two years separation with the respondent’s consent118 and five years 
separation without the respondent’s consent.119 The initial three facts are fault based; 
the latter two are not. The procedure outlined dictates that the court has a duty to 
enquire into the facts alleged by the petitioner,120 and that if it is satisfied, the court 
should then grant a divorce.121 This should take the form, initially, of a decree nisi 
and then,122 after a period of six weeks,123 a decree absolute.124 However, it is open to 
the High Court to fix a shorter time frame.125 The judiciary, under section 10, may 
refuse a decree absolute if the parties fail to comply with a religious divorce126 or if 
financial situations are not adequate.127 The facts above are built upon in section 2 of 
the Act. 
 
3.1. A Critique of the Current Law 
 
The statutory framework outlined above does not represent the majority of divorce 
cases.128 In 1973, the Conservative Government introduced an administrative process 
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ironically named the ‘special procedure’129 – it is, in fact, far from ‘special’, given 
that it is now used in over 98% of cases.130 Summarily, the Labour Government 
expanded this to all undefended divorce petitions in 1976. The special procedure is a 
process whereby the parties can petition for divorce, either on their own or through a 
solicitor, without a court process - aside from a collective mention in court at the end 
of the procedure. If the petition is defended, then the case may go to court, if it is not, 
then it will avoid a court process. Either way the initial procedure is still 
administrative; however, it may or may not enter the courts. The process itself is 
described in greater depth below, however, initially one can highlight the turn from a 
judicial process to an administrative model.  
 
There are several facets of the current legislation that contribute towards this thesis. 
Initially, one may highlight the division between the sanctity of marriage and 
providing a humane divorce process. This division is evident broadly with regard to 
the fault factors and the tests required to fulfil them; the fault facts themselves can be 
seen as an attempt to guard marriage. Meanwhile, the Act’s initial requirement that 
the marriage be at least one year old can also be seen as a protection. As Freeman 
stated ‘is it necessary? Does it really prevent ill-considered marriages and hasty and 
ill-thought out exits therefrom? If not, why not?’131 More specific protections can be 
identified within the statute itself both within the fault and no-fault provisions.  
 
Section 1(2)(a) concerning adultery was relied upon in 16% of cases in 2009.132 
Section 2(1) places a time limit of six months on the use of paragraph (a) where ‘it 
became known to him that the other had committed that adultery, the parties have 
lived with each other for a period exceeding, or periods together exceeding six 
months’. Initially one can highlight a restrictive time period, which can be seen as 
protecting marriage. The procedural bar also requires that the parties are living with 
each other, which would seem to be an irrelevant requirement. How would living 
together affect the fact that adultery has been committed? It would not, however, it 
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would implicate that the marriage may have been reconciled, acting as a further 
safeguard of the marriage.   
  
Section 1(2)(b) states that breakdown may be demonstrated if ‘the respondent has 
behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with 
the respondent’. Unreasonable behaviour is the most commonly relied upon fact, 
being the basis of 48% of cases in 2009.133 Like section 2(1), section 2(3) stipulates 
on issues relating to time, stating that that if the parties have lived together for a 
period of, or culminating in, six months, the fact that they have done so will be 
disregarded. Once more, this may be seen as a method of protecting marriage. 
 
The 1973 Act details the fact of ‘desertion’ in section 1(2)(c) as ‘the respondent has 
deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at least two years immediately 
preceding the presentation of the petition’. Desertion is the least used fact, with only 
435 cases being based on it in 2009.134 Section 2(5) outlines that the court shall not 
take into account any one period, not exceeding six months, or numerous periods not 
collectively exceeding six months. Again, this has the same safeguarding effect.  
 
With regard to the no-fault provisions, one may highlight the varying time periods as 
protective instruments. Section 1(2)(d) outlines that irretrievable breakdown can be 
demonstrated if ‘the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of 
at least two years immediately proceeding the presentation of the petition… and the 
respondent consents to the decree being granted’. Section 2(7) provides that the 
respondent must consent to the petition.135 Meanwhile, section 2(6) states that they 
shall be treated as ‘living apart unless they are living with each other in the same 
household’. The courts, in the case of Mouncer v Mouncer,136 required a clear 
separation, arguing that by sharing some domestic responsibilities and meals, the 
question of separation was blurred.137 Clarity can perhaps be found in the case of 
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Hollens v Hollens,138 where a separate household was found, given that the parties 
had not spoken, eaten or slept together for the period, demonstrating that one can live 
under the same roof and have a ‘separation of households’. This was further qualified 
in Santos v Santos,139 where the parties had never lived together, requiring the court to 
take a more holistic view of the term focusing on the minds of the parties. As a result 
the courts may look to both physical and mental elements. It must be questioned, at 
this point, whether the strict interpretation of paragraph (d) is still relevant today. 
With the rising cost of house prices and rent, combined with the economic 
disadvantages of divorce, it is very difficult for potential divorcees to ‘live apart’. 
What is more, the ‘admirable’140 efforts of the parties in Mouncer – living together to 
care for their child – should surely be prioritised in a society where single parents and 
absent parents are regularly criticised for social problems.141 This comment is 
strengthened by the fact that paragraph (d) was used in 25% of cases in 2009 and 
remains the second most popular fact to rely on.142 Given the practical problems and 
ramifications of the provisions designed to protect marriage within the fact, which 
will be analysed in greater detail in the coming chapters, combined with the facts 
popularity, one may heavily the question the necessity of the provisions. 
 
Lastly, irretrievable breakdown can be demonstrated via section 1(2)(e) where ‘the 
parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of at least five years 
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition’. Therefore, this paragraph 
does not require affirmative ‘consent’, as in paragraph (d). Yet, this is, like paragraph 
(d), subject to section 2 (6), thereby, the comments in relation to the related case law 
above are equally relevant. When the Divorce Reform Act 1969 was being passed, 
Lady Summerskill labelled the Bill a ‘Casanova’s Charter’,143 voicing fears over the 
final fact forcing a divorce upon parties. Given that the percentage of cases that relied 
upon paragraph (e) in 2009 was only 10%, their fears seem to have failed to 
materialize.144 However, despite this, protections were offered, as paragraph (e) is 
also subject to section 5, which allows a respondent to oppose the decree on the basis 	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of the divorce resulting in ‘grave financial or other hardship to him and that it would 
in all the circumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage’.145 Whilst the fact is 
relatively unpopular, the requirement to wait five years is a serious factor to consider.  
It is clearly aimed towards protecting marriage and may have adverse affects upon 
individuals. This will be analysed at length in the coming chapters.   
 
Evidently there are numerous statutory provisions that seek, at the expense of 
providing a divorce, the protection of the marriage. The impact and justification of the 
use of fault and the provisions surrounding them will be investigated in the following 
chapters.    
 
4. The Special Procedure – The Administrative Phase 
 
The chapter shall now detail the reasoning behind the introduction of the special 
procedure, before moving on to explicate the procedural steps.  
 
4.1 The Impetus behind the Special Procedure  
 
Two main forces influenced this ‘fundamental change’.146 Firstly, a report by Elston, 
Fuller and Murch147 highlighted the shortcomings of the aforementioned undefended 
divorce hearings.148 These included administrative problems such as: questioning the 
overuse of the county courts;149 the minimal benefits of an adversarial procedure in 
undefended divorces;150 and the lack of practical benefits of court hearings, especially 
when 85% of them lasted less than ten minutes.151 Meanwhile, from the perspective of 
the divorcees, Elston et al demonstrated that the procedure frequently made them feel 
embarrassed and nervous.152 One petitioner went so far as to describe the court scene 
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as a ‘Gilbert and Sullivan comic opera’.153 Given the second aim of the Law 
Commission in 1966 was ‘to enable the empty legal shell to be destroyed with the 
maximum fairness, and the minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation’, it would 
seem illogical to continue such a impractical and damaging divorce model at the 
expense of the second aim. This was an interesting development with regard to the 
dichotomy between the two aims – protecting the sanctity of marriage and providing a 
humane divorce process. Evidently, the Government at the time felt that protecting 
marriage at the expense of a humane process was not the correct approach.   
 
Secondly, the ‘burdensome’154 cost of Legal Aid was, like it is today,155 a driving 
force in regards to reform. The introduction of the ‘special procedure’ allowed the 
Government to cut Legal Aid for undefended divorce petitions. However, as Freeman 
predicted,156 the cost of the ancillary proceedings meant that the savings were never 
made, as the ‘savings in connection with the process of dissolution were outweighed 
by greatly increased expenditure in dealing with financial disputes’157 which were still 
covered by Legal Aid.158 Again, one may highlight economic concerns influencing 
divorce reform. This has been a consistent theme since the introduction of a judicial 
process. Naturally the area has changed to a degree; in 1857 it was the cost to the 
individuals applying for the divorce, in 1973, it was the cost to the Government.  
 
Incidentally, the Special Procedure’s introduction also made divorce more fiscally 
accessible for the entire population, reducing the cost of a divorce from the rough 
figures of £100 to £12.159 Therefore, it had the added benefit of being a more suitable 
process in many instances, whilst also pertaining a more reasonable cost.   
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4.2. The Special Procedure – The Process  
 
The procedure itself is non-specifically outlined in Part 5 of the Family Procedure 
Rules 2010, which sets out that ‘subject to rule 14.10(2) and (3), the forms referred to 
in a practice direction, shall be used in the cases to which they apply’.160 Practice 
Direction 5A outlines the relevant forms to carry out a divorce petition. This chapter 
will now illustrate this process.  
 
When forming a petition, all petitioners must initially complete Form D8. The form 
requires details of the marriage, petitioner, respondent and any children. Beyond this 
it allows the petitioner to list any particulars such as allegations of adultery, 
unreasonable behaviour and desertion. Attached to the D8 Form is a ‘prayer’. The 
prayer of the petition is a ‘request to the court’. This allows the petitioner to stipulate 
whether they are requesting a judicial separation, costs and ancillary relief. The courts 
provide guidance for the D8 Form.   
 
If the petitioner and respondent have children then a Statement of Arrangements for 
the Children - Form D8A - must also be filled in. The form outlines that: 
 
‘Before you issue a petition for divorce or dissolution try to reach agreement 
with your spouse/civil partner over the proposals for the children’s future. 
There is space for him/her to sign at the end of this form if agreement is 
reached’. 
 
The form requires the details of the children of both parties, other children of the 
family and children that have been born to either of the parties but are not treated as 
such. It then requires the arrangements for the children, such as where they live and 
their educational, childcare and maintenance needs.161 This must be submitted to the 
court with a marriage certificate and an administrative fee of £300.  
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Following this the court must give the respondent: notice of proceedings, a copy of 
the petition, the Statement of Arrangements for the Children and an 
Acknowledgement of Service – Form D10. Three events may then follow this. The 
respondent may ignore, contest or accept the petition. Meanwhile, they may amend 
the Statement of Arrangements for the Children or submit their own version. If they 
ignore the petition then the petition must be served on the respondent by a bailiff.  
 
If they contest the petition then the petitioner must wait 29 days. If the respondent 
continues with the defence of the petition then the proceedings may now follow the 
judicial route.162  
 
If it is not contested then the petitioner is able to apply for directions to trial. 98% of 
divorces are not contested.163 In these instances the court informs the petitioner with a 
notice of issue of petition – Form D9H. Following this the petitioner sends to the 
court an Application for Directions for Trial – Form D84. At the same time they must 
complete an Affidavit in Support of a Petition – Form D80. This demonstrates one of 
the five facts outlined in the section 2(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. There 
are five forms available: D80A, D80B, D80C, D80D, D80E. Each form reflecting its 
respective fact – adultery, unreasonable behaviour, desertion, two years separation 
with consent and five years separation without consent.   
 
Following this the petition is then put on the special procedure list. A judge then 
considers whether the documents are satisfactorily completed, whether there has been 
irretrievable breakdown and whether the Statement of Arrangements for the Children 
is satisfactory. The judge may then grant a decree nisi and the court will send a 
Certificate of Entitlement to a Decree, Form D84A. This outlines when the decree nisi 
will be pronounced. The court may request that the petitioner and respondent appear 
to answer minor questions. After the pronouncement of a decree nisi the petitioner 
must then wait six weeks and send a Notice of Application for Decree Nisi to be made 
Absolute, Form D36. Providing this, the courts will then grant a Decree Absolute and 
the marriage will be legally dissolved.  
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From a judicial perspective, Lord Waite, in Pounds v Pounds,164 gave an apt 
description of its workings: 
 
‘In routine cases… the registrar gives directions for trial by entering the cause 
in the special procedure list and thereafter considers the evidence filed by the 
petitioner. If he is satisfied… he will make and file a certificate to that 
effect…The actual process of pronouncement of the decree has become 
reduced to a very brief ceremony of a purely formal character in which 
decrees are listed together in batches for a collective mention in open court 
before a judge who speaks or nods his assent. The right to a decree absolute 
six weeks thereafter is automatic, on the application of either party.’165 
 
What is clear from the above description, both of the procedural process from the 
divorcees point of view and that of the judiciary, is that the process itself has become 
highly administrative. Arguably, a petition may still be contested, thereby retaining a 
link to the judicial model. However, as mentioned above, instances of a contested 
petition are extremely rare, only occurring in 2% of cases.166 It would seem therefore 
that, in practice, the process of gaining a petition has become an administrative one.  
Given this distortion of the law, this leads the thesis to ask in the following chapters 
what a modern divorce law could entail and whether an administrative process is 
appropriate.  
 
5. The Current Reforms 
 
Questions over the administrative nature of the current divorce process are 
particularly pertinent as, with the release of the interim findings of the Family Justice 
Review on the 31st March 2011 and the arrival of the Pre-Application Protocol for 
Mediation Information and Assessment Meetings in April 2011, the future of the 
divorce process was laid open to change.  
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Whilst the chapter will not engage in an analysis of the reform attempts, as this will 
be undertaken in the fourth chapter, an explanation of the workings of the reforms and 
reflections on their historical context is relevant to the foundations of the thesis.  
 
5.1. The Family Justice Review 2011 
 
Shortly following the release of the Protocol, the Family Justice Review, formed by 
the Labour Government in 2010, released its preliminary findings.167 The Review 
concerned numerous areas of Family Law, however, within Annex R it gave a short 
but significant focus to the reform of the procedure concerning a divorce petition.168 
 
The Report proposed that an individual or a couple, when considering a divorce, 
should go to an information hub or an ‘online divorce portal’,169 which would explain 
the process and possible grounds for divorce. The application may then be completed 
online either jointly or individually, allowing issues concerning children, finances and 
religion to be arranged.170  
 
The form will then be submitted to a processing centre along with identification and a 
fee.171 This will be received by an administrator who will check the application, 
acknowledge to the petitioner that they have done so and then serve the petition on the 
other party.172  
 
Like the current system the respondent may contest or accept the petition. If it is 
accepted and there are unresolved issues then the administrator will issue notice for 
divorce and direct the parties towards information concerning services to resolve 
issues.173  
 
If the petition is contested then ‘the processing officer will transfer the application to 
the applicants local court for judicial consideration. The judge will then examine the 	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case and determine whether the notice of divorce should be issued.’174 It is unclear 
from the Review what this properly entails. On plain reading it would seem to 
indicate that there would be no courtroom appearance. 
 
5.2. The Pre-Application Protocol for Mediation Information and Assessment 
Meetings 2011 
 
In Spring 2011 a Protocol for Mediation Information and Assessment was released.  
This supplemented the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and came into force on the 6th 
April 2011.  
 
The Protocol outlines that married couples who are considering a divorce will be 
expected to reflect on ‘whether the dispute may be capable of being resolved through 
mediation… [and] to have attended a Mediation Information and Assessment 
Meeting’.175 This is a necessary pre-condition to a petition for divorce. If the 
divorcees fail to do this they ‘may’ be referred by the court to a meeting with a 
mediator.176 The procedure for the Information and Assessment Meeting is outlined in 
Annex A of the Protocol. It provides that the applicant to family proceedings should 
contact a family mediator to arrange for a meeting.177 The details of the respondent 
are required and they are contacted to discuss willingness and availability to attend a 
meeting.178 The parties must then attend the meeting, either together or separately.179 
Public funding may be available; if it is not then the funding of the meeting is 
allocated to the party or parties.180 If the parties continue with the proceedings then a 
Family Mediation Information and Assessment Form must be completed and signed 
by the mediator.181  
 
Parties will be excused from attending the meeting only under circumstances listed in 
Annex C. These include situations where the mediator has determined that the case is 	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not suitable for mediation.182 It also includes circumstances where a party has made 
an allegation of domestic violence against another party,183 which has resulted in a 
police investigation, or if civil proceedings for protection have been issued within the 
past 12 months. Bankruptcy of one of the parties184 or if the situation is urgent will 
also suffice.185 An urgent situation is described as one where there is a risk to life, 
liberty or physical safety,186 or if any delay caused by attending the meeting would 
cause a risk of harm to a child, miscarriage of justice or unreasonable hardship.187  
 
5.3. The Current Reforms – A Historical Perspective  
 
The reforms are of note, with regard to a historical perspective, as they emphasise the 
administrative nature of the special procedure. What is more, they appear to have little 
to no relation to issues revolving around sanctity of marriage, whilst the 
administrative, and even digital, emphasis would appear to indicate support for socio-
economic considerations.  
 
However, this is partly based on speculation, the information given on the Family 
Justice Review was scarce and there was equally little justifications provided by the 
Pre-Application Protocol. What justifications were given shall be assessed within the 
final chapter, which considers what the aims of a modern divorce law could be. 
Nevertheless, on face value, it provides a stark comparison to previous reform 
attempts and a change of tone to the material discussed earlier.  
 
 6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined and analysed the evolution of divorce law within England 
and Wales up until present day. Its examination not only introduced the law as a 
foundation to the thesis, but also outlined the changes regarding the emphasis placed 
on divorce law – what its purpose was and has become. This shift in the aims of the 	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law is relative to the hypothesis as it demonstrates the origins, and limitations, of 
many of the arguments for the retention of the current law. 
 
Initially the chapter isolated the changing role of the sanctity of marriage within the 
construction of divorce laws. This can be seen as having an extraordinary level of 
protection up until the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857. On the facts, the inaccessibility 
of a Parliamentary divorce ensured that, until the Act was introduced, divorce was 
simply unattainable for the majority of the population. Indeed, the fact that only 325 
Parliamentary divorces ever took place over a 200-year period puts this in context.  
 
Once the 1857 Act had been introduced and as further reforms were enacted this 
protection was further reduced. Cosmo Lang’s statement, quoted at the beginning of 
the thesis, is extremely poignant. Essentially, he argued that once the floodgates were 
opened, public opinion would dictate divorce law. It would appear that Lang’s 
comments were too late, once the initial step towards widespread divorce had been 
taken, through the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, socio-economic and humane 
arguments became ever more relevant; as evidenced by the Dr Hunter’s Bill, Lord 
Russell’s attempted reform, the Gorell Commission, the Herbert Act 1937 and the 
Divorce Reform Act 1969. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapter with regard to the theoretical arguments concerning fault.   
 
This division is still evident within the current law, which encompasses numerous 
elements seeking to protect marriage, whilst also proffering the aim of reducing 
bitterness, distress and humiliation. As will be discussed in the following chapters, it 
is these inconsistencies within the law and the failure to simply focus on dissolution 
that produces a process that has opportunities to create unfairness, bitterness, distress 
and humiliation, whilst also doing so in economically inaccessible manner. 
 
Finally, by outlining the current reforms, it became apparent that the protections for 
sanctity of marriage may be further reduced if the suggestions of the Family Justice 
Review 2011 are followed, which would digitalise the current process, further 
emphasising its administrative nature.  
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Chapter 2. Fault  
 
Synopsis 
 
This chapter will outline the theoretical debates regarding fault within divorce law 
and provide two separate conclusions. Firstly, building upon the previous chapter, it 
will argue that the evolution of the law mirrors the changing strengths of the 
respective theoretical arguments concerning fault. Specifically, that the strength of 
the traditional arguments, concerned with the sanctity of marriage, has waned as 
society’s conception of marriage as a religious institution has altered. Secondly, it 
suggests that fault may have little theoretical justification within the modern day 
divorce. This will set the foundation for the third chapter, which will explore the 
attempted no-fault reforms, leading to the final chapter’s assessment of what the aims 
of a modern divorce law could now be.  
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1. Introduction.  
 
The previous chapter concluded that, during its evolution, the purpose of divorce law 
was clearly determined by two broad influences. Specifically, it isolated the 
motivations of protecting the sanctity of marriage and providing a humane divorce, 
which included making socio-economic considerations. It hypothesised that as 
divorce law has progressed the states’ incentive to protect the sanctity of marriage has 
diminished whilst socio-economic concerns have become more prominent. This 
chapter seeks to provide an analysis of these separate motivations, building upon the 
last chapter, whilst also going on to consider alternative arguments.  
 
The law has evolved from a purely fault based system into the current mixed fault and 
no-fault approach. Many of the arguments for restricting access to divorce link to 
fault, setting higher requirements to reduce the number of divorces. The chapter shall 
therefore provide an analysis of fault, linking it to numerous arguments by academics 
and politicians alike, who seek to alter divorce law to achieve certain objectives, such 
as the protection of marriage or for socio-economic, contractual, psychological or 
tort-based motivations. 
 
It will begin with an analysis of the traditional sanctity of marriage arguments, 
concluding that the contention is reliant upon society’s conception of marriage. As 
this has changed - marriage becoming progressively less of a religious institution - the 
strength of the argument has waned. Following this, the chapter shall investigate 
socio-economic concerns. It argues that restricting access to divorce is likely to be as 
if not more damaging, than a divorce itself. It then proceeds to assess contractual 
arguments, concluding that an analogy of a contract is misleading. With regard to 
psychological arguments in favour of the use of fault, it finds that whilst they have 
some merit, they would not justify the use of fault for all divorces. Finally, whilst 
assessing tort-based arguments, the thesis concludes that it would be difficult to 
justify using tort-based principles and that it would be exposed to practical 
limitations.   
  
Its conclusion, that the waning strength of certain arguments mirrors the development 
of the law and that fault-based divorce could be abandoned, is not a new one, being 
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reached by the Law Commission in 1988. However, the modern day analysis provides 
a new layer to the Law Commission’s work. This allows the thesis to move on to 
question no-fault reforms and whether the objectives of the current law have been met 
and what they could now be. 
 
2. Fault   
 
A purely fault based system requires that, for a divorce to be granted, one of the 
parties must have committed a ‘fault’, or what was originally known as a matrimonial 
offence. The concept of ‘fault’ is arguably narrow-minded; it does not focus on both 
parties or take a holistic approach to the end of the marriage. In England and Wales, 
this has always included adultery and, traditionally, a behaviour based element.188 The 
current law, outlined in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, contains three fault 
grounds, specifically, adultery, unreasonable behaviour and desertion.  
 
It is interesting to note the level of continuity, in regards to fault, in the evolution of 
divorce. Evidently, adultery has remained a common element. However, equally, it is 
possible to draw parallels between the concept of ‘unreasonable behaviour’ and 
‘cruelty’. Naturally, these are two very different forms of behaviour. As already 
underlined, there is no requirement to be morally blameworthy under the current 
law.189 Contrastingly, in an ecclesiastical divorce, morals were relevant; frequently 
cases turned into questions of good versus evil.190 Furthermore, the levels of 
behaviour deemed to be ‘cruel’ were much higher. An evident example being the case 
of Boteler v Boteler, where the courts took three years to give a ruling in a case where 
the husband had regularly fathered illegitimate children, and by default committed 
adultery, infected his wife with gonorrhoea, not once but twice, and assaulted her.191  
 
Whilst fault has always been a part of the divorce process in England and Wales, the 
justifications for this status quo are diverse. These can be divided into traditional, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 As discussed in the previous chapter, an ecclesiastical divorce provided for a divorce on 
the grounds of adultery, cruelty or heresy. 
189 Gollins v Gollins [1964] AC 644. 
190 L. Stone, Broken Lives – Separation and Divorce in England 1660-1857, (OUP, Oxford, 
1993) 36. 
191 ibid. 
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socio-economic, contractual, psychological and tort-based motivations. The chapter 
shall now analyse these - concluding that there exists little justification to maintain or 
expand upon the use of fault.  
 
3. Traditional Arguments 
 
The term ‘traditional’ refers to the emphasis and value placed upon the sanctity of 
marriage. It is rare to find a modern proponent of the traditional perspective with 
regard to divorce reform, however, it’s influence is, perhaps oddly, still recognisable 
within divorce law.192 Indeed it is easier to find other sources of ‘traditional’ 
viewpoints, within other areas of family law, such as with regard to same-sex 
marriage,193 Covenant Marriages194 and pre-nuptial agreements.195 Therefore, the 
dearth of academic commentary means this section of the chapter is reliant, largely, 
upon historical resources.  
 
The methods for supporting the traditional perspective have varied with each reform 
of divorce law. A simplistic explanation would be that the use of fault sets 
requirements of the couples, which if they are not met, will restrict a divorce petition. 
As mentioned above, this argument has been a relevant consideration within each 
attempt to reform the law. As will be discussed the traditional motivations behind 
divorce law are becoming increasingly irrelevant with regard to a modern divorce.   
 
Naturally, due to the religious elements of divorce, the evolution of the process has 
been severely affected by religious attitudes to marriage. The ecclesiastical courts 
were still a necessary part of the process until the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857. 
Despite the Reformation and the move toward the concept that a marriage was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Examples of supporters includes: R.M. Redman, ‘Marriage Should be the Traditional 
Protected Relationship, Not the New Concept of, “I’ll Love You Until You Get Ugly”’ (1987) 
10 Family Advocate 8; G. Grisez, Way of the Lord Jesus: Volume 1: Christian Moral 
Principles (Franciscan Herald Press 1983) 848. 
193 G.W. Dent, ‘The Defence of Traditional Marriage’ (1999) 15 Journal of Law and Policy 
581; G.W. Dent, ‘Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending’ (2003) 18 Brigham Young 
University Public Law Journal 419.  
194 H. Flory, ‘”I Promise to Love, Honor, Obey… and Not Divorce You”: Covenant Marriage 
and the Backlash Against No-Fault Divorce’ (2001) 34 Family Law Quarterly 133.  
195 The final sentence of Baroness Hale’s dissenting judgement in Radmacher v Granatino 
[2011] 1 AC 534 reads ‘marriage still counts for something in the law of this country and 
long may it continue to do so’.   
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dissoluble, the traditional arguments relating to divorce can be seen within each 
reform. Of note, the Royal Commission ‘to enquire into the law of divorce, and more 
particularly into the mode of obtaining divorces a vinculo matrimonii’,196 outlined 
that there was a ‘mysterious reverence of the nuptial tie’.197 It went on to recommend 
that dissolution should be allowed for adultery only on the basis of a high standard of 
proof.198 An example of this attitude can be found in the 1861 amendment to the Act, 
attempting to minimise cases of collusion, by providing the courts with wide 
inquisitorial powers.199 Interestingly this was a point of contest between the 
Archbishop’s Group and the Law Commission, as ‘Putting Asunder’ advocated an 
inquisitional approach, akin to a ‘coroners investigation’,200 whilst the Law 
Commission felt this would be ‘elaborate, time-consuming and expensive’.201  
 
In regards to later reforms, as mentioned earlier, the Gorell Commission was divided 
largely on religious grounds. Subsequently, the Church of England’s move to a 
neutral stance, in regards to reform, was then largely credited for the enactment of the 
Herbert Act. Famously, the Archbishop of Canterbury triggered the Divorce Reform 
Act 1969 by publishing ‘Putting Asunder’.202 The approach of the Archbishop’s 
Group was echoed by the Law Commission, who prioritised the first aim of the Act 
as: to buttress, rather than to undermine, the stability of marriage. Evidently, the role 
of the Church of England was crucial up until the introduction of the current law. 
 
This attitude continued and, in the attempted reform of the law, via the Family Law 
Act 1996, discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, the opening statement 
of the Government by Lord Mackay stated:   
 
‘I personally believe strongly in the value of the institution of marriage and I 
believe that it is a divinely appointed arrangement fundamental to the 
wellbeing of our community… Seeking to prevent the breakdown of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Home Office, Royal Commission to Enquire into the Law of Divorce, and more 
Particularly into the Mode of Obtaining Divorces a Vinculo Matrimonii  (Cmnd 1604, 1853). 
197 ibid 1. 
198 ibid 18-21. 
199 N 27, 178. 
200 N 107, 67. 
201 N 17. 
202 N 107. 
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marriages is an objective, which goes far beyond the scope of the law… I 
believe that a good divorce law will support the institution of marriage by 
seeking to lay out for parties a process by which they receive help to prevent a 
marriage being dissolved’203   
 
He then concluded with a passage from the Bible: 
 
‘when the Pharisees said to Jesus that Moses permitted a man to write a 
certificate of divorce and then to divorce his wife, Jesus replied that Moses 
permitted it because of their hardness of heart’204  
 
Given the discussion above, it is clear that religious elements have always played a 
strong part in divorce reform. Arguably this is a natural reality, a marriage is 
traditionally a religious concept and it would appear to be logical that a divorce would 
retain this religious link. Indeed, in Manby v Scott205 it was held that marriage was: 
 
‘A holy state…ordained by Almighty God in Paradise before the fall of man, 
signifying that mystical union which is between Christ and His Church’.206 
 
However, this requires marriage to be purely seen in a religious context, which as will 
be argued below, it may not always be construed as.  
 
Theoretically, the jurisprudence on this is convoluted. Lord Penzance, offered a 
classic description of marriage in Hyde v Hyde207 where he stated ‘marriage, as 
understood in Christendom, may… be defined as the voluntary union for life of one 
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others’. One can place emphasis on his 
use of Christendom. However, marriages are governed by law, through the Marriage 
Act 1949; its public element therefore cannot be denied. Meanwhile, it is possible to 
have a civil ceremony, removing the religious element to the marriage. Indeed, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Looking to the Future – Mediation and the Ground for 
Divorce (Stationary Office, 1993) iii. 
204 ibid v. 
205 Manby v Scott (1663) 1 Mod 124. 
206 ibid. 
207 Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 1 P&D. 
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2009, civil ceremonies accounted for 67% of all ceremonies, increasing from 62% in 
1999.208 It would seem reasonable to observe that the majority of marriages are seen 
not necessarily as religious, but as civil acts. Furthermore, the trend over the past ten 
years would seem to indicate that this attitude is becoming increasingly common.   
 
This conclusion highlights the main flaw of the traditional argument – that it is reliant 
upon the weight society places upon the religious elements of marriage. As societal 
conceptions of marriage turn from viewing it as a religious institution into a civil one, 
then the strength of the argument dramatically decreases. An important contextual 
point concerns the recently released Family Justice Review, which included no 
religious references.209 The panel itself is made up of a number of individuals, none of 
who have an official religious background, although some of them naturally may be 
religious.210 Meanwhile, the Interim Report makes no reference to religion in the 
context of divorce. Whilst this is an interim report, the lack of any religious 
background may indicate a move away from the traditional perspective. Given that 
the traditional argument has played a role in every reform, and attempted reform, of 
the law, including the Family Law Act 1996; this is an interesting development.   
 
It would seem that Lang’s statement, emphasised in the previous chapter, may be 
correct. The traditional argument is grounded in society’s conception of marriage as a 
religious institution. With this in mind, it would appear that any traditional argument 
offered in support of fault might lack strength, as it is reliant upon a changing social 
attitude, and one that is now becoming increasingly in the minority. 
 
4. Socio-Economic Arguments  
 
Socio-economic concerns relate to social and economic issues that emerge following 
a divorce. From a social perspective, the arguments may range from protecting social 
morals to protecting children of the marriage; meanwhile, from an economic 
perspective they can relate to the cost of the divorce itself and the economic impact of 
the separation. Like the traditional arguments, socio-economic contentions have also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 N 2. 
209 N 5.  
210 ibid. 
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been a consistent area of concern with regard to reform.211 The 1857 reform of 
divorce law was, as mentioned above, partially stimulated by the fiscal differences 
between the cost of a divorce in England and Scotland, £700-800 and £20-30 
respectively.212 This bias was also one of the inspirations behind Dr Hunter, Lord 
Russell and the Gorell Commission’s respective reform movements. Lord Gorell 
evocatively stated: 
 
‘We can conceive nothing more likely to produce a sense of injustice and 
hardship, nor more calculated to bring the law into contempt among the 
people, nothing more inimical to the morality and the best interests of the 
country than that a system of judicature should remain unaltered which affords 
opportunity of redress to those who possess the means to use it, but by reason 
merely of cost and inconvenience, denies it to those who… have less means of 
escape therefrom, without recourse to law, than their richer brethren’.213  
 
Indeed, socio-economic concerns continued into the current law, however, arguably it 
was now more focussed, not upon the disparity between the availability of divorce to 
the rich and poor, but to the socio-economic impact of divorce on the ‘“casualties” of 
the present system’214 - often economically weaker individuals, frequently the wife 
and any children.215 This turn has reflections of the traditional approach analysed 
above. Whilst they may be similar, in the sense that they want to restrict divorce 
through strict fault based laws, their motivations are very different.216 Primarily, one 
can highlight a moral thread that is distinct from religion, which runs through their 
arguments. Baroness Deech is strongly of the opinion that: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 S. Fitzgibbon, ‘Marriage and the Good of Obligation’ (2002) 47 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 41; J. Eekelaar and M. Maclean, ‘Marriage and the Moral Bases of Personal 
Relationships’ (2004) 31(4) Journal of Law and Society 510.  
212 N 3, 17. 
213 N 61, 61.  
214 L. Weitzman and M. Maclean, Economic Consequences of Divorce – The International 
Perspective (Clarendon Press 1992) 3. 
215 N 17, 20-26.  
216 R. Deech, Divorce Dissent: Dangers in Divorce Reform (Centre for Policy Studies 1994) 
20. 
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‘Over the last 40 years or so we have abandoned, in terms of 
approbation/disapprobation, law and categorisation, any pressure to conform 
to basic, long unchallenged tenets of private morality’.217  
 
This attitude was echoed by Fitzgibbon, who suggested, from a secular perspective, 
that the marriage connotes obligations.218 This, he argued, is fundamentally a good 
thing as it provides enduring personal and social benefits.219 Baroness Deech argued 
that the ‘reintroduction of fault, at least in maintenance proceedings, might send a 
message that behaviour in marriage is a serious issue’.220 Meanwhile, Baroness 
Young maintained:  
 
‘The message of no fault is clear. It is that breaking marriage vows, breaking 
civil contract, does not matter. It undermines individual responsibility. It is an 
attack upon decent behaviour and fidelity. It violates common sense and 
creates injustice for anyone who believes in guilt and innocence’.221  
 
Baroness Deech supplements this moral argument with a socio-economic perspective, 
arguing that divorce is harmful in numerous ways.222 She highlights the material costs 
of a divorce, claiming divorces cost within the wide figure of £20-40 billion a year.223 
Within her costs she lists Legal Aid, welfare, extra housing for single parents, the 
running of the courts and children’s extra needs.224 On top of this she outlines the 
impact on third parties such as children, highlighting harms to their education, 
psychological development and employment opportunities, whilst raising the 
probability of using drink and drugs, relationship breakdown and abuse.225  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 R. Deech, ‘Divorce – A Disaster?’ (2009) Family Law 1049. 
218 S. Fitzgibbon, ‘Marriage and the Good of Obligation’ (2002) 47 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 41. 
219 ibid 43. 
220 N 217, 1053. 
221 Baroness Young, HL Deb 29 February 1996, vol 569, col 1638. in J. Herring, Family Law, 
(4th edn, Longman 2009) 139. 
222 N 216, 12-13. 
223 N 217, 1053. 
224 ibid. 
225 ibid. 
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The concept that divorce is socially damaging is not new. This was one of the main 
messages of the Report of the Committee on Procedure in Matrimonial Causes.226 The 
Finer Report on one-parent families then reiterated this,227 highlighting that despite 
court-based reconciliation having ‘small success’,228 it was still a necessary policy. 
However, its second suggestion was to increase the use of conciliation procedures, 
which have ‘substantial success’.229 This point will be returned to subsequently. It 
would seem that, on face value, that there are strong arguments for restricting the 
divorce process to certain fault based circumstances. However, this may be a rather 
narrow minded approach - warranting an investigation into Fitzgibbon, Baroness 
Deech and Young’s private morality arguments. 
 
4.1. Theoretical Considerations 
 
There is a distinction between what is private and what is public morality. Baroness 
Deech’s belief that we should be encouraging people, privately, to act in a certain way 
is disputable on the basis that many in modern society derive their morality from 
individual agency.230 The counter-argument to this is that society does use the civil 
system to encourage private morals, via tort law for example. However, torts 
frequently mirror criminal actions, providing private, rather than criminal, remedies. 
An example of this would include assault and battery. Whilst some behaviour may be 
against civil or criminal law and qualify within the ‘unreasonable behaviour’ bracket, 
it is not a requirement. Neither is adultery illegal, perhaps thankfully, given the level 
of petitions submitted under the fact. The private morality argument pertains that 
married couples should be held to a standard that is neither against civil or criminal 
law. The potency of this is that, by refusing a divorce, the individuals may be 
significantly damaged.  
 
Further to this, Eekelaar and Maclean undertook an empirical analysis of Fitzgibbon’s 
argument. They investigated the reasons of 39 respondents as to why they married, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Home Office, Final Report of the Committee on Procedure in Matrimonial Causes (Cmnd 
7024, 1974) para 4.  
227 Home Office, Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families (Cmnd. 5629, 1974). 
228 ibid 185. 
229 ibid. 
230 E. Hasson, ‘Wedded to ‘Fault’: the Legal Regulation of Divorce and Relationship 
Breakdown’ (2006) 26(2) Legal Studies 278. 
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exploring the couples’ perceptions of responsibilities between each other and their 
perceptions of their own rights within the relationship.231 They concluded their 
research with the observation that ‘being married was consistent with a range of 
attitudes, both to marriage itself, and also to the relationship within it’.232 Given these 
range of attitudes, it would appear difficult to apply a general moral argument in 
favour of using fault law. One may therefore cast doubt upon assertions of private 
morality.    
 
Secondly, it assumes the seemingly condescending belief that people do not take 
marriage seriously. To take the decision to divorce is a life changing decision; surely 
the general presumption must be that is not undertaken lightly? Thirdly, significant 
private actions will always be relevant in issues such as residence where someone’s 
conduct, such as molestation, may lead to a different residence outcome.233  
 
4.2. Resulting Practical Considerations 
 
To advance a private morality argument is to inadvertently advocate courtroom 
divorces. Allowing undefended petitions to proceed without a court hearing may 
undermine any situation where the party is held to account for the fault. Although the 
publicly available fact that the divorce was granted on the basis of a party’s fault 
could be interpreted as being held to account. It also does not provide for a situation 
where the fault alleged can be investigated. From the above description of the special 
procedure and specifically Elston, Fuller and Murch’s work,234 these investigations 
were impractical, expensive and frequently damaging. Meanwhile, if the petition is 
defended then the respondent must have a chance to defend himself, or herself, fully.  
 
In regards to Baroness Deech’s economic arguments, several points can be made. The 
debate can initially be split into two – the economic and the social cost of the process. 
Concerning the price of the process, a practical point may be raised. If fault were to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 J. Eekelaar and M. Maclean, ‘Marriage and the Moral Bases of Personal Relationships’ 
(2004) 31(4) Journal of Law and Society 533-38. 
232 ibid 537. 
233 A. Bainham, ‘Men and Women Behaving Badly: Is Fault Dead in English Family Law’ 
(2001) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 219.  
234 N 147, 609. 
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be prioritised and made more relevant, then expenditure would increase, perhaps 
exponentially. It would require significantly more court time. A strong counter 
argument is that the cost of the divorce process, not the subsequent proceedings such 
as ancillary relief, would be substantially reduced by introducing divorce on demand, 
removing any judicial or legal expense. On the other hand, making the process 
inaccessible would reduce applications. However, these arguments raise questions 
over what the cost to the individuals would be, outside of the divorce process.  
 
It is important to appreciate the social cost of retaining or introducing a higher level of 
fault. There are two areas that require attention – the economic and personal impact of 
divorce. With regards to economics, the cost to the individual, outside of the divorce 
process, is unlikely to be reduced by prioritising fault. If the parties were to separate 
then their expenditure on housing, childcare, extra children’s needs and welfare could 
still be relevant. Indeed, they may actually be worse to individuals, as a single parent 
may not have maintenance support. The impact on individuals, personally, will be 
dealt with under ‘psychological’ impact.  
 
Overall it would seem that using fault-based laws to restrict access to divorce might 
increase the risk of causing higher economic and social costs. The justifications for 
doing so appear to be limited and are evidently debatable, as they may rely upon 
assumptions and conflate private and public morality arguments. Furthermore, it 
would seem that providing a process to match the theory would be impractical and 
likely to exacerbate any social or economic issues arising from a divorce.   
 
5. Contractual Arguments  
 
Linked to socio-economic and traditional arguments are contractual arguments.235 
These rely upon the concept that a marriage is a contract, warranting protections to 
uphold it.236 Broadly, it may be seen as a cross between the socio-economic and 
traditional points of view. A general example of this can be seen in Baroness Young’s 	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aforementioned statement that ‘the message of no fault is clear. It is that breaking 
marriage vows, breaking civil contract, does not matter’.237 
 
Rowthorn, a proponent of the contractual line of reasoning, has argued that ‘no-fault 
divorce has undermined the notion of marriage as a contract, thereby reducing the 
security offered by marriage and promoting opportunism by men’.238 From a similar 
perspective Brinig and Crafton have stated that without fault there is ‘no incentive 
other than a moral obligation or a feeling of affection to prevent either party from 
engaging in post-contractual opportunism’.239 This seems inline with the arguments 
proffered by Lady Summerskill, discussed earlier, that the fifth fact of the Divorce 
Reform Act - five years separation without consent - made the Act a Casanova’s 
Charter, leaving women exposed to financial hardship, allowing their husbands to 
leave them impoverished. Indeed Rowthorn goes on to state: 
 
‘When no-fault divorce has been introduced in Western countries, it has 
normally been imposed retroactively, without choice, on all couples who were 
married under the previous fault-based system. This sometimes caused severe 
hardship to individuals, especially women, who had lived their entire married 
lives with one set of expectations only to find their marital contract arbitrarily 
rewritten to their disadvantage by the state.’240 
 
In response it is submitted that, in regards to the gendered issue that Rowthorn raises, 
an interesting comparison exists with Ireland. Ireland reformed their divorce law in 
1996, allowing, for the first time, a court to dissolve a marriage contract, permitting 
the parties to remarry. Shannon highlights that there: 
 
‘was a fear prior to the referendum in Ireland that a large amount of men 
would be the first to make applications for decrees of divorce in an attempt to 
‘impoverish their spouses’. It is interesting to note that the latest statistics 
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show that women outnumber men by approximately two to one in bringing an 
application to divorce’.241 
 
Before commenting on this it is important to note that Ireland introduced no-fault 
divorce, evidenced by a separation period of at least four years within a five-year 
period. Whilst Ireland has significant social differences to England and Wales, for 
example a much higher Roman Catholic population, this would seem to reduce the 
gendered dimension of Rowthorn’s argument.   
 
Both Rowthorn and Brinig and Crafton’s arguments may be criticised with regard to 
their principles. As stated by Ellman and Lohr, with reference to Brinig and Crafton, 
although it is equally applicable to Rowthorn, their arguments depend ‘upon their 
particular definition of “opportunism” – a definition that follows from their particular 
vision of the terms of the marriage contract’.242 This line of inquiry is similar to that 
undertaken earlier in this chapter with regard to socio-economic arguments 
concerning private and public morality. It would appear that these commentators 
might be assuming that certain standards of private morality are the intentions of all 
parties to every marriage.243  
 
Typically the law has been uncomfortable importing normal contractual principles 
into relationships. Indeed, in Jones v Padavatton,244 it was held that whilst family 
members could enter legally binding contracts in regards to family affairs, there was a 
presumption against such intention. Furthermore, in Sutton v Mishcon de Reya245 a 
distinction was made between a contract for sexual relations and a contract between 
persons who were cohabiting in a relationship that involved such sexual relations. 
One of the strongest examples of the courts unwillingness to imply contractual 
principles into relationships can be found in Lord Justice Atkin’s judgement in 
Balfour v Balfour,246 where he stated: 
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‘to my mind those agreements, or many of them, do not result in contracts at 
all, and they do not result in contracts been though there may be what as 
between other parties would constitute consideration for the agreement’.  
 
However, he does go on to state, ‘they are not contracts, and they are not contracts 
because the parties did not intend that they should be attended by legal 
consequences’.247 Naturally in a marriage the parties do intend there to be legal 
consequences. Yet, this does not detract that ‘marital contracts’ must be viewed 
distinctly from traditional contracts as they are relationship based. The traditional 
vows state: 
 
‘I… take thee… for my wedded wife [or husband], to have and to hold, from 
this day forward, for better, for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in 
health, to love and to cherish, till death do us part’.248  
 
Whilst this is a wide definition, it does not account for a plethora of events, which 
may occur within a marriage, such as any subsequent children. This point is expanded 
upon by Fitzgibbon, who reasons that, beyond events such as childbirth, many marital 
‘obligations’ are not mentioned at the wedding,249 these include living with the 
spouse, supporting her materially or helping with babies.250 This argument links in 
with Dewar’s belief that as family law concerns love, social life and feeling, it should 
be ‘characterized as chaotic, contradictory or incoherent.’251 Perhaps the best answer 
is to consider Cohen’s comment that: 
 
‘Some might object to the characterization of marriage as a contract. They 
observe that marriage seems more like status than contract. That is, it is the 
state that defines and specifies most of the explicit rights, duties and privileges 
of marriage, rather than the parties. They also note the absence of substantial 
specific obligations voiced at the time of formation. How could this be a 	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contract if there are virtually no specific, explicit duties? These objections are 
not fatal to the concept of marriage as contract. They do no more than 
highlight the peculiarities of this contract’.252 
 
If one is determined to see a marriage as a contract, then it is most definitely a 
peculiar one. Given its distinctive nature, it would not be out of place for reforms in 
the law to be able to have a retroactive affect.  
 
From a different perspective, Fitzgibbon, mentioned above, has suggested that a 
contractual metaphor is too ‘narrow’ and does not cover the ‘entire story’,253 instead 
preferring the concept of a fiduciary relationship.254 Whilst this would appear to fit his 
model of matrimonial ‘obligations’,255 as has already been discussed with reference to 
Eekelaar and Macleans research, this may be casting a general assumption about 
which ‘obligations’ married couples should adhere to.256  
 
From a more social, but still contractual perspective, Cohen has proffered the view 
that during a marriage a woman loses her value as ‘young women are valued as mates 
by both old and young men’.257 This imbalance provides: 
 
‘the opportunity for strategic behaviour whereby one of the parties, generally 
the man, will perform his obligations under the marriage contract only so long 
as he is receiving a net positive marginal benefit and will breach the contract 
unless otherwise constrained once the marginal benefit falls below his 
opportunity cost’.258  
 
This argument seems to have a cynical edge, indeed, Cohen continues stating ‘the 
wife typically lacks the resources with which to bribe her husband to stay in the 	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marriage even if wished to do so’.259 This appears to take an overly pessimistic view 
of relationships, ignoring the strong emotional ties between married couples. 
However, it must be highlighted that Cohen is referring to ‘the opportunity’ to behave 
in a certain way, not making generalisations, although he seems close to doing so.  
 
It would seem that the argument for introducing fault on the basis of contractual 
motivations lacks foundations. It is overtly projecting contractual principles into an 
alien situation. The rigid concept of a contract is difficult to align within the broad 
definitions of a relationship, moreover the notion that failing to do so provides for 
opportunism equally ignores the individual conceptions of a relationship. Meanwhile, 
any contractual arguments based on social perspectives, as put forward by Cohen 
appear to overlook factors other than material benefits. Combined, this analysis may 
reduce the tenacity of contractual justifications for fault. 
 
6. Psychological Arguments 
 
The use of fault can have a profound personal impact upon individuals. The 
significance of divorce was a pertinent question in the 20th century, strongly 
evidenced by Herbert’s Act, which referenced providing a humane and honest 
divorce. Meanwhile this was evident within the focus of the Law Commission, in the 
creation of the current law, upon reducing bitterness, distress and humiliation; and in 
the creation of the failed Family Law Act 1996 – discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapters. The debate is not clear cut, whilst the aim of earlier reforms, such 
as the Herbert Act and the Divorce Reform Act 1969, were upon balancing different 
arguments relating to fault, it would seem that the debate has taken a new turn and is 
now polarised between two distinct arguments over the impact of fault-based divorce.    
 
On the one hand, it has been argued that fault can provide a strong psychological 
benefit, allowing the parties to apportion blame and move on. On the other hand, fault 
has been criticised for increasing bitterness, distress and humiliation.  The modern 
debate has therefore become one of potential damage against potential utility. The 
chapter initially queries whether there is a demand for fault from individuals, 	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questioning two separate surveys. It then moves on to analyse issues around the terms 
‘innocence’ and ‘blame’, before critiquing whether the law should seek to create a 
psychological benefit.  
 
Initially, it would seem astute to recognise that a harmonious divorce is not common, 
indeed, as Day Sclater notes, it is a rare find.260 Two individuals who have bound 
their lives together legally, and often through their children, religion and assets, have 
made the decision to separate. It is perhaps natural to expect there to be some form of 
conflict within this process. The question turns to the statements above, and whether a 
fault-based divorce can benefit or damage the divorcees psychologically. 
 
6.1 Is There A Demand For Fault? 
 
There are several arguments which support the concept that fault is beneficial. Davis 
and Murch, in their survey ‘Conciliation in Divorce’, which was undertaken between 
1982 and 1984,261 found that many respondents valued the fault element;262 and 
sought to allocate responsibility.263 Specifically, the survey found that 42% believed 
there was equal responsibility between the spouses for the breakdown, whilst 7% 
claimed responsibility and 46% attributed responsibility to their spouse.264  
 
Of note, is that the 46% regards situations where a spouse thought the other spouse 
was primarily or totally responsible. There is a wide difference between ‘primarily’ 
and ‘totally’. For example, a situation where a husband was not attentive, and then his 
wife committed adultery, could be interpreted as either ‘equally responsible’ or that 
the wife was ‘primarily’ to blame. It would seem to be a highly subjective area, 
casting doubt over the actual figure in regards to allocation of responsibility. 
Nonetheless, it is relevant enough to be an issue. Richard’s added to this view 
commenting that: 
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‘Blame, accusation, and strong feelings of injustice are the normal divorce and 
they get in the way of couples making reasonable arrangements about children 
and money. Neither legal fiction of the lack of fault or imposed orders do 
anything to relieve the situation, rather the reverse’.265 
 
In contrast to these findings the Law Commission public opinion survey, in 1990, 
found that 72% agreed ‘that it was good that anyone who wants a divorce can get one 
sooner or later’266 and that 71% ‘found the present five year period too long’,267 whilst 
83% agreed ‘that it was good that couples who did not want to put the blame on one 
of them did not have to do so’268 and finally 84% agreed that it was ‘good that one 
could begin proceedings immediately if the other had committed adultery or behaved 
intolerably’.269 Immediately, one can distinguish the two sets of statistics on the basis 
that Davis and Murch were questioning actual divorcees, whilst the Law Commission 
was simply taking account of public opinion. In this regard it is difficult to see the two 
sets of statistics in the same light, as the study groups would be likely to have 
different perspectives of the process. Meanwhile, the Law Commission statistics 
merely show that 83% of participants thought it was ‘good’ that couples did not have 
to allocate blame, if they did not want to do so. It would appear that these statistics do 
not depreciate the value that some of the participants, in the ‘Conciliation in Divorce’ 
study, placed in blame.   
 
Stemming from Davis and Murch’s work, three issues would seem to be of 
importance: the question of innocence, the necessity of adjudging guilt and the 
relevancy of a psychological benefit to divorce law.  
 
6.2 Innocence  
 
With regard to ‘innocence’, Davis and Murch commented that certain parties felt that 
they were ‘innocent’ and that this was aggravated by the fact that they then had the 	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responsibility of obtaining a divorce.270 Participants went on to argue that ‘if you lead 
a blameless marital life, you should be able to feel secure in your marital status’.271 
This seems to provide a schizophrenic message, advocating fault and concepts of 
‘innocence’ and ‘guilt’, yet also criticising the burden of the responsibility of having 
to obtain a fault based divorce. One can question what the full ramifications of this 
would be? Initially it would seem to advocate either a system whereby divorce would 
not be allowed ‘if you lead a blameless marital life’, or perhaps they are advocating a 
system based on joint consent. This is understandable, however, when looking at the 
evidence, Davis and Murch quote two respondents saying: 
 
‘She’s the guilty party and she’s got away without any trouble. It’s the one 
who has to take action and has all the trouble who has to suffer… [another 
respondent stated] I don’t think it’s fair that my husband’s had to do nothing 
and I’ve had to do everything. He’s the one who went. I’ve spent years on 
it.’272 
 
Given this, it would appear that Davis and Murch, whilst portraying this as an 
argument in favour of retaining fault, could have overlooked that it may actually be 
contrary to this. The respondent seems to be highlighting the straining procedural 
effort to attain a divorce. On a practical note, this seems to be a slight exaggeration of 
reality. The special procedure is, as noted above, straight forward. Furthermore, bar 
financial restraints, it is possible to hire a solicitor to carry it out, removing the 
inconvenience. Perhaps the burden of the procedure is therefore not decidedly 
cumbersome. Aside from this, one may posit the question – would another process be 
any different? Presumably the ‘innocent’ party would still seek a divorce in a no-fault 
system. If this is so, then the party would have to go through the administrative 
hurdles of this system too, albeit these may be slightly less difficult. In other words, 
the onus would still be on the ‘innocent’ party to obtain the divorce. This would seem, 
contrary to Davis and Murch’s statement, to be against a fault system. Overall the 
concept that parties could somehow apportion ‘innocence’ and ‘guilt’, whilst avoiding 
the procedural requirements of doing so, appears to be convoluted.  	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6.3. Blame 
 
This leads on to the question - should a divorce apportion blame? As mentioned 
above, there would seem to be some value to slightly under a majority of divorcees in 
apportioning blame. Day Scalter is firmly of the opinion that: 
 
‘the time has come to set aside pathologised images of the divorce process, 
and to recognise that the future psychological health of out society rests upon 
an acceptance of the reality of the darker side of human nature, of its hostile 
and destructive aspects, which co-exist with its finer and more ‘civilised’ 
parts.’273  
 
This statement is, in many regards, refreshing. It has echoes of Dewar’s logic - 
divorce is dealing with is the dissolution of a relationship and is likely to be 
emotional, with the potential to be hostile and destructive. However, it is also 
sweeping, leading one to question whether the use of fault would be relevant in all 
cases. As Elston, Fuller and Murch demonstrated, this did not seem to be the case 
when the judicial approach was applied to the current law, stimulating the 
introduction of the special procedure.274 Further to this, the Law Commission in 1990 
assessed the implications of the law on creating bitterness, distress and humiliation.275 
This assessment is dealt with in great detail in the following chapter. However, in sum 
the Law Commission found that the prevalence of fault-based claims, particularly 
under the grounds of behaviour, creates bitterness, distress and humiliation.276 This 
can be distinguished from adultery petitions, which tend to ‘carry less stigma and are 
more likely to involve agreement’.277 In contrast, the behaviour petitions may create 
hostility or exacerbate pre-existing antagonism between the parties.278  
 
It was put forward that a lack of fairness, which can be commonly found in fault-
based claims, results in bitterness, distress and humiliation, as the respondent ‘will 	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often resent the fact that he is being held responsible’.279 At the same time, the 
requirements for separation may also stimulate the parties to make ‘more damaging 
allegations’.280  
 
The Law Commission went on to outline the three possible types of recipients of a 
behaviour petition.281 These included a collaborating recipient,282 someone who 
received a petition ‘out of the blue’283 and, lastly, a party who was guilty of violence 
or serious misconduct.284 In each situation a behaviour-based petition was alleged to 
have created bitterness, distress and humiliation. In the first situation this was a result 
of encouraging the petitioner to ‘dwell on everything in the marriage and about the 
respondent which is bad and therefore to encourage a resentful and uncompromising 
attitude’.285 In the second situation it was argued that the respondent was ‘likely to 
react bitterly and antagonistically to the surprise petition’.286 Lastly, in the third 
situation, it was argued that the petition could ritualize hostility that had been present 
in the marriage.287  
 
Arguably it is the third type of petitioner – a party who was guilty of violence or 
serious misconduct – which is most relevant to Day Sclater’s argument. The other two 
types would seem to be irrelevant. Whilst there may be an argument for 
conceptualising the darker side of human nature, it would not appear necessary to do 
so across the board. Meanwhile, even if the third type of petitioner were engaged 
then, as the Law Commission highlighted, this may run the risk of ritualizing 
hostility.  
 
However, given this, one may question the practical ramifications of following this 
theoretical notion. For a court based system to investigate the question of blame, 
taking on the ‘coroners’ approach relied upon earlier, the parties would have to be 	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exposed to a considerable amount of court time. This is simply not fiscally or 
practically an option. Furthermore, any attempt to do so would likely only be a crude 
attempt to deal with the situation.   
 
6.4. Relevancy 
 
With regards to relevancy, one can pose the question – should divorce provide a 
psychological benefit? Should it have a therapeutic aim? The answer to this question 
depends on the interpretation of a ‘divorce’. As mentioned above, a divorce can be 
seen as a conflict prone legal situation, dealing with the legal separation of two 
individuals. If this interpretation is followed then there seems little reason to provide a 
therapeutic element. However, there is another view, encapsulated in Day Sclater’s 
statement: 
 
‘despite the emotional trauma which divorce can bring, the story is not 
altogether a pessimistic one; rather, divorce is not only about coming to terms 
with loss, but it is also about the positive rebuilding of a new post-divorce 
sense of self. This rebuilding process, however, involves revisiting and 
reinterpreting the past of the marriage from the vantage point of the present; 
this making sense of the past may be a pre-requisite for letting go and moving 
on.’288 
 
To believe that once a divorce is granted, that there are no psychological implications 
for the parties, is idealistic, verging on naïve. There are clearly economic issues, 
which are exacerbated and complicated by any relevant children, which may further 
aggravate issues in regards to custody. These issues are pertinent because they do not 
dissipate for considerable periods of time, for example, at least until a child matures 
into an adult. Ideally the psychological state of the parties would not impact upon 
these issues. However, frequently, this may not be the case. Given these implications, 
the dual approach, of looking at the dissolution of the marriage, and the consequences 
would seem to be logical.  
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The psychological impact of blame can be seen to have a mixed impact. It would 
appear logical to accept Day Sclater’s arguments that divorces can have darker 
elements to them and that they can be viewed in a more holistic fashion, with regard 
to rebuilding a new life. However, as an all encompassing argument for the use of 
fault and the apportioning of blame, it would seem ill suited, running the risk of 
increasing hostility. With regard to this, the above argument creates the impression 
that the ‘psychological’ argument could have sway in select circumstance. 
 
7. Tort-Based Arguments  
 
The belief that the legal system should pass judgment on the fault of one party is one 
that has been briefly discussed, however, it deserves significant attention. As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, within the development of the law, there has always 
been a strong emphasis upon fault and party misconduct. Indeed, this is particularly 
relevant in regards to ecclesiastical divorces, which stressed ‘good vs. evil’; and 
which were later compounded by the cases of ‘criminal conversation’.  
 
Tort-based arguments draw comparisons between the wider concept of divorce and 
tort; specifically this can be found in Perry’s work,289 which was further developed by 
Swisher.290 Perry summarises the debate, stating: 
 
‘Some have argued that no-fault divorce has hurt women economically, 
stripping them of bargaining power that put them in a stronger negotiating 
position under the system where proof of fault was required. While others 
contend that women are no worse off under no-fault that they were under the 
fault system, no one has argued that the economic interests of divorcing 
women are adequately protected under no-fault.’291  
 
Her central thesis is that if divorce is viewed as an ‘accident’, then ‘policies and 
analyses drawn from tort law can provide the theoretical basis… for an alimony 	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award’.292 The focus of this argument is based on economics. Swisher, building upon 
Perry’s work, adds a social agenda to the argument, stating that he seeks to: 
 
‘explore the ways in which fault-based factors, when applied to serious or 
egregious marital misconduct that significantly contributes to the marital 
breakdown, may still be utilized in order to bring about enhanced social, 
economic, and legal protection to spouses on divorce, while concurrently 
establishing a greater sense of responsibility and accountability in marital 
relationships.’293  
  
The economic focus of these arguments is the pertinent issue. It would seem that both 
Perry and Swisher may be conflating a divorce, overlooking the fact that a ‘divorce’ is 
many events, such as sending a petition and ancillary relief. This leaves them open to 
the criticism that they are advocating fault factors with regard to the economic 
consequences of divorce, whilst turning a blind eye to the actual divorce petition.294  
 
Perhaps the only interpretation of this conflation, which would allow it to work, 
would be if the petition were fault based. The following decision on the petition could 
then bear implications upon the economic consequences in a subsequent hearing. 
However, following Perry’s reasoning, the petition stage would have to be based on 
establishing whether or not there was an ‘accident’, rather than an investigation into 
the economic consequences of the parties’ actions. This would require a further 
analysis of the facts.  
 
The practical implications of this model seem strained. Initially, one can highlight that 
it would it require a considerable amount of court time. Not only would this have 
economic implications, but also it may be viewed negatively by the participants, as 
demonstrated by Elston, Fuller and Murch.  
 
Secondly, the arguments seem to be focussed on the behaviour of one spouse, 
however, this may be oversimplifying the problem, ignoring the role of the other 	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spouse. Given that, in the Conciliation in Divorce’ survey discussed above, 42% of 
participants considered they were equally responsible, and a further 46% said their 
spouse was primarily or totally responsible, it would appear difficult to accurately 
apportion blame, especially when there would be potential fiscal consequences within 
ancillary relief. It is also likely that this would result in an increase in the number of 
appeals, as it would significantly amplify opportunities for disagreement.  
 
Thirdly, one may question whether the participants in the above survey would have 
responded differently if the implications of their partner’s actions would have had a 
significant economic impact. How would this have affected their relationship? With 
regards to social and psychological issues, this may be particularly relevant in cases 
that may feature excessive conflict.  
 
Fourthly, it would appear to have manifest punitive elements, which may give distinct 
advantages to petitioners. To prioritise fault in this fashion, in effect, lends significant 
and perhaps undue power to one of the spouses. As Dewar notes, family law concerns 
emotions, relationships and love.295 Surely, part of relationships includes making 
mistakes. However, in this context, once a mistake has been made, if this were to be 
upheld in court, then knowledge of this precedent would give considerable power to 
the unoffending individual. As discussed above, the concept of unreasonable 
behaviour has large subjective elements. Resultantly, the interpretation of 
unreasonable behaviour would have to be fundamentally altered to accommodate for 
this, failing to do so would lead to the application of, potentially, economically 
harmful rulings, based on the subjective opinions of petitioners. Although, this seems 
to have been noted by Swisher, who makes frequent reference to ‘serious… 
misconduct’,296 implying a higher objective standard of behaviour. Nonetheless, this 
punitive aspect is difficult to align with family law. Allowing this element of fault 
would seem to target these fundamental factors.  
 
Ultimately, one must accept that to imply tort-based principles into divorce would be 
accompanied by a litany of problems, undermining its equitable motivations to 
provide economic and social balance. Whilst the law on divorce has strong 	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connections to fault in a tortious sense, it would seem to be out of place in modern 
society and manifestly impractical.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the select theoretical arguments analysed above, 
which favour retaining fault within divorce, may be limited. It analysed numerous 
theories relating to fault. These included traditional, socio-economic, contractual, 
psychological and tort-based theories. It found evidence to support the belief that the 
arguments may be wanting.  
 
Specifically it identified the waning influence of the traditional arguments relating to 
the sanctity of marriage. As an argument its reliance upon changing societal 
perceptions of marriage has steadily reduced it’s influence. This links with the 
findings of the previous chapter, explaining the declining role the sanctity of marriage 
has played within divorce law. Given this, it would appear that there is little evidence 
to support the use of fault on the basis of traditional justifications. The analysis 
undertaken seems to clash with current law, which places its first aim as buttressing 
the stability of marriage.  
 
With regard to socio-economic concerns, the chapter highlighted that the arguments 
in favour of using fault to provide socio-economic benefits may be conflating private 
and public morality arguments. Nevertheless, it was put forward that fault may 
actually increase the opportunities for negative socio-economic outcomes. It would 
appear that for the law to avoid creating opportunities for these negative outcomes, a 
no-fault model could be adopted.   
 
Related to both of the above concepts, contractual arguments were found wanting on 
the basis that family law is typically averse to imposing contracts and that practical 
limitations exist. As stated, it is difficult to impose the rigid confines of a traditional 
contract into a relationship, as many individuals may expect differing obligations. It 
would appear difficult to justify fault on a contractual basis.  
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Simultaneously, on the evidence discussed, there appeared to be both practical and 
theoretical limitations with regard to tort-based arguments. On the analysis 
undertaken, it seemed that tort-based arguments conflated a divorce petition with 
ancillary relief. To accommodate these tortious principles, the law would have to 
avoid subjective reasons for divorce and focus largely on objectivity. Meanwhile, it 
was raised that introducing fiscal results in such a fashion may further negatively 
impact upon the divorcees relationship. Therefore, there appeared little to justify the 
use of fault with regard to tortious principles.  
 
Lastly, the use of fault for psychological motivations was found, in some select 
circumstances, to provide a benefit. Specifically, where there had been serious 
misconduct or violence. However, when weighed against the majority of divorces, 
this would not merit the overall retention of fault, and in itself, may have some 
internal problems.    
 
It would seem that the arguments for fault are based on loose theoretical foundations, 
either due to a lack of social consensus on the subject, as with the traditional 
arguments, or as a result of poor practical applicability. From a theoretical 
perspective, it may be submitted that fault could be abandoned. This conclusion is not 
new, being reached by the Law Commission in 1988.297 However, the modern day 
theoretical analysis is supplementary and valuable with regard to the rest of the thesis. 
The following chapter shall question no-fault divorce and attempted no-fault reforms.  
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Chapter 3. No-Fault: Reforming the Law  
 
Synopsis 
 
The previous chapters concluded that the modern law, contained within the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and based on a mixed fault and no-fault system, has 
developed to contain broadly divided motivations, split between seeking to protect the 
sanctity of marriage and providing a fair system with minimal bitterness, distress and 
humiliation. Furthermore, it suggested that fault based divorce, when placed under 
modern analysis, lacked theoretical justification.  
 
This chapter shall turn the debate onto no-fault, concentrating on the failed Family 
Law Act 1996. The chapter contributes to the thesis in two ways. Firstly, it broadly 
argues that the Family Law Act 1996 failed due to a divide both in regards to its 
objectives and theoretical impetus - between protecting the sanctity of marriage and 
providing a no-fault system with minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. This 
contributes towards the wider hypothesis of the thesis. Secondly, despite outlining 
why the Family Law Act 1996 failed, it defends no-fault divorce as a concept, 
identifying the failure of the Act as a result of a theoretical divide which caused 
practical problems.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is concerned with the concept of no-fault divorce. It has been 
demonstrated that the arguments in favour of fault may lack justification. As a starting 
point, the chapter adopts the criticism of fault as support for no-fault divorce. As 
stated, the criticism of fault as a concept and the conclusion reached was not a new 
one, the Law Commission’s 1988 Discussion Paper and 1990 Report also reached the 
same observation. The result of this was an attempt, by the Conservative Government 
lead by John Major, to enact a no-fault reform through the Family Law Act 1996. 
This chapter seeks to analyse this reform attempt. It proposes that there is evidence to 
support the argument that the failure of the Family Law Act 1996 was the result of 
convoluted aims and practical problems. However, it submits that this should not 
undermine the concept of no-fault divorce.  
 
This analysis shall assess each Part of the Act, adding a modern perspective to the 
scrutiny. Of note will be the investigation into mediation, with a view to 
understanding the divorce process. This is particularly relevant as mediation, is 
frequently associated with no-fault divorce.  
 
The chapter shall draw out two broad conclusions. Firstly, it argues that despite the 
failure of the Family Law Act 1996, no-fault divorce is still a viable option for the 
future. Secondly, it will outline why the Family Law Act 1996 failed and suggest that 
a convoluted approach to divorce law is unlikely to be successful. This will contribute 
towards the analysis of the final chapter, which considers what the aims of a modern 
divorce law could include.  
 
2. Reform Attempts 
 
Soon after the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 was introduced, it was placed under 
significant scrutiny by Elston, Fuller and Murch’s study,298 contributing towards the 
introduction of the Special Procedure.299 Given the transformative nature of this 
reform, it was perhaps to be expected that further investigations into the law were 	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subsequently tabled. This chapter shall analyse the impetus behind the law reform 
process, leading up to the Family Law Act 1996 with an investigation of the 1985 
Report of the Matrimonial Causes Procedure Committee and the Law Commission’s 
1988 Paper and 1990 Report. This acts as a necessary foundation and precondition to 
the analysis of the 1996 Act itself and the attempted introduction of no-fault divorce.   
 
2.1. The Booth Committee  
 
As Freeman stated, the special procedure was nothing short of ‘revolutionary.’300 
Therefore it is hardly surprising, that, given the fact that it was not passed through 
Parliament or debated openly,301 divorce reform came back on the agenda when the 
Lord Chancellor, in 1982, appointed a committee to examine the procedure and 
practice of the courts under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. This was with the aim 
of recommending reforms that might mitigate the intensity of disputes, encourage 
settlements and provide further for the welfare of the children, whilst having regard to 
simplification and saving costs.302 In 1985 the Report of the Matrimonial Causes 
Procedure Committee,303 chaired by Justice Booth, was published, arguably taking the 
first step towards reform.  
 
Following the Lord Chancellor’s directions, the Booth Committee put forward 
numerous suggestions concerning divorce procedure.304 Amongst these, important 
‘First Steps’ were outlined, including renaming a petition to an ‘Application for 
divorce’ whilst referring to the parties as the Applicant and Respondent.305 Arguably, 
these suggestions were not ‘radical’, however, they do indicate a new direction in 
regards to divorce reform, away from adversarial traditions. Whilst it did not suggest 
no-fault divorce, this new direction could be linked to a growing movement. Building 
on this, it was proposed that no particulars of behaviour should be given in an 
Application under section 1(2)(b) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973,306 and that the 	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parties should be able to file a joint statement of arrangements for the children.307 This 
would have departed from the current process under the special procedure, outlined in 
the previous chapters, which requires that the statement of arrangements be filled in 
by the petitioner and then sent to the respondent. It deals with issues such as where 
the children will live and be educated, their childcare and maintenance needs and 
contact issues. Beyond administrative matters, the Booth Committee suggested that 
there should be an initial hearing before a registrar,308 at which point conciliation 
should be available.309  
 
2.2. The Law Commission Paper And Report 
 
Following the Booth Committee, the Law Commission, in 1988, published a 
Discussion Paper.310 This outlined the current law and the background to the 
development of modern divorce law.311 It then moved on to critique the law based on 
the original objectives of the law and suggested a no-fault system.312 The Law 
Commission found that the law ‘falls well short of the objectives it set out to fulfil’313 
and two further objectives the Law Commission had added. It set out to question 
whether these objectives were met, investigating: 
 
‘(a) Does the law buttress the stability of marriages? 
(b) Does the law enable the “empty legal shell” of a dead marriage to be 
destroyed? 
(c) Does the law promote “maximum fairness”? 
(d) Does the law promote “minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation” 
(e) Does the law avoid injustice to an economically weak spouse, usually the 
wife? 
(f) Does the law adequately protect the interests of the children of failed 
marriages?’314 	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It then went on to consider alternative models, analysing a fault-based model and 
then, under the umbrella term ‘no-fault’: breakdown,315 separation,316 mutual 
consent317 and unilateral demand models.318 Similar concepts to mutual consent and 
breakdown can be found in the current law. The unilateral demand model allows 
either party to petition for divorce without any requirements, aside from 
administrative ones. In short this would be the special procedure, without the 
requirements to fulfil one of the five facts of the current divorce law. The separation 
model provides for divorce based on a period of separation, two years separation with 
consent, as found in the current law, being an example of this and the notion of 
‘irretrievable breakdown’ reflecting the breakdown model, albeit with the fault facts. 
The Law Commission proceeded to suggest that, of the potential proposals, two no-
fault options were most realistic: divorce after a period of separation and divorce after 
a period of transition, allowing them to reflect and make the necessary arrangements 
for the future.319 
 
Shortly after the Discussion Paper, the Law Commission released a Report titled 
‘Family Law – The Ground for Divorce’.320 The composition of the Law Commission 
was significantly altered, only Mr. Trevor Aldridge and Professor Brenda Hogget, 
later Baroness Hale, remained, whilst the other three Commissioners had left. The 
Report went further than the Law Commission’s previous efforts, adopting a more 
socio-legal attitude when critiquing the current law, rather than a legally based 
critique, as described above. The Report found that the law was confusing and 
misleading,321 discriminatory and unjust,322 distorted party bargaining positions,323 
provoked unnecessary hostility and bitterness,324 did little to save the marriage325 and 
could make things worse for the children.326 The Law Commission outlined what it 
believed were the objectives for the law. This is an important distinction to outline. 	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The previous Discussion Paper had outlined, mainly, the Divorce Reform Act 1969’s 
objectives and, beyond this, the two new objectives discussed above. In contrast, the 
Report outlined similar, but unique, objectives: 
 
‘(i) It should try to support those marriages which are capable of being saved. 
(ii) It should enable those which cannot be saved to be dissolved with the 
minimum of avoidable distress, bitterness and hostility. 
(iii) It should encourage, so far as possible, the amicable resolution of 
practical issues relating to the couple’s home, finances and children and the 
proper discharge of their responsibilities to one another and to their children. 
(iv) It should seek to minimise the harm that the children of the family may 
suffer, both at the time and in the future, and to promote so far as possible to 
continued sharing of parental responsibility for them.’327 
 
This can be contrasted with the previous objectives of the Law Commission in its 
1966 Report of buttressing the stability of marriage and providing a process with 
maximum fairness and minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation.328  
 
When one compares the two Reports, the 1990 Report advocating individual 
marriages, the 1966 Report supporting the stability of marriage itself, it is clear that 
they have very different objectives. The emphasis in the 1990 Report is, clearly, more 
concerned with creating a humane process, where divorce was unavoidable. In 
contrast, the 1966 Report seems to aim to provide an idealised divorce law – 
attempting to avoid divorce all together and then, when it ‘regrettably’ occurs, to 
provide a suitable process. It is a fine, but important, distinction, especially when 
considering the Governments subsequent proposals below.  
 
The Law Commission’s Report, similar to the Discussion Paper, then went on to 
outline potential models for reform.329 It concluded that a no-fault option was 
preferable and: 
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‘(i) that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage should remain the sole ground 
for divorce; and 
(ii) that such breakdown should be established by the expiry of a minimum 
period of one year for consideration of the practical consequences which 
would result from a divorce and reflection upon whether the breakdown in the 
marital relationship is irreparable’.330   
 
The Report suggested that the party or parties should make a statement that their 
marriage had broken down which would be followed by a minimum period of 
reflection of a year.331 Beyond this, the Report, like the Booth Committee, dedicated a 
significant amount of time to a discussion of procedure.332 Similarly, it suggested 
numerous procedural changes, largely with the aim of providing neutrality, such as 
referring to the parties as ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ rather than ‘petitioner’ and 
‘respondent.’333 At the same time the Report suggested that opportunities for 
counselling, conciliation and mediation should be outlined and encouraged.334 It 
would seem from both the Law Commission Paper and Report that no-fault divorce 
should be the reform model.   
 
In 1993 the Government responded to this by creating a Consultation Paper entitled 
‘Looking to the Future – Mediation and the Ground for Divorce’.335 The differences 
in tone and direction between the Law Commission’s Report and the Consultation, 
beyond the broad framework of no-fault divorce based on a period of separation, is 
surprising. Immediately the tone was set when the Lord Chancellor, in the foreword, 
outlined that ‘I personally believe strongly in the value of the institution of marriage 
and I believe that it is a divinely appointed arrangement fundamental to the wellbeing 
of our community’.336 Meanwhile, the objectives laid out in chapter one included: to 
support the institution of marriage and to include practicable steps to prevent the 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage, whilst ensuring that the parties understand the 
practical consequences of divorce before taking any irreversible decision; then, where 	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divorce is unavoidable, to minimise the bitterness and hostility between the parties 
and to reduce trauma for the children and to keep to the minimum the cost to the 
parties and the taxpayer.337  
 
This can be compared to the aims of the 1966 Report detailed above and contrasted to 
the 1990 report, which clearly did not place supporting the institution of marriage as 
the first aim.  Equally, when critiquing the current law, the Consultation, in contrast to 
the Law Commission, raised the traditional argument discussed in the previous 
chapter, that the ‘present system allows divorce to be obtained quickly and easily 
without the parties being required to have regard to the consequences’,338 implying 
arguments concerning the sanctity of marriage and the socio-economic disadvantages 
of divorce. This is confirmed by the fact that the Consultation raises the belief that it 
is not ‘difficult’339 to get a divorce, indicating that it could be more difficult.   
 
The Consultation was set out in a similar way to the Law Commission Report. It 
outlined the current law,340 laid out the objectives of the law,341 critiqued the law,342 
discussed the options for reform343 and proffered some suggestions for how it might 
work.344 The Consultation was not directed at proposing reform, simply outlining 
possible reforms. However, the possibilities were confined to its objectives, which, as 
the above paragraphs should have made clear, were vastly different from the 
Commissions.   
 
In 1995 the Government outlined its proposals (the Proposal) in ‘Looking to the 
Future – Mediation and the Ground for Divorce.’345 The Government retained all of 
the objectives listed above in the Consultation.346 It then went on to outline its 
proposals: 	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‘It should be possible to obtain a divorce in England and Wales on the sole 
ground that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The breakdown of 
marriage should be demonstrated by the passing of time for reflection and 
consideration, in order for the couple to address what has gone wrong in the 
marriage, whether there is any hope of reconciliation, and, in the event that 
they decide that the breakdown is irretrievable, to make proper arrangements 
for living apart before a divorce order can be made. The Government proposes 
that the minimum period of time for reflection and consideration should be 
twelve months. In practice the period may be longer in a significant number of 
cases, because some couples will elect not to apply for divorce immediately 
after the period has ended, and in other cases the divorce order will be delayed 
because arrangements for children property and finance have not been 
made’.347  
   
Following this, the Family Law Act 1996 was passed. One can trace the reform 
movement from the Booth Committee to the introduction of the Act. Within this, the 
changing aims of divorce law proposals are pertinent to the why the Act failed.  
 
3. The Family Law Act 1996 
 
The Family Law Act 1996 embraced no-fault divorce. It was set out in several 
different Parts, the first outlining the general principles of the Act to be utilised by a 
court or any person when implementing the second or third. The principles outlined in 
section 1 included: 
 
(a) that the institution of marriage is to be supported; 
(b) that the parties to the marriage which may have broken down are to be 
encouraged to take all practicable steps, whether by marriage counselling or 
otherwise, to save the marriage; 
(c) that a marriage which has irretrievably broken down and is being brought to 
an end should be brought to an end – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 ibid 14. 
	   82	  
i. with minimum distress to the parties and to the children 
affected 
ii. with questions dealt with in a manner designed to promote as 
good a continuing relationship between the parties and any 
children affected as is possible in the circumstances; and 
iii. without costs being unreasonably incurred in connection with 
the procedures to be followed in bringing the marriage to an 
end; and 
(d) that any risk to one of the parties to a marriage, and to any children, of 
violence from the other party should, so far as reasonably practicable, be 
removed or diminished.  
 
Immediately, one may highlight the focus on the sanctity of marriage. The first and 
second principles of the Act are to support marriage and take all practical steps to 
save it. Given the current law’s aim is simply to buttress the stability of marriage, 
which is not explicitly mentioned in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, this has a 
significant traditional emphasis. The following provisions are also noteworthy. There 
is little difference between the second aim of the Field of Choice; minimum distress is 
clearly the same; also, promoting a good continuing relationship may be equated, 
albeit loosely, with reducing bitterness. However, the focus on avoiding the risk of 
violence to either party, or any children, and any unreasonable costs, are clear 
modifications. However, perhaps it is important to note that, whilst many Acts have 
good ‘aims’, it is the influence of the objectives upon the substance of the Act that 
will have a direct impact. Given Part I overarches the substantive provisions of Part II 
and III, this is pertinent.  
 
Part II outlined the process of divorce and separation. The Act kept the concept of 
irretrievable breakdown,348 but combined it with a no-fault divorce model. This was 
to be demonstrated by three factors.349 Firstly, by the submission of a statement of 
breakdown,350 after attending an information meeting.351 Secondly, instead of the 	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‘facts’ that were in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the Family Law Act 1996 
required a period of time – for reflection and consideration – to demonstrate 
irretrievable breakdown.352 This was set at nine months, beginning with the fourteenth 
day after the day on which the statement was received.353 A further six months would 
be added to this period if there were children under sixteen.354 Thirdly, an application 
for a divorce order acted as a final demonstration of irretrievable breakdown. For this 
to occur, section 3(1)(c) and section 9 required that the parties had solved any 
questions concerning their finances and children. Meanwhile, the parties had to 
declare that the marriage could not be saved as per section 5(1)(d). Part II also 
provided for the introduction of information meetings within section 8. These were 
designed as a ‘device for providing objective information face to face in the most 
expedient, comfortable and cost-effective manner.’355 Part III dealt with mediation, 
how it was provided for and the provision of legal aid.  
  
The Act was not fully implemented. As it stands today, Part I and Part III have been 
brought into force. Yet, after two sets of pilot schemes, both for mediation, which was 
directed by Davis,356 and the information meetings, which was directed by Walker,357 
Part II was not carried forward. The Lord Chancellor issued a statement that the Act 
would be deferred and then, in 2001, that it would not be implemented.358  The Act is 
theoretically and practically divided, clearly supporting the institution of marriage and 
providing an end to the marriage with ‘minimum distress’. The following analysis of 
the Act will demonstrate how this schism in its objectives contributed towards the 
failure of the Act. It also provides relevant analysis with regard to modern day 
reforms. As it failed for such a myriad of reasons, it is, perhaps easiest to examine the 
arguments within an assessment of each Part of the Act.  
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4. Part I: The Sanctity Of Marriage And No-Fault – Mixed Messages 
 
Part I, outlining the general principles of the Act, was implemented in 1996. As this 
underlies and forms the basis of the Act, any criticism directed towards it can also be 
interpreted as a broad appraisal of the Act itself. Initially, the strongest criticism is 
that the Family Law Act 1996 was convoluted between liberal and conservative 
maxims. Predominantly, this was manifested in two linked areas - the debates over the 
role of marriage and the use of fault.   
 
In regards to the sanctity of marriage, if one examines the Divorce Reform Act 1969, 
and the aims of the Law Commission’s Report - Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: 
The Field of Choice – it is clear that the support of marriage is a priority, over 
maximum fairness and the minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. Evidence for 
this claim can be found in the Law Commission’s Report where the support of 
marriage is the first aim, whilst the second aim explains that when a marriage breaks 
down it is ‘regrettable’, further prioritising the first aim. The way the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 was drafted further reflects this, evidenced by section 6, which 
encourages reconciliation or, optionally, the supplemental provisions in section 2, 
which allow for time bars to prevent a party petitioning for a divorce.  
 
The Family Law Act 1996, in contrast, seems to have put the two concepts on equal 
footing, compromising the liberal concept of no-fault with the traditional conservative 
focus on supporting and saving marriage.359 As Stylianou and Bailey-Harris cogently 
argue, this was most likely a major contributor towards the failure of the Act, 
producing a fragmented piece of legislation.360 On top of this it opened itself up to 
criticism from both liberals and conservatives. Perhaps an explanation for this 
compromise is the political background to the Act. Initially one can argue that, as it 
was passed by a Conservative Government, they influenced the Act ideologically. 
Arguably, a Conservative Government, with a small majority, was unlikely to be able 
to pass such a liberal reform without making some political changes to appease their 	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backbenchers. Given the current coalition Government lacks a strong ideological 
majority; this is perhaps a relevant contrast were they to initiate any further legislative 
reform.  
 
The emphasis on the sanctity of marriage is, as mentioned in the previous chapters, 
one of the consistent arguments for the use of the fault. However, as the earlier stages 
of this chapter demonstrated, the Law Commission found that fault created 
‘bitterness’.361 This was further emphasised in the Law Commission Report, which 
argued that it created ‘hostility and bitterness’362 and that it was unfair, failing to 
create ‘justice’.363 Beyond this, it rejected a return to fault on the basis that it was 
‘crude’,364 as it failed to respond to complex and sensitive issues, and that ‘guilt’ and 
‘innocence’ were illogical and ineffective.365 Given these strong endorsements for no-
fault divorce, it is hardly surprising that the Family Law Act 1996 opted for this 
model. The implications of this decision run throughout the Act.  
 
‘Fault’ is an area that has been discussed at length in the previous chapter. In regards 
to the Family Law Act 1996, Hasson portrayed the debate as juxtaposed between the 
‘idealist’ and ‘progressive’ viewpoints.366 However, as discussed above, there are 
further nuances to the fault debate, such as the psychological benefits in certain cases. 
To recollect the conclusions of the previous chapter; there are five main justifications 
for the use of fault, namely traditional,367 socio-economic,368 contractual,369 
psychological370 and tort-based arguments.371 The chapter found these justifications 
might be lacking, aside from the narrow circumstances where fault may provide a 
psychological benefit.  
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Given this, it would seem fair to conclude that the Act had convoluted theoretical and 
practical objectives, drawing criticism from both an idealist and progressive 
perspective. From the idealist point of view the sanctity of marriage was reinforced, 
however, it is possible to argue that the no-fault provisions would make this position 
superficial. Considering Baroness Deech is willing to criticise the current partially 
fault based law, one can only question what her attitude would be if the law were 
based on no-fault. Meanwhile, from the progressive point of view, the traditional 
emphasis of the Act distorted the agenda of the no-fault provisions.    
 
5. Part II: The Period For Reflection And Consideration And The Information 
Meetings 
 
Part II was not implemented. It dealt with the major no-fault provisions of the Act, 
such as the directions for mediation,372 which will be discussed in relation to Part III, 
the controversial ‘information meetings’373 and the ‘period for reflection.’374  
Unusually the Government decided to trial the Act through pilot studies. These were 
roundly critiqued for a number of reasons. As they concern provisions for no-fault 
divorce, this adds another dimension to the criticism.  
 
The information meeting took the form of an individual meeting. It was designed as a 
‘device for providing objective information face to face in the most expedient, 
comfortable and cost-effective manner.’375 The aim of the meeting was to help 
‘couples to understand the consequences of their actions, and the emphasis on 
maintaining ‘a level playing-field’ between the various services’376 that were on offer. 
On top of this ‘so that the information providers did not commit the heinous offence 
of giving advice, they were trained to deliver the information in a standard format 
which did not permit personal tailoring.’377  
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The main criticism stems from the information meetings ‘rigid’378 approach, which 
failed to cater to the different demands of clients and, frequently, devolved into the 
delivery of impersonal information.379 Meanwhile, it was raised by Eekelaar that this 
may be providing objective information as a means of influencing behaviour.380 
Beyond this, and perhaps more critically given the multi-cultural society we now live 
in, questions have been raised over whether information meetings could cater to the 
needs of ethnic minorities and the victims of domestic violence.381 Whilst Bridge 
offers the agreeable suggestion that more choice could have been offered to different 
couples, in regards to the information meeting, she fails to take her concept to its 
logical conclusion – that the Family Law Act 1996 itself did not cater to wider needs. 
What is clear, is that the failure to provide for the different demands of a range of 
divorcees is an essential deficiency in both the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the 
Family Law Act 1996. Logically each divorce is different and providing a rigid 
structure combined with a traditionalist agenda, advocating the sanctity of marriage, is 
unlikely to meet everyone’s basic needs.382 The information meetings are one such 
example where an uncompromising framework was placed upon divorcees aiming to 
‘encourage or pressure’383 them either to reconcile or mediate.384 Bridge may be 
correct when she suggests that more choice could, or perhaps should, have been 
offered.385  
 
The information meetings may also be criticised on a practical level. Firstly, it is 
possible to argue that an information meeting about divorce could occur before a 
marriage. To provide a contractual analogy, one would not enter one’s company into a 
statistically high-risk contract without assessing the prospect of a potential breach. It 
is plausible to argue that couples should be provided with information before they 
enter a marriage. Although the counter argument to this is that the information is 	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available through organisations such as OnePlusOne,386 should the parties seek it. It is 
also possible to highlight that the information provision argument is concurrent 
throughout other areas of family law, such as within the debate over pre-nuptial 
agreements, where it may be criticised for presupposing the risk of marriage failure 
on public policy grounds.387 Secondly, it is possible to argue that there is a conflict 
between providing information about mediation and providing information about 
legal services, on the basis that one undermines the other.  
 
However, what is clear from the academic debate is that the notion that information 
could be made available to parties in the process of divorce is not disputed. What one 
may draw from this is that the concept of the information meetings was received 
positively, but that the procedure and methods for imparting information was not. 
Therefore, it may be suggested that if the information meetings had been modelled on 
a flexible basis, then it may have been met with a different response.  Equally, 
Walker’s proposition of providing an information DVD or booklet could be adapted 
to provide a suitable alternative.388  
 
Section 7 outlined that fourteen days389 after a statement has been made,390 there will 
be a period for reflection and consideration.’391 This would last for a nine-month 
period,392 and is an example of a no-fault separation model. However, the purpose of 
the period is not specifically attached to no-fault. Several criticisms can be levelled at 
both the period itself and the motivation behind it – ‘for reflection and consideration’.  
 
On a practical level, Davis makes the cogent point that frequently the ‘period for 
reflection’ will occur before a decision is made.393 As he mentions, it is a huge 
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‘symbolic’ step to take.394 If one is to make a broad assertion concerning when 
individuals reflect and consider on whether to get a divorce, it would seem logical to 
observe that they would do so before making a decision rather than after. It would 
seem unlikely that the general population of divorcees would make a decision, only to 
subsequently justify it. Freeman adds to this criticism by highlighting that the 
extension of the period for reflection, by six months, where the divorcees have a child 
under sixteen,395 would frequently adversely affect women.396 Freeman goes so far as 
to label this ‘moral absolutism’397 demonstrating a situation where a ‘woman whose 
husband murders two of their three children must remain married to him for at least 
80 weeks.’398 Returning to Davis’ comments, surely a divorce where children are 
involved is even more significant, increasing the chance of parties thinking about it? 
Therefore, perhaps Freeman’s 80-week number is a conservative estimate for a period 
that a hypothetical wife would have to remain married to her husband. One may also 
add to Freeman’s thesis, commenting that the provision for the extension of the period 
also affects fathers, not just mothers.    
 
On the other hand, there are potential benefits to the separation period itself. Primarily 
one can argue that it allows parties to organise solutions to any financial matters or 
issues regarding any children. As mentioned above, section 9 of the Act required the 
parties to have done this before an application for divorce could be made. However, 
the time period to do this is subjective in each divorce. One party may take 24 months 
to arrange their affairs, another may take a week. Equally it may depend on the length 
of a marriage and other factors such as the presence of children and other dependents. 
What is clear is that the aim within the Act is not for this, but for ‘consideration and 
reflection’, which in view of the emphasis behind the Act, potentially entails 
reconciliation rather than forward planning. This is made all the more pertinent by the 
fact that the current special procedure takes so little time itself, roughly between 3-6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 ibid. 
395 Part II, S 7(11). 
396 Part II, S 7(11). 
397 N 379. 
398 ibid. 
	   90	  
months on average.399 This is a substantial difference to the 15 months expected of a 
parent with a child under 16. 
 
Inherently, the period of reflection, due to the convoluted nature of the Act, is 
conflicted within itself. Part I outlines that the institution of marriage is to be 
supported, which can be seen in the period of reflection. However, it also outlines that 
the marriage should be brought to an end with minimum distress. There is a clear 
dichotomy. If the period for reflection would potentially have caused distress, and 
perhaps further damaged any chance of reconciliation, then how can it be deemed to 
be supporting marriage? This is a fundamental and inescapable contradiction. The 
tension that Stylianou400 and Bailey-Harris401 highlighted in regard to Part I flows 
throughout the entire Act and is encapsulated here.   
 
A potential solution would have been to remodel the purpose of the period and to 
maintain a similar timeframe as the special procedure. In regards to the purpose, for 
reflection and consideration, it would seem cogent that this occurs before a decision 
to divorce is made. The purpose of the period could, therefore be a pragmatic one, 
allowing the parties to prepare for the changes that will occur after a divorce and, 
potentially, to carry out mediation, conciliation or reconciliation should they so wish. 
Providing a flexible process, instead of making it a mandatory structure, may provide 
much-needed relevancy, increasing productivity. Equally, the timeframe is important 
to gauge correctly. As mentioned above, some parties may take a far longer or shorter 
time to organise themselves. If this is the case then a logical approach could be to 
make a small, but mandatory, time period, such as is the case with the special 
procedure, providing for those who need less time. However, allowing for an 
extension of the period where necessary to organise any issues relating to children or 
finances.  
 
It would seem that the attempt to reconcile the support of marriage with no-fault 
divorce may have created significant internal tensions within the period for reflection 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 R. Cowdry, ‘Whose Divorce is it Anyway – the Human Rights Aspect’ (2004) Family Law 
892. 
400 K. Stylianou, ‘The Tensions between Family Mediation Principles and the Formal Legal 
System’ (1998) Family Law 218. 
401 R. Bailey-Harris, ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Divorce Reform’ (1995) Family Law 618. 
	   91	  
and consideration. When this is combined with the conclusions of Walker’s pilot 
study of the information meetings, which identified the meetings observed a rigid and 
bureaucratic structure. It is possible to hypothesise that the information meetings and 
period for reflection may have been misjudged, negatively influencing the Act as a 
whole. However, these conclusions are not a slight on no-fault divorce, merely the 
specific models chosen.  
 
6. Part III: Mediation  
 
Mediation was a seminal part of the Family Law Act 1996, and has been encouraged 
by governments for the past 20 years,402 whilst dividing academic opinion.403 It is 
frequently associated with no-fault divorce.404 Mediation is not a necessary facet of 
any no-fault model, however, its use was a necessary precondition for the receipt of 
Legal Aid and encouraged for those self-funding. Therefore, it is naturally linked to 
the process of acquiring a divorce through the Family Law Act 1996. As a result, 
despite the fact that mediation would be utilised with regard to issues concerning 
finances and children, which is not the focus of this thesis, it was so prominent within 
trialled no-fault models, that an investigation into its capacities for success is 
pertinent.  
 
Mediation was alluded to in Part II, with reference to attendance at information 
meetings,405 the financing of mediation,406 the provision of information,407 the 	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directions for mediation,408 adjournments409 and provision of marriage counselling.410 
However, it is primarily dealt with in Part III. This Part of the Act was retained. 
Despite this, the failure of the Act can still be connected to Part III as it is naturally 
linked to Part II and I. The Act outlines the provision and availability of mediation.411 
It also provides legal aid for the process,412 however, controversially, it also outlines 
that a ‘person shall not be granted representation for the purposes of proceedings 
relating to family matters, unless he has attended a meeting with a mediator’.413 
Following the introduction of the Act, a pilot scheme evaluating mediation was 
introduced. The failure of the Act to be fully implemented can be linked with the 
scrutiny mediation was subsequently placed under.  
 
Initially a definition of mediation will be given; this will be followed by an outline of 
its current use within divorce law and the outcomes of the pilot schemes that took 
place in the 1990s. An analysis will then be undertaken, questioning select issues 
within mediation, such as communication, agreement longevity, gender and 
economics, both with regard to the 1996 Act and from a modern perspective. The 
conclusion reached is that, where mediation is accepted voluntarily, there are a 
number of potential benefits.  
 
6.1. A Definition Of Mediation 
 
Mediation has been described as a: 
 
‘form of intervention in which a third party, the mediator, assists the parties to 
a dispute to negotiate over the issues that divide them. The mediator has no 
stake in the dispute and is not identified with any of the competing interests 
involved. The mediator has no power to impose a settlement on the parties, 
who retain authority for making their own decisions’.414  
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In the context of divorce, the Government, in its White Paper ‘Looking to the Future – 
Mediation and the Ground for Divorce’ defined it as a: 
 
‘process in which an impartial third person, the mediator, assists couples 
considering separation or divorce to meet together to deal with arrangements 
which need to be made for the future’.415  
 
There are two factors that must be emphasised in regards to this definition. Firstly the 
mediator is neutral. To quote Astor, they ‘leave their own perspectives out of the 
equation’.416 Secondly, the focus of the process is on constructing arrangements for 
the future. It is, therefore, not focussed on the past, but ‘forward looking’.417  
 
‘Mediation’, as a term, is frequently used to describe a plethora of different processes. 
It is important to distinguish it from those it is most commonly associated with. 
Initially, it can be distinguished from ‘reconciliation’, which seeks to encourage the 
parties to ‘abandon the petition and rescue the marriage’.418 Whilst some have argued 
that mediation can have therapeutic elements,419 this thesis argues that it is a distinct 
form of mediation – ‘therapeutic mediation’. The basis for this claim is that 
therapeutic mediation is focussed on trying to improve the parties’ relationship, 
which, inherently, has a focus on the past and present, rather than the future focus of 
mediation. Lastly, mediation is frequently associated with the term ‘conciliation’.420 
However, again, this thesis argues that it can be distinguished from mediation, on the 
basis that conciliation routinely occurs during the current court process as, almost, a 
court-aid, such as in the Private Law Programme.421 Arguably this is a form of ‘in-
court-mediation’,422 however, the fact that mediation is a separate process, in its own 
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right, is a vital distinction. As a result, any in-court-mediation shall be referred to as 
conciliation, whereas out-of-court mediation shall be referred to as mediation.423  
 
6.2. Mediation Within Divorce Law 
 
The current use of mediation can be separated into two categories, privately or 
publicly funded. However, it should be noted that the planned reforms of Legal Aid 
may cut all public funding for divorce disputes, including, it would seem, funding for 
mediation. As a result, all mediation occurring after the reforms may be private. 
Nevertheless, until this occurs it is still important to outline the operation of publicly 
funded mediation.  
 
Mediation may be sought from many sources such as the National Family Mediation 
Network, which represents 40% of the mediation profession.424 Whilst there exists a 
College of Mediators, it does not have exclusive or shared authority over 
mediation.425 Although, as Webley has highlighted, it may be assisted in acquiring 
this by the Family Mediation Council.426 In general, mediators may be found in both 
solicitors, who, through the Law Society family mediation training, are qualified, and 
through the College of Mediators.427 The main difference, it would seem, is that the 
Law Society seems to focus on knowledge, whilst the College gives preference to 
values and skills based training.428   
 
Part III of the Family Law Act 1996 has been implemented. This stipulates that a 
‘person shall not be granted representation for the purposes of proceedings relating to 
family matters, unless he has attended a meeting with a mediator.’429 This was 	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reinforced in the Access to Justice Act 1999 which read ‘the criteria set out in the 
code shall reflect the principle that in many family disputes mediation will be more 
appropriate than court proceedings’.430 According to the National Audit Office, 
‘between October 2004 and March 2006, 29,000 people who were funded through 
Legal Aid, attempted to resolve their disputes through mediation.’431 As a result, all of 
those applying for Legal Aid must first attend mediation.  
 
6.3. The Mediation Pilots 
 
Subsequent to the introduction of the Family Law Act 1996, a pilot scheme focusing 
on mediation was carried out. The report concerning the pilot was organised by 
Gwynn Davis. The pilot had several aims, these included: 
 
‘- the relative benefits and cost-effectiveness of contracting for the provision 
of publicly funded and quality assured family mediation services through 
different supplier arrangements; 
 - the most effective quality assurance and contracting arrangements for the 
delivery of publicly funded mediation services; 
 - the level of quality assured legal advice necessary to support publicly 
funded family mediation and the most cost-effective arrangements for 
providing it; 
 - the relative costs/benefits, both for the assisted person and the taxpayer, of 
the provision of publicly funded mediation and supporting legal advice, 
compared with the current arrangements.’432  
 
Davis’ findings will be used throughout the assessment of mediation during this 
chapter, as they are the most relevant study to date of mediation within England and 
Wales. In relation to the Family Law Act, one can draw out several areas of analysis. 
Of note is the client feedback concerning ‘attitudes to negotiation’ where they found 
that only 11% of informants were not willing to negotiate, but that 59% believed their 	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former partner was not.433 Beyond this, and perhaps linked to these findings, was the 
fact that many of the subjects ‘displayed high levels of mistrust’.434 From these facts, 
it is plausible to suggest that either the parties mistrust each other, and therefore, 
mistakenly, believe that they will not negotiate. Or on the other hand, that they were 
not willing to negotiate and were trying to portray their former partner as 
uncooperative, rather than being seen as uncooperative themselves. Obviously, it is 
possible, if not likely, that there was a mix of these two circumstances.  
 
Perhaps the most crucial area of Davis’ research concerns the client’s attitudes to 
mediation itself. In general they found mediation helpful. Specifically, 35% found it 
‘very helpful’ and a further 35% found it ‘fairly helpful’.435 Meanwhile, 51% believed 
the mediator understood the situation ‘very well’ and 27% believed they understood it 
‘fairly well’.436 71% said they would recommend mediation to others experiencing a 
dispute about children.437 These statistics are positive, demonstrating that mediation 
could make a valuable contribution.  
 
However, the problem that Davis identified was that 60% of clients found a solicitor 
‘very helpful’ and that in 69% of cases they understood the problems ‘very well’.438 
Obviously, these numbers are far higher than in the study concerning mediation. Not 
only does this demonstrate a preference for solicitors, but also that the conception of 
‘solicitors as aggressive troublemakers’439 should be regarded as of ‘historical interest 
only’.440 It would seem that solicitor’s partisanship is a ‘highly valued commodity’.441 
Davis goes on to conclude that mediation should not be seen as a replacement for 
lawyers but that it could provide a valuable service to some couples.442  
 
These findings appear to demonstrate that the Act’s mediation focus was misplaced. 
Initially, this can be seen as a criticism of mediation itself. As this chapter will 	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attempt to show, it is in reality a criticism of how the Act sought to implement 
mediation. The following analysis will therefore investigate select issues concerning 
mediation as a process. However, broadly it would seem that Davis’ research did 
contribute significantly to the failure of the Family Law Act 1996.  
 
6.4. How Does Mediation Affect Conflict, Communication And Co-operation? 
 
Mediation is commonly associated with the benefits arising from its focus on party 
negotiation, namely, a decrease in conflict, and an increase in communication and co-
operation. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, this is frequently associated with the 
‘spirit of no-fault’.443 Historically, the Finer Report argued that it would ‘engender 
common sense, reasonableness and agreement in dealing with the consequences of the 
breakdown’.444 The Government Consultation Paper for the Family Law Act 1996 
placed this concept in the centre of its argument, stating:  
 
‘it encourages couples themselves to resolve disputed issues and helps them 
develop their skills in negotiating their conflicts… it avoids the polarisation of 
the adversarial process, which can freeze parties into opposing solutions to 
problems’.445  
 
It then reiterated this in its Proposal for the Act arguing it would ‘improve 
communications… [and] help couples work together’.446 It would appear that 
increasing communication and co-operation and reducing conflict seems to be one of 
the main foundations in the arguments for mediation both with regard to previous and 
current debates.  
 
When evaluating this concept it is clear that there is a dichotomy between assertions 
made under theoretical versus empirical research. In regards to the empirical research 
undertaken, many appear to have treated the mediation process itself as a ‘black 
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box’,447 focussing instead on the outcome of the process. This is particularly true in 
regards to England and Wales where the most comprehensive study into mediation, 
by Gwynn Davis, focused on issues such as satisfaction levels, cost-effectiveness and 
success rates, rather than the inner workings of the mediation itself.448 Therefore, 
when analysing this aspect of mediation, one may have to rely upon international 
studies. The empirical arguments will be laid out below. However, there will be an 
initial discussion of the theory behind the assertions.    
 
6.4.1. Theoretical Arguments 
 
One can identify several theoretical arguments that have potentially created an image 
of mediation as preferable. Davis refers to this as ‘the story’ of mediation, associating 
it with ‘reasonableness and compromise’.449 These can be found in a variety of 
sources – including religious and academic texts. The Bible makes frequent reference 
to mediation both in the Old and New Testament. For example, Job 9:33, which 
states: 
 
‘If only there were someone to mediate between us, someone to bring us 
together’.  
 
Naturally, the Bible is not an academic text; however, its influence should not be 
ignored, especially when one bears in mind the religious attitudes within the previous 
reforms of divorce law. This was particularly relevant in the aforementioned Gorell 
Commission and even in regards to Lord Mackay’s statements regarding the Family 
Law Act 1996. It is also possible to highlight the largely restorative movement in the 
criminal justice system that developed in the 1970s as contributory to the view of 
mediation in its ‘contemporary form’.450 Nils Christie, albeit from a criminological 	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perspective, famously outlined conflicts as ‘property’,451 arguing that the traditional 
adversarial approaches removed conflicts from individuals and placed them in the 
hands of the ‘professional thieves’452 such as lawyers and judges, removing the 
opportunity for the parties to deal with the conflict themselves. Perhaps the strongest 
official indication of this movement is contained within the Report of the Committee 
on One-Parent Families, also known as the Finer Report.453 This documented 
‘conciliation’ which, as mentioned above, is essentially synonymous with the modern 
concept of mediation. The Report outlined that procedures focussing on conciliation 
procedures ‘have substantial success in civilising the consequences of the 
breakdown’.454 Whilst the Report was not as thorough as some of its modern 
counterparts, such as the Law Commission’s Discussion and Consultation papers, it is 
often labelled as the ‘starting point’ in the movement.455   
 
It is important to conceptualise divorce as a conflict situation. In a broad sense, two 
adults, who have legally and socially bound their lives together, are breaking that 
bond. The question therefore commonly turns to the level of conflict. In relation to 
this, mediation and the traditional adversarial process are theoretically often portrayed 
in very different lights. The adversarial process described in the previous chapters is, 
possibly from the offset, seen in a negative light. Common sense dictates that an 
‘adversarial’ conflict is less likely to be productive than a ‘constructive’ conflict. It is 
perhaps for this reason, that mediation is seen as the antithesis to the adversarial 
approach. As Walker highlighted: 
 
‘such loaded language constructs an image of the legal process as inherently 
hostile… By contrast, mediation is perceived as supportive, facilitative, non-
conflictual: everything that is inherently ‘good’ in a dispute resolution 
process’.456  
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Consequently, one may argue that the debate, from a linguistic point of view, is 
carried out using ‘loaded language’, being inherently distorted in favour of mediation.  
 
Dingwall also lays the charge of mediation promotion at the feet of the ‘tabloid 
culture… [and as] part of the occupational self-interest of mediation practitioners’.457 
He qualifies this with the argument that the recent National Audit Office report on 
mediation, published in 2007, which trumpeted the ability of mediation to make the 
divorce process ‘less acrimonious’,458 was heavily skewed by its reliance on evidence 
based on a survey of mediators.459 In regards to the tabloid culture, this has been 
particularly relevant of late given the release of the Protocol concerning the virtually 
compulsory ‘Information and Assessment Meetings’ described in Practice Direction 
3A to the Family Procedure Rules 2010. This was outlined in the first chapter and will 
undergo analysis in the following chapter. The media response to the Protocol is 
relevant. In particular one can highlight the response of The Telegraph, which stated: 
‘It’s Good for Couples Who Want to Divorce to Talk’.460 Meanwhile, The Mirror ran 
with the headline: ‘Warring Couples to be Given Mediation to Keep Them Out of 
Court’.461 Both of these are indicative of what Dingwall was referring to in regards to 
the tabloid attitudes to mediation. Of note, and as will be explained in following 
chapters, The Mirror may have misread the situation - the meetings are not mediation 
per se but information and assessment meetings concerning mediation. The 
developments are not compulsory mediation.  
 
6.4.2. Empirical Research 
 
As the above discussion has demonstrated, there are numerous sources that can be 
credited for the development and perseverance of the theoretical belief that mediation 
may reduce conflict and increase communication and co-operation. However, the 	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question remains – do they? This is potentially difficult to answer. As the 
Government Consultation for the Family Law Act 1996 noted the ‘empirical evidence 
about mediation in this country is limited [which] is hardly surprising bearing in mind 
that family mediation has developed here only in the last decade or so’. Despite this 
statement being made in 1993, little has changed in nearly two decades. As mentioned 
above, Davis et al carried out pilot studies on the proposed mediation, but, their 
research was not focussed on the process itself, but on the satisfaction, success and 
cost. Apart from this study there has been a dearth of empirical research in England 
and Wales. As a result it is difficult to address the question directly and, to some 
degree, international studies must be relied upon.  
 
International researchers also frequently treat the mediation process as a ‘black box’, 
analysing many different areas before and after the process but not during. However, 
Kelly, who was relied upon as evidence by the National Audit Committee,462 has 
documented and carried out a significant number of studies and, when reporting on 
studies in the US and Canada. She found that ‘lengthier processes appear to promote 
more frequent, less conflicted communication’463 and that parents who engage in 
mediation: 
 
‘…reported significantly less conflict, more co-operation, more child-focused 
communication, and more non-custodial parent participation in decision 
making about the children, compared with the adversarial sample’.464    
 
Arguably, much of the research relied upon in this article seems to focus on the post-
mediation relationship between the parties,465 however, merely because the aim of the 
article is focussed on the outcome, does not mean it cannot play a significant role in 
relating to the method. Meanwhile, Kelly subsequently provided an influential 	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process based research study, focusing on the California Divorce and Mediation 
Process.466 Here, Kelly conducted a ‘multidimensional study of the comparative legal, 
economic, psychological, and relationship effects of mediation and adversarial 
divorce on the participants during and after the divorce process’.467 The longitudinal 
study consisted of 437 ‘mostly well educated, primarily white, and middle class’468 
individuals who were questioned before, during and after the mediation process. Kelly 
found that the: 
 
‘…mediation group rated their mediators as more skilful and more helpful in 
proposing ways to resolve disagreements and getting to workable 
compromises, compared to the litigation group rating of their attorneys… [and 
that] 76% of mediation women and 62% of the men indicated that mediation 
helped them to become more reasonable with each other, compared to 26 and 
39% of the adversarial men and women, respectively’.469 
 
Whilst this would seem to clearly demonstrate that mediation ‘was more effective in 
increasing the general level of co-operation’, there are several points that can be 
made. 470 Firstly, by Kelly’s own admission the individuals were mostly well 
educated, white and middle class. Therefore, it may be difficult to transmute these 
findings to individuals outside the socio-economic groups assessed in the study. Its 
value may also be degraded, for the purposes of this thesis, due to its international 
focus. There are numerous international social differences that diminish its 
importance. Lastly, and this is perhaps the most pertinent point, the lawyers involved 
in the adversarial process in England and Wales and in California are distinct. They 
will have developed in a different social and educational system, and be practicing 
under unique practice directions. To make a direct comparison between the 
professions may consequently be tenuous. What makes this criticism particularly 
relevant is that Kelly’s studies were extensively relied upon by the National Audit 
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Office in their assessment of Legal Aid and mediation for people involved in family 
breakdown.471  
 
Perhaps one way of including national research is to use Davis et al’s work in 
conjunction with other international research. Bickerdike and Littlefield carried out a 
study of divorce mediation in Australia.472 Clients were assessed over a twenty-month 
period and were chosen if they had been married for two years.473 550 clients attended 
the sessions, of which 252 agreed to complete the questionnaires, whilst a further 50 
couples agreed to have their session videotaped.474 Their research indicated that 
‘couples who engage in high levels of contentious behaviour and low levels of 
problem solving and who exhibit disparity in problem solving are less likely to reach 
successful outcome in mediation’475 whilst contrastingly ‘higher levels of problem 
solving… [and] lower levels of contentious behaviour’ were associated with 
agreement.476  
 
This would appear to indicate that mediation is successful where the divorcees co-
operate, communicate and have low levels of conflict and, as a result, demonstrates 
the impact mediation has on allowing couples to communicate and co-operate. If one 
combines this concept with Davis’ research, which outlined the success rate of the 
mediation pilots, then that may be indicative of the levels of co-operation, 
communication and conflict in England and Wales. Davis demonstrated that 
agreement was reached in 45% of cases relating to children issues and 34% in relation 
to financial issues.477 If one were to follow this logic through, then it would be 
possible to argue that Davis research can provide inadvertent information on the 
levels of communication and co-operation within the mediation pilots.  
 
If this were accepted, then it would appear to provide negative conclusions. However, 
naturally there are flaws with this argument as it is imposing the conclusions of one 	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study onto another, plus there are variables created by the number of sessions 
monitored and the international elements involved. Yet, given that there has not been 
a study in England and Wales, it is perhaps the best, if still tenuous, use of national 
statistics.  
 
To conclude, despite there being a range of theoretical arguments, there still remains a 
lack of valuable empirical research relating to a reduction in conflict and an increase 
in co-operation and communication. Whilst the results of international studies are 
valuable, it is difficult to transmute them to England and Wales. Building on this, 
when the results of Davis’ study is linked with international studies the synthesis of 
the two is less illuminating. The only credible conclusion that can be reached from 
this is that there is a lack of evidence to demonstrate that compulsory mediation 
would reduce conflict and increase communication and co-operation across the board. 
However, with some individuals it does seem to produce these positive results. From 
Bickerdike and Littlefield’s research it would appear that those who are more willing 
to co-operate will be more successful. Whilst they did not distinguish whether the 
process could encourage those who were not co-operating to co-operate, it appears to 
indicate that mediation would be most appropriate with those who are initially willing 
to do so. Overall, it would seem that mediation is a credible option that should be 
strongly encouraged for those who fit that description. However, the research, or lack 
of, does appear to negate the arguments of those who would argue for compulsory 
mediation. Given these conclusions, it is unsurprising that the mediation provisions 
within the Family Law Act 1996 were not well received. However, as stated, where 
individuals are willing to co-operate, mediation may provide a better process, it 
should therefore not be dismissed for future reforms.  
 
6.5. Is Mediation Better In The Long Term? 
 
The Government has, largely, trumpeted the fact that mediation can increase the 
likelihood of parties abiding by the terms of their arrangements. The advantages of 
this are numerous, as a steadfast agreement would help remove any future legal costs 
and the associated problems of renegotiation. The belief that mediation could increase 
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the chances of this occurring was outlined in the Consultation Paper – ‘Looking to the 
Future: Mediation and the Ground for Divorce’,478 where it was stated that mediation: 
 
‘tends to result in longer-lasting arrangements for the parties and their 
children, with better prospects of renegotiating such arrangements when 
circumstances change’.479  
 
Interestingly, this advantage was not reiterated in the Governments reform 
proposals.480 However, despite not explicitly repeating it, the proposal did document 
similar benefits that could lead to a more enduring settlement. These included 
increasing the parent’s abilities to communicate, reducing bitterness and tension and 
taking responsibility for their own choices.481 This would appear to support the belief 
that mediation provides for a stronger long-term relationship.  
 
The Government has since echoed its initial sentiments in the Consultation Document 
‘Parental Separation: Children’s Needs and Parents’ Responsibilities’.482 Furthermore, 
Jonathan Djanogly, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Ministry of Justice, 
recently argued that mediation was inextricably linked to the ‘Big Society’ and that it 
is ‘capable of giving people a sense of control over their futures’.483 This concept of 
self-control seems to reflect the previous emphasis on responsibility. 
 
Whilst investigating the question of the long-term impact of mediation, one may 
query the argument that a party negotiated agreement would endure. The evidence 
seems to be polarised between those who argue it does provide abiding agreements 
and those who do not.484 On the one hand commentators such as Mantle have 
highlighted that ‘one half of all agreements made were still intact, six months after 
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mediation’485 and that this should be seen as a ‘cause for celebration within the 
mediation field… given the level of conflict often apparent between parties in 
dispute.’486 Herring, contrastingly argued that there is an abundance of evidence 
disputing this claim.487 Demonstrating this, Herring highlighted the work of Eekelaar, 
Maclean and Beinart.488 They argued that, in instances where the parties both 
consented to the application, the number of cases that had to be adjudicated – the 
settlement failure rate - was under five percent.489 However, on a closer inspection, it 
appears that Herring may have misapplied their work. The issue they are discussing is 
the initial success rate of the process. What Mantle researched was the longevity of 
the agreement. They are separate issues. This was repeated with regard to the 
submission of Wright’s article, which Herring also provided as evidence.490 This 
examines the process of solicitor-led negotiation, arguing that solicitors had adopted 
some mediatory practices. Her study openly admits that the clients ‘have not been 
revisited’.491 Therefore how it could demonstrate the endurance of an agreement is 
illusive. What it does demonstrate is, sometimes, the foundations for a long-lasting 
agreement can be, hypothetically, insecure. However, it does not demonstrate that 
mediated agreements are less durable. Davis et al’s study, whilst not specifically 
assessing the longevity of agreements, did ask parties whether they thought they could 
modify the agreement if necessary. 59% of informants said they thought they could 
modify a mediation agreement if necessary, whilst 65% thought they would be able to 
modify a solicitor-negotiated agreement.492 Whilst this does not explicitly 
demonstrate the length of agreements, it does indicate the parties’ initial views, which 
seems to favour solicitors.    
 
On an international level, Kelly found, in a study based in California, that: 
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‘there was significantly more compliance immediately after divorce in the 
mediation groups… compared to the adversarial sample… these differences 
were still evident at one year post divorce but disappeared at two years post 
divorce, in part because the adversarial group [became] more compliant over 
time’.493  
 
Meanwhile, a study by Ellis and Stuckless in Canada demonstrated similar 
findings.494 What is important to stress in these situations, which Kelly may have 
underemphasised, is that the initial two years are potentially the most important. 
Logically, these are the years where many divorcees must re-establish themselves; 
they are undoubtedly going to be under far more pressure due to their personal 
circumstances. It is likely that they will have to almost ‘re-start’ their lives. This will 
be exacerbated if there are children. One should therefore stress the benefit of 
compliance within the first two years of a divorce. A failure to comply would 
undoubtedly only make non-recipient’s circumstances more difficult.  
 
Adding to this point is the fact that frequently critics of mediation highlight that ‘in 
the long run, mediation proves no more effective at containing hostilities than any 
other form of divorce dispute resolution’.495 However, this statement may be 
misleading. On first impression it seems to indicate that hostilities between the parties 
in mediation cases rise. However, according to Kelly’s research, the situation is 
actually the reverse, and that after a period of two years, divorcees from an 
adversarial divorce tend to reduce their hostilities down to the level of those who have 
mediated. This is perhaps an example of clever phrasing by Bryan to condemn 
mediation, however, when seen in its true colours, acts as an exhibition of mediation’s 
benefits.    
 
Overall it would seem that mediation does increase compliance initially, which is 
perhaps the most important time to comply from the parties’ perspective. Whilst 
Davis’ research does seem to provide a strong argument against this, the parties’ 	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initial perceptions do not seem to be reflected in reality. It would seem that one may 
argue that there is a significant improvement created by the mediation process. This 
appears to underline the conclusions reached with regard to reducing conflict and 
increasing communication – demonstrating that mediation, if voluntarily accepted, 
may be a valuable process in future reforms.  
 
6.6. Is There Gender Equality In Mediation? 
 
A routinely raised issue is that mediation tends to ‘perpetuate existing power relations 
within the family’.496 Dingwall and Greatbatch have argued that women in particular 
are at a disadvantage as they are ‘conflict averse’.497 The obvious danger in these 
circumstances is that the dominant spouse will be allowed to manipulate the process 
to their advantage. These situations may also be exacerbated if there are 
circumstances of domestic violence. Ultimately these areas are linked; as a result, it is 
logical to assess them in unison. 
 
The debate is, as Herring notes, highly polarised, with researchers such as Davis and 
Roberts arguing that there is no gender-based disadvantage whilst others, such as 
Bryan and Tilley arguing the contrary.498 Bryan’s argument outlines that mediation in 
divorce actually entrenches a power imbalance in favour of men.499 Accordingly, this 
entrenchment stems from several areas, including tangible resources500 and intangible 
resources, such as status and dominance.501 It would appear that Bryan’s emphasis on 
tangible resources, such as earnings, job availability, education and occupation, seems 
to disproportionately influence the rest of her argument. Following the development 
of her thesis; having more tangible resources creates an initial financial distortion 
between the parties, impacting on their relationship, lending the husband more status, 
which in turn gives him greater dominance and self esteem. It would not be unfair to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 G. Davis and M. Roberts, ‘Mediation and the Battle of the Sexes’ (1989) Family Law 305.  
497  D. Greatbatch and R. Dingwall, ‘The Interactive Constructions of Interventions by 
Divorce Mediators’in J. Folger and T. Jones (eds) New Directions in Mediation: 
Communication Research and Prospectives (Sage 1994) 84. 
498 N 422, 143. 
499 P. Bryan, ‘Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power’ (1992) 40 
Buffalo Law Review 441. 
500 ibid 449. 
501 ibid 457. 
	   109	  
say that the bulk of her reasoning relies upon the initial difference in tangible 
resources. Whilst this may have been true in the 1992, when she wrote the article, it is 
plausible to ask whether this is still relevant now? As demonstrated in the following 
chapter each sex is now performing roughly the same number of jobs and the pay gap 
is closing, albeit slowly.502 However, there are still significant differences in the types 
of jobs being performed – part-time and full-time – not to mention the opportunities 
available to women within a job’s hierarchy. Yet, Bryan’s contention is largely based 
on a factor that is routinely evolving – the societal relationship between man and 
woman. Her argument should therefore be consistently re-evaluated as this changes. 
Naturally, Bryan was writing in 1992, and this must be acknowledged within any 
analysis. In time, it may be possible to conduct a completely gender neutral debate, 
focussing on the economically weaker spouse who, due to their tangible 
disadvantages may be at more of a risk. However, for now, it would seem that a 
resource-based argument still holds some weight. Economics was not the only facet of 
Bryan’s argument. She correctly highlighted the influence of traditional sex ideology 
that ‘pervades this culture and… disputants behaviours’503 and the significance of 
depression on the process.  
 
The final, and perhaps most crucial segment of Bryan’s argument is her interpretation 
of ‘neutrality’. She puts forward that the power balance is initially uneven, before 
going on to suggest that this is entrenched by the fact that ‘mediator neutrality places 
the responsibility for generating alternatives and outcomes solely on the parties’.504 
Essentially Bryan is proposing that ‘the ethic of neutrality and party empowerment 
compromises any attempt by the mediator to produce fair financial agreements 
through power balancing because it denies mediators the opportunity to use the only 
effective power balancing technique: interfering with the substance’.505 However, this 
potentially comes down to a question of interpretation. One may ask, is it necessary 
for the mediator to be able to affect the substance of a process? It is unclear from her 
work as to why this is. The power imbalances she reflects upon would undoubtedly 
affect the abilities of the parties to negotiate. However, this is surely why the multiple 	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definitions of mediation place a heavy emphasis on the word ‘assist’. If there is a 
power imbalance then the party must be assisted by the mediator. If one is willing to 
accept that there can be a power imbalance, then it would only seem logical that the 
mediator should be able to assist, by guiding, rather than substantiating, the process, 
whilst remaining within the remit of ‘impartiality’. If one accepts this premise then 
the problem becomes not one with mediation per se, but with the practice of 
mediating, which is influenced by training, experience and the wider development of 
mediation as a practice.   
 
This conclusion is reinforced by Davis and Roberts’ study concerning the South-East 
London Family Conciliation Bureau. They found that 86% of women, in contrast to 
67% of men, found the agreement reached fair.506 In their argument they supported 
the above deduction by stating: 
 
‘…if the mediators simply provide a forum in which parents get on with the 
negotiations without interference, then it might well be argued that, in cases 
where one party threatens to dominate, the mediation attempt will serve to 
perpetuate this imbalance and give it legitimacy. But some of the Bromley 
evidence indicates that the mediators did much more than this: they were 
active; they did challenge; they controlled the ebb and flow of the negotiation; 
in some cases, the ‘weaker’ party did, indeed feel empowered’.507  
 
The authors then went on to say the intrinsic point that ‘it is unreasonable, in our 
view, to criticize family mediation because of its failure to remedy structural 
inequalities in our society’.508 One can hardly disagree with this sentiment. It is 
unrealistic to expect a divorce law to remedy the structural inequalities within our 
society and to attempt to do so would likely produce an esoteric system. Reinforcing 
this is the fact that the alternative is hardly any better. As already discussed, the 
solicitor led negotiation according to Erlanger et al was ‘bitter or nonexistent; terms 
were secured through threats and intimidation or pressure from attorneys or court 
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personnel; and in each case at least one of the parties criticized the outcome’.509 
Meanwhile, Wasoff concluded that many of the participants in her research had been 
‘pressurized… [were] dissatisfied… [and] lost out financially’.510 If one partially 
accepts Bryan’s argument above, that there are imbalances when one spouse has an 
economic advantage, then it would seem logical to say that they must equally apply in 
these situations too. Following from this, one may propose that correctly performed 
mediation, could actually provide a better service. If mediation were to become more 
prevalent, it would seem logical to assume that market forces would ensure that the 
better service would become mainstream.  
 
To conclude, it would appear that gender may have an impact upon mediation. 
However, Bryan’s contention that a mediator cannot remedy this seems unfounded 
and can be countered by Davis and Robert’s research, which demonstrates the 
advantages of training and experience. Given this, it would seem logical that any 
future reforms pay regard to the impact gender may have upon mediation.  
 
6.7. Mediation And Domestic Violence – Are They Compatible? 
 
A polarised question is whether mediation can be used in circumstances where there 
has been domestic violence. Domestic violence is defined as ‘any incident of 
threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or 
emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, 
regardless of gender or sexuality’.511 It has been suggested that, statistically, roughly 
one third of women of women will be physically assaulted by a partner in their 
lifetime.512 Adding to this is the fact that ‘ninety to ninety-five percent of domestic 
abuse victims are women and women are ten times more likely to be abused by an 
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intimate partner than are men’.513 It is therefore clear that this is a gendered issue. 
However, it is a considerable topic area, which could not be done justice by this 
thesis. For further reading see the following.514  
 
6.8. Are There Economic Benefits To Mediation? 
 
Mediation is frequently linked with economical benefits. In its consultation document 
the Conservative Government argued that ‘it tends to reduce the costs to the parties 
(and, where they are legally aided, to the Legal Aid Fund) because of reduced 
involvement of lawyers and the courts’.515 In their law reform proposal they reiterated 
this belief stating ‘family mediation will still prove to be more cost effective than 
negotiating at arms length through two separate lawyers and even more so than 
litigating through the courts’.516 More recently the Family Justice Review indicated 
that alternative techniques, such as mediation, might be more ‘cost effective’.517 
Before any analysis can be undertaken, one must initially differentiate between a 
reduction in costs and cost-effectiveness. A reduction in costs is, plainly, a financial 	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benefit set against the normal costs of a divorce. Cost effectiveness, on the other hand, 
is whether the cost of a service is value for money. For this reason, any question of 
cost effectiveness must be undertaken after an examination of mediation as a whole, 
allowing for an examination of the value of mediation. An assessment must therefore 
be carried out into the relative costs of mediation and if they are economically 
beneficial and, secondly, if these costs are value for money. 
 
In regards to the first question there have been numerous studies, of which Gwynn 
Davis’ work is of particular note.518 Before these can be set out it is important to 
clarify several issues. Firstly, as Davis states, it is impossible to accurately compare 
the ‘legal costs of those who engage in mediation with the legal costs of those who do 
not’;519 as they have either gone one way or the other, not both ways. This is 
complicated by the fact that different divorcees have a variety of disagreements such 
as contact, residence, ancillary or all encompassing disputes. Each one of these would 
require inconsistent levels of attention and distort the level of contact hours with a 
respective mediator or solicitor. One must also bear in mind that each divorce is 
unique in its own right and, the process followed may or may not be successful, 
complicating the cost. As a result, it is difficult to make a direct comparison. A further 
obstacle is that there are for-profit and not-for-profit mediators, who charge differing 
amounts. As there are a limited number of not-for-profit mediators, it is perhaps more 
logical to mainly assess the for-profit mediators. Lastly, this all may be complicated 
by Legal Aid, which could subsidise the cost of mediation. Consequently, a clearer 
scrutiny into the actual differences between mediation and solicitor led negotiation 
should assess Legal Aid as a separate issue. Overall, whilst averages may be relied 
upon, they have limited value. It is, perhaps, an area that is ripe for further empirical 
research, requiring researchers to go down both routes as actors, assessing the varying 
costs of each process, providing a more accurate selection of results.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518 G. Davis and G. Bevan, ‘A Preliminary Exploration of the Impact of Family Mediation on 
Legal Aid Costs’ (1999) Child and Family Law Quarterly 411; G. Davis et al, ‘Can Mediation 
Reduce Expenditure of Lawyers?’ (2001) Family Law 186; G. Davis, Monitoring Publicly 
Funded Family Mediation – Summary Report to the Legal Services Commission, (Legal 
Services Commission, London, 2000).   
519 G. Davis et al, ‘Can Mediation Reduce Expenditure of Lawyers?’ (2001) Family Law 186. 
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Davis’ evidence would seem to demonstrate that mediation is cheaper than solicitor 
led negotiation. Perhaps the best approach is to assess a comparison between the costs 
of mediation for couples who are mediating over ‘all issues’ and those who are 
pursuing the same route through solicitors.520 This avoids variables and gauges the 
maximum average cost of both mediation and solicitor led negotiation. In regards to 
those who pursue mediation, mediate and then make an agreement, one can identify 
the cost of the ‘intake assessment’,521 the mediation itself522 and the ‘green form 
advice’.523 Davis and Bevan estimate that these cost £188, £750 and £240 
respectively.524 The sum of this comes to £1,178. However, this figure does not 
necessarily reflect the current cost of mediation, as the research was carried out in 
1996-98 and must reflect those prices. On the other hand, Davis did repeat this 
estimate in his report to the Legal Services Commission in 2000 and a further article 
in 2001 - quoting the price of £1,200.525  
 
In contrast the National Audit Office in its report ‘Legal Aid and Mediation for 
People Involved in Family Breakdown’526 stated that non-mediated cases cost £1,682 
whilst mediated cases cost £752.527 The discrepancy between Davis’ findings and the 
National Audit Office’s indicates that perhaps the Audit Office’s findings are based 
on not-for-profit suppliers, which Davis estimated would cost £700.528 However, the 
not-for-profit figure should be treated with trepidation. There is a limited number of 
these organisations and if mediation were to make the jump to mainstream it is likely 
that the number of for-profit organisations would rise. As a result, the National Audit 
Office’s figure may be misleading.  
 
What is clear in regards to both sets of figures, whether they are discrepant or not, is 
that mediated cases are, on average, cheaper than non-mediated cases. One can now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520 G. Davis and G. Bevan, ‘A Preliminary Exploration of the Impact of Family Mediation on 
Legal Aid Costs’ (1999) Child and Family Law Quarterly 411. 
521 ibid 414. 
522 ibid. 
523 ibid 416. 
524 ibid. 
525 G. Davis, Monitoring Publicly Funded Family Mediation – Summary Report to the Legal 
Services Commission (Legal Services Commission 2000) 12; G. Davis et al, ‘Can Mediation 
Reduce Expenditure of Lawyers?’ (2001) Family Law 186. 
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examine whether it would be cost effective. There are two main factors that can be 
queried.  
 
Firstly, the figures quoted reflect the cost of successfully mediated cases. Where, they 
are not successful, one must consider the cost of the mediation and the further legal 
fees required. The rate of success has contradictory reports. In England and Wales, 
the Newcastle Centre for Family Studies found that ‘”all issues” were agreed in only 
39 per cent of “comprehensive” mediations, and 19 per cent of child-related 
mediations’.529 The settlement failure rate for these statistics would therefore be 61 
and 81 per cent respectively. This can be compared to solicitor led negotiation, where 
another English and Welsh based study demonstrated that ‘the settlement failure rate 
was under 5 per cent’.530  
 
However, these findings can be contrasted to studies from other countries, which on 
the whole have been positive. Kelly has outlined that mediation ‘research across 
countries indicates that clients reach agreement in divorce mediation between 50% to 
85% of the time, with most studies in the mid to upper range’.531 Of note is a study 
carried out by Depner, Cannata and Ricci on mandatory custody mediation in 
California.532 However, the natural flaw with this statement is that ‘other countries’ is 
not particularly relevant to England and Wales.   
 
Nevertheless, it would seem that given the success rate in England and Wales is so 
low, implementing mandatory mediation would be unlikely to save costs for those 
who fail to successfully mediate. This is another, of many reasons, to encourage 
divorcees to choose which process will work for them.   
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Family Lawyers – The Divorce Work of Solicitors (OUP 2000) 16. 
530 G. Davis et al, Ancillary Relief Outcomes: A Pilot Study for the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department (University of Bristol 1999) in J. Eekelaar, M. Maclean & S. Beinart, Family 
Lawyers – The Divorce Work of Solicitors (OUP 2000) 16. 
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532 C. Depner, K. Cannata and I. Ricci, ‘Client Evaluation of Mediation Services’ (1994) 32 
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However, there still remains the argument that, despite the costs, the parties may 
benefit from the process through an increase in communication and co-operation and 
a reduction in conflict. This was an area that was discussed above. However, when 
seen in an economic context, the discussion is diversified. One could potentially argue 
that, even if the parties did not come to a successful agreement through mediation, 
then the process could still be economically justified on the basis that it increased the 
parties communication and co-operation and reduced any conflict. As mentioned 
above this is a difficult area to judge, due to a lack of research. Yet Bickerdike and 
Littlefields argued that ‘couples who engage in high levels of contentious behaviour 
and low levels of problem solving and who exhibit disparity in problem solving are 
less likely to reach successful outcome in mediation’.533 From this one can imply that 
if the parties are not successful it is unlikely that the mediation encouraged them to 
communicate better. As a result, one can doubt whether mediation would be cost 
effective where mediation was not successful, as it would not seem to have a great 
impact.  
 
Overall, it would seem that mediation is cheaper than a solicitor or court based 
process. One should err on the side of caution when considering the National Audit 
Office statistics, as they may have overlooked for-profit mediators. However, what is 
clear is that, where the mediation is unlikely to be a success, it is doubtful as to 
whether there will be any benefits which would justify the cost of the mediation and 
then the added cost of its failure.   
 
6.9. Conclusions On Mediation  
 
In regards to the Family Law Act 1996, there were significant problems concerning 
mediation. Davis’ effectively demonstrated that there was still a high demand for 
solicitors, diminishing the view that mediation could provide a panacea. Beyond this 
it would seem that, from the modern analysis above, compulsory mediation would 
seem ill advised. There are numerous issues relating to conflict, gender and 
economics, which all demonstrate that an across the board policy would have 
significant problems. Given this, the credentials of the Act were and are still 	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significantly damaged. As Part III is still active,534 this criticism also extends to the 
requirement for those applying for Legal Aid to attend mediation.  
 
However, this is not to discount mediation as a process. As has been argued, in many 
situations mediation may reduce conflict and increase communication whilst 
improving the longevity of agreements. Furthermore, it may be cheaper than the 
traditional process. The above arguments demonstrate that the provision of voluntary 
mediation, with significant levels of uptake, would be likely to produce superior 
results.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The previous chapter concluded that there appeared to be few theoretical justifications 
for fault. In turn this chapter has discussed the attempted no-fault reform through the 
Family Law Act 1996.  
 
It would seem from the above that the Act failed for a myriad of reasons. Specifically 
Part I of the Act induced somewhat of a schizophrenic approach, advocating the 
support of marriage but also no-fault divorce. This convoluted approach presented the 
opponents to both of these principles with considerable grounds to criticise the Act.  
 
Practically the impact of Part I affected many of the facets of Part II, such as the 
information meetings and the period for reflection; causing internal tensions within 
the processes, resulting in, what could be argued as, a lack of direction. This criticism 
was underlined by the pilot study carried out by Walker, which assailed the 
information and assessment meetings for providing a bureaucratic and frequently 
irrelevant approach. Part III was similarly influenced by Davis’ pilot study, which 
went on to demonstrate that mediation was not a panacea.    
 
This chapter has outlined three conclusions that have emerged from the failure of the 
Act. Firstly, it has proposed that the reasons why the Family Law Act 1996 failed 
does not detract from the arguments for no-fault. It suggested that by attempting to 	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reconcile two opposing forces – no-fault divorce and sanctity of marriage, the 
provisions of the Act lacked direction and were subsequently mired by practical 
failure. However, it was noted that this did not detract from the arguments for no-fault 
divorce. As the last chapter put forward, there are numerous theoretical arguments 
against fault. Yet, the failure of Family Law Act 1996 has been attributed not to the 
theoretical flaws of no-fault, but the existence of counteractive aims within the Act, 
specifically those revolving around sanctity of marriage, which caused practical 
problems. The summation of this allows the thesis to suggest that no-fault divorce 
could, despite the Family Law Act 1996, remain the working model for future 
reforms. 
 
Secondly, building on the first conclusion, the above analysis has allowed the thesis to 
argue that by supporting both the liberal concept of no-fault divorce and the 
traditional concept of sanctity of marriage, the Family Law Act 1996 had opposing 
aims. As evidenced, this convolution distorted the Act providing an incoherent 
message. This caused the period for reflection and consideration to have a conflicted 
purpose, whilst also failing to provide the information and assessment meetings the 
direction and conviction they needed.  Given the theoretical conclusions concerning 
the traditional arguments and the practical failure to reconcile them in the 1996 Act, 
the conclusions of the previous chapters has been further demonstrated. This allows 
the thesis, within the next chapter’s analysis of the current law, to suggest that by 
having distorted aims the practical application of the law may be damaged.   
 
Thirdly, the chapter demonstrated that where accepted voluntarily, mediation has 
many attractive benefits, including a reduction in conflict and increase in 
communication; greater agreement longevity; economic benefits and, with correct 
mediator training, a process that can support a spouse where the other is dominant. 
Equally, it also argued that where mediation is not accepted voluntarily, these benefits 
may be less forthcoming. 
 
The failure of the Act is a lesson that should be recognised. In regards to this thesis, 
the practical failure of the Act demonstrates that multiple objectives within a divorce 
law detract from its potential for success. However, the processes that were outlined, 
such as the information meetings and mediation, were not necessarily completely 
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misguided. It may therefore be possible to remodel, redirect and then reuse parts of 
the Act. In particular the above analysis has highlighted that there is a demand for 
information and that voluntary mediation has numerous benefits. This is particularly 
relevant in the following chapter’s coming analysis of the recent Protocol for 
Mediation Information and Assessment Meetings; and the Family Justice Review. 
What is more it does not severely detract from no-fault as many of the problems 
associated with the Act were due to practical rather than theoretical problems.  
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Chapter 4. The Aims of a Modern Divorce 
 
Synopsis 
 
This chapter seeks to draw together the conclusions previously reached, whilst 
separately assessing the aims of the law as it stands in the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973. This allows the chapter to suggest five interlinked themes for the thesis.  
 
Firstly, within the second and third chapter, the thesis proposed that a no-fault system 
could be adopted. Secondly, it suggests that voluntary mediation may, if approached 
correctly, create higher levels of communication, cooperation and longer lasting 
agreements, whilst feasibly doing so at a lower cost.   
 
Thirdly, following the analysis carried out during this chapter, it submits that the 
current law has not met either its first or second aim, providing what can be an unfair 
process that provides multiple opportunities to cause bitterness, distress and 
humiliation to the parties and any children. 
 
Following on from this, the chapter puts forward its fourth and central proposition - 
that conflicted aims, between protecting the sanctity of marriage and providing a fair 
process with minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation, may actually exacerbate 
problems. This allows the thesis to suggest that a no-fault model, which seeks to 
provide an economically accessible process, focussed solely on the dissolution of the 
marriage with minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation, could be adopted. 
 
Finally, it applies the above themes to the current reforms, outlined in the first 
chapter, arguing that they may provide a convoluted law if the provisions for 
mediation are coercive. With regard to this thesis, this may provide problems 
concerning the practical application of the reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The first chapter, following an outline of the development of divorce law up until 
current day, concluded that as it has developed, the purpose of the law has changed 
from a traditional to socio-economic focus. This was built upon in the second and 
third chapters; which explored the concept of fault and no-fault divorce. 
 
It was suggested that now, under a modern analysis, fault has few theoretical 
justifications. Traditional, socio-economic, contractual, psychological and tort-based 
rationales were explored; none of which were found strong enough to justify the 
retention of fault within divorce. Whilst there were certain strong arguments for 
specific situations; for example, the use of fault has been conceived to promote 
psychological benefits in certain cases; as a comprehensive vindication, no theory was 
adequate.  
 
Subsequently, no-fault divorce was investigated within the thesis. This exploration 
took the form of the failed Family Law Act 1996. The chapter was divided into three 
segments, exploring Part I, II and III of the Act. With regard to Part I, the Act was 
found to be divided between the broadly opposing theoretical objectives of providing 
a no-fault divorce whilst protecting sanctity of marriage - causing practical difficulties 
within the application of the Act. Following this, it was suggested that several facets 
of Part II, such as the period for reflection and the information meetings, were 
negatively influenced by the internal tensions caused by Part I. This led the chapter to 
conclude that a theoretically divided Act may impact upon the practical application of 
the law. Finally, through an assessment of Part III, the chapter included an analysis of 
mediation, arguing that, from a modern analysis, compulsory mediation would appear 
ill advised, however, that should not diminish the welcome impact mediation may 
invoke when voluntarily accepted, as it may reduce conflict whilst increasing 
communication and maybe even the longevity of agreements over ancillary matters.   
 
Emerging from the second and third chapter, it would appear that the thesis’ first 
theme – that a no-fault divorce model could be adopted – is evidently clear. There 
appears to be little rationale for the continued use of fault. No-fault divorce provides 
an attractive alternative. Especially as broadly opposing theoretical objectives, which 
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contributed towards the failure of the 1996 Act, is avoidable. It is argued that this 
must not be interpreted as a rejection of no-fault models. Broadly, the first theme, that 
a no-fault model could be adopted, has strong evidence to support it, as demonstrated 
in the second and third chapter.   
 
The second theme, that voluntary mediation may provide a beneficial procedure, was 
investigated and demonstrated within the assessment of Part III. The thesis considered 
a range of issues and, it was found that, when accepted voluntarily, mediation could 
reduce levels of conflict, communication and cooperation. With correct mediator 
training and handling, certain studies showed that it may not discriminate against 
women. Finally, if successful, mediation is likely to reduce the overall cost of the 
divorce, however, where not successful the cost had the potential to increase. Despite 
this, the previous chapter clearly demonstrated that mediation, as a voluntary process, 
has the capacity to provide a range of benefits.  
 
Given these two themes, the thesis shall now move on to assess the current objectives 
of the law, questioning whether they have been met, allowing the thesis to propose its 
third theme – that the current law has not met its aims. It then suggests what the 
objectives of a modern divorce law could encapsulate, outlining its central tenet that 
divorce law should be economically acceptable and focused solely on providing a 
process with minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. Following this, it shall 
outline its final proposition – that the current ongoing reforms, outlined in the first 
chapter, specifically the Pre-Application Protocol for Mediation Information and 
Assessment and the Family Justice Review, may not meet with several of the thesis’ 
findings.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, within the build up to the Family Law Act 
1996, the aim’s of the Law Commission 1966 Report,535 often linked with the aims of 
the current law, were assessed by the Law Commission in it’s 1988 Discussion 
Paper.536 This chapter shall seek to outline how the Law Commission approached the 
issue, whilst simultaneously adding scrutiny from a modern perspective.  
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This chapter’s structure includes an assessment of both of the current aims of the law, 
outlined by the Field of Choice. These read: 
 
“(i) To buttress, rather than to undermine, the stability of marriage; and  
(ii) When regrettably, a marriage has irretrievably broken down, to enable the 
empty legal shell to be destroyed with the maximum fairness, and the 
minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation.”537 
  
It shall then move on to assess the subsidiary aims laid out by the Law Commission 
Paper. These include injustice to an economically weaker spouse and the impact on 
the children.538  
 
The analysis concludes, with regard to the theoretical debate concerning fault in the 
previous chapter and the exploration of the Family law Act 1996, that a conflicted 
divorce law is unlikely to meet its multiple aims; perhaps even aggravating the issues 
it seeks to avoid. This provides the fourth and central message the thesis seeks to 
portray. It proposes that a more cogent solution could be to adopt a no-fault model 
with an economically acceptable process focussed simply upon reducing bitterness, 
distress and humiliation; providing a more humane divorce.  
 
Using this hypothesis, the thesis tentatively evaluates the ongoing reforms.539 It 
suggests that, whilst they possess certain positive attributes, they may learn from the 
mistakes of the current, previous and failed laws relating to divorce and provide a 
more focussed approach to the law – the fifth and final theme of the thesis. 
 
2. The First Aim Of The Field Of Choice   
 
The Law Commission’s 1966 Report titled, ‘Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: The 
Field of Choice’ argued that the first aim of the law in England and Wales should be: 
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‘To buttress, rather than to undermine, the stability of marriage’.540 
 
The notion of reinforcing marriage was touched on in the previous chapters. It was a 
source of debate in the Gorell Commission with Cosmo Lang even arguing that ‘any 
extension of the causes for divorce beyond female adultery was against the express 
words of Christ’.541 Following this, the introduction of the 1937 Act was opposed by 
the Anglican Parish clergy and MPs with significant levels of Catholic constituents.542 
It is therefore perhaps no surprise that the preamble to the 1937 Act contained the 
statement that it was a necessary ‘expedient for the true support of marriage’.  
 
In light of these repeated endorsements of divorce law supporting marriage, it is 
possible to question whether the current law has buttressed the stability of marriage. 
Two lines of analysis may be undertaken. Firstly, one can argue from a numerical 
perspective, that the sheer number of divorces – 113,949 in 2009543 - demonstrates, to 
a degree, that the institution of marriage has not been reinforced.544 Whilst the number 
is the lowest since 1974, when there were 113,500 divorces, it is still a significant 
figure.545 To provide historical context, the average number of petitions, dissolutions 
and nullities in the period 1901-1905 was 812; 2,848 between 1921-1925; 7,535 
during 1936-1940 and 33,132 over 1951-1954.546 Within a century, the quantity of 
divorces has increased by roughly, 14,000% - a staggering sum.  
 
However, the current statistics are slightly misleading, as they do not represent that, 
between the introduction of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 and 2009, a bell curve 
pattern emerged; the numbers of divorces peaking in 1990 with 191,615 divorces, 
only to then decline to the current levels.547 Building on the above percentages given, 	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544 Naturally, when assessing marriage and how it is viewed in society, there are a plethora of 
factors to consider, such as the rising rates of cohabitation, however, this chapter is not 
seeking to question this, but raise the fact that there is a high rate and number of divorces, 
especially when seen in light of divorce history. Office for National Statistics, General 
Lifestyle Survey Overview (2011) 
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the percentile increase in divorces between 1901 and 1990 was approximately 
23,500%.  
 
Meanwhile, with regards to the duration of marriages, the average lifespan has also 
declined; currently, 33% of marriages will have ended by their 15th anniversary, 
whilst only 20% had ended by that point in 1969.548 It is not been suggested that the 
divorce process is wholly responsible for the decrease in the duration of marriages. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible that the increase in access to the divorce courts may have 
had an impact.  
 
One may inquire as to the ease of obtaining a divorce. Given the nature of the special 
procedure, it would appear that it is relatively simple to acquire a divorce. It would 
seem, on the basis of the number of divorces, and the ease in which they are obtained, 
that with the introduction of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the stability of 
marriage was diminished. Naturally, the process of obtaining a divorce may not solely 
be responsible, as other factors, such as society’s acceptance of divorce, may have 
impacted upon divorce rates.  
 
Secondly, leading from this, a discussion regarding reconciliation may take place. The 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides for reconciliation in section 6. This has two 
sections; one requiring that the legal representatives acting for the petitioner certifies 
that they have discussed reconciliation provisions. The second provides the court with 
the power to adjourn proceedings if there is a reasonable possibility of reconciliation.  
 
Despite these legislative provisions, the special procedure has had a significant 
impact, distorting what was initially intended to be a judicial mechanism into an 
administrative one. Arguably, the reconciliation provisions are unsuccessful on 
account of several reasons. This has, largely, been credited to the fact that solicitors 
regularly fail to explore reconciliation;549 frequently taking the view that it would be 
ineffectual.550 Yet, the Law Commission 1988 Discussion Paper did suggest that the 
‘fall-off rates’ between petition and decree nisi; and during the transition from decree 	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nisi to decree absolute, appear to provide ‘evidence for some post-petition 
reconciliation.’551 This would seem to be one-sided conjecture. One may question 
whether it is the procedure followed which, as the Law Commission seems to suggest, 
facilitates reconciliation, or if it is the parties themselves or outside influences, such 
as friends and family for example, who are affecting the reconciliation. Nevertheless, 
in regards to the ‘general’ concept of reconciliation, rather than the ‘fall-off rates’, the 
Law Commission supported the belief that the requirement to prove a fact may 
entrench hostility or alienate a respondent,552 restricting opportunities for 
reconciliation, whilst also claiming that the speed of the process limits time for 
reflection.553 Whilst it may be argued that this could entrench hostility or alienate a 
respondent, it is questionable whether it will allow for a period for reflection. As 
already discussed, the assumption should surely be that this takes place before the 
decision to divorce is made. It could also fail to appreciate that the length of time 
taken under the special procedure may provide enough time for reflection for some 
couples.  
 
From a political perspective, it would seem that both the Law Commission and the 
Government, with the introduction of the Family Law Act 1996, discussed in greater 
depth below, accepted that the original objective of supporting marriage was not 
being met. The Government included into the Act: 
 
‘the parties… are to be encouraged to take all practicable steps, whether by 
marriage counselling or otherwise, to save the marriage’.554 
 
The attempted introduction of no-fault divorce and,555 in Part II, the inclusion of a 
‘period for reflection’556 both link in to the Law Commission’s suggestions.557 An 
interesting difference concerns the Law Commission, who, in contrast to the 
Government, did not suggest supporting the institution of marriage - indicating a 
distinction in approaches; the Law Commission arguing that the law should aim to 	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save a marriage, which was capable of being saved, where as the Government was 
arguing that the law should aim to support the institution of marriage as well. Either 
way, the Family Law Act 1996 itself acts as testimony to the fact that the original aim 
of supporting marriage was not being fulfilled. What is more, the fact that it was not 
implemented means the aim still remains unachieved.  
 
The creation of the Family Justice Review (the Review) by the outgoing Labour 
Government also adds to this discussion.558 The aim of the Review seems to prioritise 
fairness, speed and simplicity over the buttressing of marriage. As mentioned 
previously, the interim findings of the Review did not engage with religious 
arguments. Indeed, none of the members of the Review panel had a religious 
background. It is plausible that the final findings will expand upon their initial 
statements, providing a religious element. Equally, it is possible that the review may 
change the dynamic of the law, placing fairness, speed and simplicity above the need 
to buttress the stability of marriage. Although, tempering this statement, the Review is 
not a Law Commission project - perhaps reducing the likelihood of reform emerging 
from the proposals.  
 
With regard to the theoretical discussion of the previous chapter, this approach would 
seem to be a logical progression considering the waning influence of the traditional 
argument as outlined above. Indeed, if one charts the progression of the divorce 
reform since the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, one may highlight the changing 
emphasis between the initial support of marriage and the divided attempt by the 
Family Law Act 1996, which advocated no-fault divorce but also reconciliation.559 
Now, potentially, the focus may turn solely to fairness, speed and simplicity over the 
sanctity of marriage.  
 
Overall two main conclusions may be reached. Firstly, it would seem that the first aim 
has not been met. Marriage has not been buttressed by the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973; there are a staggering number of divorces and minimal effective provisions for 	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the protection of marriage, casting doubt whether, in reality, divorce law can buttress 
the institution of marriage. Secondly, linking to the chapter concerning fault, support 
for the concept that divorce law should protect marriage, appears to be waning. It 
would seem logical to suggest that this should no longer be an aim of the law, and 
even if viewed as an aim, not the primary aim, as it currently stands. However, 
tempering this statement is that fact that, as the theoretical discussions concerning 
fault demonstrated, marriage is still valued by a large section of society. Therefore, 
perhaps the most sensible solution would be for divorce law to take a neutral stance 
on the concept of marriage, neither actively promoting nor undermining it.   
 
3. The Second Aim Of The Field Of Choice 
 
The second aim outlined by the Law Commission in the Field of Choice stated that 
the law should provide the ‘maximum fairness, and the minimum bitterness, distress 
and humiliation’.560 A relevant consideration made apparent in the previous chapter, 
is that the divorce process may be distinguished between the special procedure and 
the judicial process; where a petition is defended.  
 
As mentioned, Elston, Fuller and Murch explored the judicial process, demonstrating 
the negative impact of the judicial process.561 This chapter shall primarily examine the 
special procedure, questioning separately, whether the law provides maximum 
fairness; and minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation.  
 
3.1. Fairness 
 
Ensuring fairness ‘in a way that is just to all concerned, including the children as well 
as the spouses’,562 was a major foundation in enactment of the Divorce Reform Act 
1969. This was the one of the approaches of the Law Commission in the Field of 
Choice who, when arguing for ‘maximum fairness’,563 stated that the law at the time: 
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‘does not achieve the maximum possible fairness to all concerned, for a 
spouse may be branded as guilty in law though not the more blameworthy in 
fact.’564  
 
This seemed to be an echo of Putting Asunder’s operandi, which argued for the 
removal of the formal concepts of ‘innocent’ and ‘guilty’.565 One may critique the 
current law’s relation to fairness from two perspectives – procedural and substantive.  
 
Procedurally, as regards to the Law Commission and the Archbishops Group’s focus 
on innocence and guilt, several points can be made. Putting Asunder’s aspirations 
must surely be tempered by their insistence on an investigation into the breakdown of 
the marriage, akin to a ‘coroner’s investigation’. It assumes that the parties would not 
come to their own conclusions on guilt and innocence, especially if the previous 
matrimonial offences were one of the important elements. Returning to the 
investigations behind the psychological justifications of fault divorce, it would appear 
that many individuals do personally allocate blame. Considering Putting Asunder 
advocated a significant investigation; it would seem fair to assume that if 
implemented, the relationship between the parties may have been aggravated. 
Furthermore, as discussed in relation to justice based justifications for fault, it would 
be difficult to impart a fair investigation, with a certain outcome, when many couples 
considered that they were both at fault for the end of the marriage.  
 
In contrast, the Law Commission’s proposed reform, which was adopted, required 
proof of one of five facts, which included the previous matrimonial offences, although 
they were no longer addressed as such. When this is combined with the reality that the 
parties are labelled the ‘petitioner’ and the ‘respondent’, something the Booth 
Committee, detailed in the following chapter, was quick to recommend should be 
altered,566 it is hard to see how anything was changed. Indeed, perhaps it is difficult to 
imagine how any legal system could not include these concepts if the courts are 
involved, as they correlate to an adversarial form. One party must win and, where a 
case is reliant upon the demonstration of a fact to be successful, this is arguably even 	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more pertinent. To put this in perspective, the fault grounds were used in roughly 64% 
of cases in 2008.567 Again, one can highlight the aforementioned psychological 
discussions held in the second chapter, evidencing that parties may naturally allocate 
blame. Conceivably, with these concepts in mind, this is why the Law Commission 
utilised the word ‘maximum’ as an acknowledgement of the inherent flaws in the 
attempt to ensure a fairer process – accepting a limited capacity for success. This 
argument is compounded by the fact that the majority of petitions are conducted under 
the special procedure. With this in mind, it would appear that parties are labelled 
‘innocent’ and ‘guilty’ without going through a judicial procedure.  
 
An area of concern in the current system is the fact that, in certain cases, the 
respondent may not challenge the petition, either due to circumstance or capacity. 
More explicitly, parties may lack the financial capacity to defend a petition, or simply 
not wish the expenditure of doing so, preferring to accept the petition. This was raised 
by the Law Commission,568 who went on to highlight that this is especially 
problematic where Legal Aid is not available. Given the recent news that all Legal 
Aid is going to be removed for divorce petitions, this is a prominent point.569 The 
impact of its removal is seismic, changing the landscape of those able to challenge a 
divorce petition, ensuring that only those who can afford to challenge a petition may 
do so. It could be argued that this may amount to a form of economic discrimination. 
The introduction of the special procedure as a procedural reform, rather than as a 
legislative one, relied upon the fact that a respondent could still challenge a petition 
through the judicial mechanism outlined in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
Without a safety net to ensure individuals can do so, there is a prominent economic 
distinction between those who can afford to use the judicial process and those who 
can only afford the administrative process. Arguably, the fact that many individuals 
are financially unable to make legal challenges is a truth for all forms of English and 
Welsh Law. Mr Justice Mathew’s statement that ‘in this country justice is open to all 
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– like the Ritz Hotel’570 is perhaps ironically pertinent in this regard. Overall, as 
mentioned above, restricting access to the judicial procedure on the basis of 
economics effectively makes divorce law a two-tiered system, distinguishing it as a 
legal area worthy of reform.   
 
The law is also open to substantive criticism. The Law Commission, in its Discussion 
Paper, was quick to highlight the perpetuation of the concepts of guilt and innocence 
in fault based petitions.571 It went on to emphasize that this is exacerbated by the fact 
that the behaviour need not be morally blameworthy, yet the law apportions blame,572 
evidenced in the case of Gollins v Gollins.573 These examples of blame are numerous, 
demonstrated by various fault-based cases, such as Stevens v Stevens574 where it was 
raised that, prior to appeal, Cumming-Bruce J had stated: 
 
‘Mrs. Stevens is a highly strung lady with a good deal less capacity for self-
control than most people and she is liable, if she gets irritated, to get very 
worked up and, to use a vulgar phrase, to go off the handle. The term 
hysterical, which is rather a loose one, is quite an apt adjective to describe 
how she presents herself when she is worked up. Her husband is capable of 
being rather a brutal personality’ 
 
Another example is contained within Bradley v Bradley575 where Scarman LJ stated 
‘often a woman will willingly make the sacrifice of living with a beast of a husband’. 
To the neutral reader these judicial dicta are clearly apportioning a form of ‘blame’. 
Although, these were handed down in the 1970’s and so may not reflect current 
judicial attitudes, however, due to the special procedure, the majority of divorce cases 
do not go to trial, so they are some of the few judgements available to critique.  
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When granting a divorce in a fault-based petition, the court is agreeing with one 
party’s subjective intolerability to living with the other party,576 either due to adultery 
or unreasonable behaviour.577 The Law Commission, in this instance, does not 
emphasise how distorted this attempt at ‘fairness’ is. If fairness is impartiality, then 
how can a judgment, which is so reliant on the subjective beliefs of one party, be fair? 
With the concepts of ‘innocence’ and ‘guilt’ being so prominent, there are 
connotations of a criminal trial. The central tenet of criminal law is the presumption 
of innocence, but, in the instance of divorce, it would seem that once the objective test 
has been fulfilled, the subjective question is impossible to rebuke. As a result if the 
respondent disagrees with the subjective viewpoint of the petitioner then, ultimately, 
it can only be perceived as ‘fair’ to the petitioner. Take the above case of Stevens as 
an example. Mrs. Stevens’ petition was eventually successful, despite Mr. Stevens’ 
attempts to defend his position. If Cumming-Bruce J’s dicta is accepted, then Mrs. 
Stevens clearly had a role to play in the breakdown of the marriage. Yet, her husband 
was, legally, apportioned with the blame for the breakdown of the marriage.  
 
Returning to procedural issues; this problem is exacerbated with regard to the special 
procedure, where the judge must accept, on paper, the subjective element of the 
application.578 Arguably, the fact that it is uncontested ensures fairness. However, if 
the respondent is consenting to avoid going to court, not because they disagree with 
the petition, but for economic or personal reasons, such as wanting to avoid further 
conflict, then this counterargument is nullified. To promote the opposing argument 
that - individuals who want to defend themselves are able to do so - seems to also 
correspondingly promote at least some form of conflict between the parties.     
 
Yet, as the Law Commission points out, the fault-based grounds may actually provide 
a bargaining chip for one of the parties in instances where the respondent wants an 
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immediate divorce but has no fact to rely on.579 Another bargaining chip can be found 
in petitions submitted under the fact of two years separation with consent, where one 
party may have a power imbalance if they withhold their consent.580 Distorting party 
positions is unlikely to provide for an impartial divorce.  
 
It is clear that the current law on divorce has the potential for unfairness. It favours 
the party submitting the petition both in regards to procedure and substantive law. 
This stems from controlling who may or may not petition, giving one party an 
advantage before the divorce has begun and, secondly, during the divorce itself, by 
focussing on the petitioner, the petition is, naturally, one sided. This is all 
compounded by the fact that soon, with the cuts in Legal Aid, a respondent will only 
be able to challenge a petition if they have the economic means to do so, creating a 
two-tiered system. Arguably divorce petitions are rarely challenged, nevertheless, this 
does not denigrate from the argument that the law is substantially unfair.  
 
3.2. Bitterness, Distress And Humiliation 
 
Like fairness, the aim to reduce bitterness, distress and humiliation (henceforth BDH) 
seems to be in the very foundations of the law. As stated, on a number of occasions, 
the Field of Choice, sought to minimise ‘embarrassment and humiliation’,581 whilst 
also arguing that: 
 
‘it should seek to take the heat out of the disputes between husband and wife 
and certainly not further embitter the relationship between them or between 
them and their children. It should not merely bury the marriage, but do so with 
decency and dignity and in a way which will encourage harmonious 
relationships between the parties and their children in the future.’582  
 
In contrast, Putting Asunder appears to accept BDH as part of the process, arguing 
‘the public interest requires as a general rule that “empty” legal ties should be 	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dissolved… that has to be put in the scales against the injury an unoffending 
respondent may suffer’.583 Despite this, it was the Law Commissions suggestions that 
were ultimately adopted. An important difference outlined at the beginning of the 
chapter was between the special procedure and the judicial process – uncontested and 
contested cases. This distinction is perhaps most relevant when exploring BDH.  
 
With regard to the judicial process, one can turn to Elston, Fuller and Murch’s work. 
As already stated, their research effectively demonstrated that, in contested cases, the 
law failed in its aim to minimise BDH,584 often providing unnecessary courtroom 
drama; one interviewee describing the process as a ‘Gilbert and Sullivan comic 
opera’.585 This failure was one of the reasons for introducing the special procedure. It 
is unflattering criticism of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 that, shortly following its 
introduction, its calibre was already being tested by negative empirical research 
results.   
 
In both contested and uncontested cases, the parties go through administrative hurdles 
that may cause BDH. The Law Commission argued that the prevalence of fault-based 
claims, particularly under the grounds of behaviour, creates BDH.586 This can be 
distinguished from adultery petitions, which tend to ‘carry less stigma and are more 
likely to involve agreement’.587 In contrast, the behaviour petitions may create 
hostility or exacerbate pre-existing antagonism between the parties.588 It was also put 
forward that a lack of fairness, which, as discussed above, can be commonly found in 
fault-based claims, results in BDH, as the respondent ‘will often resent the fact that he 
is being held responsible’.589 At the same time, the requirements for separation may 
also stimulate the parties to make ‘more damaging allegations’.590  
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As noted in the previous chapters, the Law Commission outlined three possible types 
of recipients of a behaviour petition. These included a collaborating recipient,591 
someone who received a petition ‘out of the blue’592 and, lastly, a party who was 
guilty of violence or serious misconduct.593 In each of the situations a behaviour-
based petition was alleged to have created BDH. In the first situation this was a result 
of encouraging the petitioner to ‘dwell on everything in the marriage and about the 
respondent which is bad and therefore to encourage a resentful and uncompromising 
attitude’.594 In the second, it was argued that the respondent was ‘likely to react 
bitterly and antagonistically to the surprise petition’.595 Lastly, in the third, it was 
argued that the petition could ritualize hostility that had been present in the 
marriage.596  
 
One may question the predicted outcome of the first situation – a collaborating 
recipient. The Law Commission states that the respondent ‘may not be able to view 
the allegations against him with indifference despite his consent to the use of the 
behaviour fact’.597 But, it could be argued that, if the petitioner were collaborating 
with the respondent, then it would be more probable that an indifferent fact would be 
chosen? This would naturally depend upon the level of collaboration. One may 
speculate that higher levels of cooperation would result in an increase in the chance of 
an indifferent fact being used. This seems to be an area the Law Commission has 
overlooked.   
 
Equally, it is important to question the Law Commission’s evidence. Initially, one can 
highlight that several of the proffered arguments are speculative. The repercussions of 
the situations, described above, are not referenced and rely largely upon tentative 
statements such as ‘hostility and conflict may well be generated… a respondent in the 
second category is likely to react bitterly’.598  
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Following this, when the Discussion Paper does use evidence it is often difficult to 
assess its quality. Frequently, it refers to the Booth Report as ‘evidence’.599 However 
this Report did not document its evidence and, like the Discussion Paper, the reader is 
expected to accept it on face value.600 One can find the same circumstances in regards 
to the frequently cited Law Society paper ‘A Better Way Out’.601 The paper, despite 
being relied upon as evidence in the Discussion Paper, proffers no actual evidence 
itself and relies upon similar speculative phrases such as: 
 
‘even though the ‘accused’ may not want to oppose divorce proceedings, 
indeed may welcome them, resentment at having to accept the blame for a 
situation for which he or she may feel the other spouse to be as much or more 
responsible can provoke quarrels where none…’602  
 
In regards to the language of both the Law Society and Law Commission, whilst 
speculative terms may often be considered typical, given the lack of empirical 
evidence, the suggestive language is perhaps more misguiding and therefore of note. 
In defence of the Law Society paper, the Sub-Committee was composed of 
professionals with significant experience, and summarily endorsed by the then Master 
of the Rolls, President of the Family Division and other members of the judiciary.603   
 
Access to evidence is also difficult. The Davis and Murch seminar ‘The 1969 
Legislation in Practice – Cause for Concern?’604 was relied upon frequently. This was 
unpublished and as evidence, it would seem that the Law Commission requires 
readers to unequivocally accept it, without the opportunity to access it. Although, with 
this in mind, one can assume that a large part of the 1985 seminar was subsumed into 
their 1988 book Grounds for Divorce,605 which was also heavily used. This was, in 
contrast, to the other sources relied upon, heavily researched through two projects, 	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one focussing on the special procedure, whilst the other focussed on conciliation in 
divorce.606 The research was aimed at assessing the way in which English divorce law 
operates in practice.607 Although it was not specifically aimed at assessing BDH, the 
research did back up many of the Law Commission’s statements. Particularly that the 
behaviour petitions stood out as less amicable,608 due to the bitterness at the sense of 
injustice609 and the issues arising when a petition arrived ‘out of the blue’,610 
detailing, and frequently exaggerating, past behaviour.611         
 
Ingleby, who looks at the factors underlying no-fault divorce, gives the Law 
Commission’s findings considerable credibility.612 Within his research, he carried out 
empirical studies upon the ‘files of sixty divorcing clients, twelve from each of five 
solicitors… over a period of eighteen months’,613 considering the parties responses to 
the current fault grounds. The advantage of this, over Davis and Murch’s work, is that 
it is partly focussed directly on the subject at hand – the implications of the divorce 
law on the level of BDH created by a divorce petition.  
 
It would seem fair to conclude that, despite the frequent speculative comments within 
the Law Commission’s findings, the current fault-based divorce law does often create 
BDH. This is affirmed by the literature that supports their argument.614 Almost from 
its conception the Divorce Reform Act 1969 has been accused of creating BDH, not 
only by academics such as Davis and Murch but also institutions including the Law 
Society, the Booth Committee and the Law Commission itself. The concept of 
providing a divorce that has minimum BDH is understandable, still, as concluded in 
the previous chapter, given the lack of support for the use of fault, it would appear 	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logical to argue that fault should be removed. It provides numerous opportunities to 
create BDH without contributing to a justifiable aim.  
 
4. Subsidiary Aims 
 
4.1. Does The Law Avoid Injustice To An Economically Weaker Spouse?  
 
Both the Field of Choice and Facing the Future advocated that the law must ‘avoid 
injustice to an economically weaker’615 spouse, avoiding leaving a ‘blameless’616 
spouse ‘destitute and outcast’.617 However, this is a slight misrepresentation as the 
Field of Choice was largely concerned with avoiding ‘injustice to wives’.618 Facing 
the Future, whilst generally attempting to provide a balanced view with statements 
such as ‘many spouses still have great difficulty in coping financially’619 and 
‘marriage breakdown often results in financial hardship’,620 was frequently assessing 
the impact on women and, on occasion, simply equating being economically weaker 
to being female. This can be seen in statements such as ‘the economically weaker 
spouse is likely to have difficulty in finding alternative accommodation. Not only 
must it reflect her budget…’621 It has been several decades since the Field of Choice 
was published, therefore, it is important to assess whether there is the need for such a 
focus today. In answering this question, this chapter shall focus on the ‘economic 
independence’622 of women in general. Perhaps the strongest way of assessing this is 
through statistics concerning employment and income rates. 
 
Facing the Future highlighted that the effect of separation on women increased 
unemployment from 4% to 34%.623 Contrastingly the Department for Work and 
Pensions’ 2007 Research Report – ‘Partnership transitions and mothers’ 
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employment’624 – demonstrated that ‘prior to a separation, around 60% of mothers 
with partners are in work. This proportion drops… to around 56%’.625 Whilst this is a 
study of transitional mothers, rather than all women, it is still a valid indicator of the 
unemployment rate. Importantly, it also demonstrates the unemployment rates of 
those who have dependents, whose economic status is arguably more vital. As the 
Research Report demonstrates the work patterns of separated women changed during 
the 1990’s where, for example, in the period 1990-1996 the percentage in work 
dropped from roughly 54% to 40%, whilst in the period 1997-2001 this was reduced 
to a drop of roughly 4%. Resultantly, it is possible to argue that, whilst separation 
does result in a 4% drop in employment, this is not as significant as it was when 
Facing the Future was published.  
 
The Law Commission also put forward the argument that women have less job 
prospects than men and that their occupations are frequently poorly paid, highlighting 
that women tend to have poorer paid occupations in service sector positions, rather 
than managerial or supervisory posts.626 Yet, the Office for National Statistics clearly 
shows that women’s employment opportunities have steadily improved since Facing 
the Future, and have drastically improved since the Field of Choice. In 1985 men 
filled two million more jobs than women, however, by 2008 the numbers were 
similar, with each sex performing roughly 13.6 millions jobs.627 Whilst, there are 
clear differences in the types of jobs, with women performing more part-time work 
and less full-time work,628 it is difficult to now argue that there are less employment 
opportunities per se for female labour. Although tempering this statement, it is clear 
from the European Commission’s eighth ‘Report on Progress on Equality Between 
Women and Men in 2010 – The Gender Balance in Business Leadership’629 that the 
‘higher up the hierarchy, the fewer women there are.’630 The Report details that only 
‘3% of the largest publicly quoted companies have a woman chairing the highest 
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decision-making body.’631 Furthermore, in ‘terms of companies not listed on the stock 
market, women still represent only one third of leaders of EU businesses’; within this 
figure the UK is seventh best in the EU with 33%.632 It would seem that whilst there 
are roughly equal opportunities for employment, the opportunities for women are in 
part-time work and in low hierarchy positions.  
 
In regards to the gender pay gap, in 2010, the gap for full-time employees dropped by 
2.2%, the largest drop since 1997.633 Whilst this only reduced the gap to 10.2%, 
which is still a sizeable sum,634 it represents a continuous fall since the two Law 
Commission publications. These Government statistics seem to contradict the EU 
Report, detailed above. The European Commission stated that the difference between 
men and women’s average gross hourly earnings as a percentage of men’s average 
gross hourly earnings is 22% in the UK, and 17.5% in the EU on average. Meanwhile, 
the Report argues that there ‘has been no reduction in the gender pay gap in the last 
few years.’635 Yet, this is a verdict regarding the EU as whole, not the UK 
specifically. The Government statistics, showing the reduction in the gap, have caused 
some to speculate that it will continue to such an extent that there may even become a 
reversal of the current situation.636 But, given the sizeable difference between the 
Government and EU statistics, one may query this.  
 
Contrastingly, the pay gap for part-time work widened in favour of women to 4% in 
2010.637 Obviously, part-time work does not provide the same level of income as 
equivalent full-time employment. Furthermore, it typically has a lower income rate.638  
At the same time, when one analyses the median earnings of the two genders, the 
picture is less auspicious. In 2010 the median pay of full time male employees was 
£538, whilst the median female employee was paid £439.639 This is clearly the 
strongest argument for retaining a female focus. Whilst it would seem that there is ‘a 	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general trend towards more equality… eliminating gender inequalities remains 
slow.’640 Therefore, whilst it is foreseeable that the situation may change, the focus of 
the law should remain on both of the sexes, whilst remaining vigilant to the evident 
inequalities.  
 
The question now turns to whether the law does actually protect the economically 
weaker spouse. There are three relevant provisions. The first, as mentioned in the first 
chapter, is where a petition based on five year’s separation could be dismissed where 
the divorce would cause  ‘grave financial or other hardship to him and that it would in 
all the circumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage’.641 The second is a provision 
found in section 10 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 that allows for the decree absolute 
to be postponed under the court is satisfied with the financial arrangements in a case 
regarding a petition based on two years or five years separation.642 Lastly, the third 
can be found in the wide discretion granted to the judiciary in section 25 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.643  
 
The Law Commission was quick to point out that section 5, the first safeguard, 
despite being used very rarely,644 is an effective provision when it is invoked. It is 
useful in certain cases such as: Reiterbund v Reiterbund;645 Archer v Archer646 and 
Julian v Julian.647 These cases concern situations where there is an ‘expectation of an 
occupational widow’s pension for which the husband is unable to compensate’.648 As 
outlined, when used properly there are numerous advantages to this provision. The 
benefits notwithstanding, the Law Commission argued, correctly, that for no-fault 
divorce to be introduced, the provisions would have to either be available to everyone 	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or no one.649 However, as it was highlighted, if ‘divorce were impossible in cases 
where hardship could not be avoided, it would defeat the object of enabling dead 
marriages to be dissolved in due course’.650 As the previous chapter sought to 
demonstrate, the arguments behind fault are lacking. Therefore, it would seem only 
logical to conclude that these protections, in a no-fault system, would have to be 
offered to everyone.   
 
The second safeguard, despite not being able to stop the divorce, is alleged to ensure 
that the best financial outcome is made; within the time frame it can prolong the 
divorce.651 With the removal of fault, the potential to expand this safeguard to all 
divorcees is the natural conclusion the Law Commission came to.652 This would seem 
like a logical conclusion. As will be discussed below, when the Family Law Act 1996 
was initiated, all financial issues had to be settled when the final application for 
divorce was made. In regards to the third safeguard – the discretion granted to the 
courts under Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 – this would be unlikely 
to change with the introduction of no-fault divorce. At the same time it could be used 
productively to counterbalance the potential problems of removing the first safeguard.  
 
Overall, it is clear that the law’s focus should remain neutral, however with 
safeguards to provide for the prevalent economic disadvantages exposed to women.  
 
4.2. The Impact On Children 
 
It is important, especially in regards to children, to distinguish the process of a 
divorce from a divorce itself. The Law Commission provided evidence that 
demonstrates children ‘would have preferred [their parents] to have stayed 
together’653 and, unsurprisingly, further research since then has demonstrated this 
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too.654 It is impossible to affect the parties’ decision to divorce, save by either 
restricting divorce law or making divorce more difficult to dissuade petitions. Yet, as 
discussed in the second chapter, there is evidence that delaying a divorce can be 
equally damaging.655 In short, whilst the process of a divorce may be altered, it is 
difficult to influence anything outside of the process itself, namely the relationship of 
the parties. As outlined in the introduction of the thesis, the focus is solely on the 
process of a divorce.   
 
This concept seems to have been accepted by the Law Commission, which suggested 
that the process should aim to ensure that, firstly, ‘nothing should be involved in that 
process which makes it more difficult for the children to cope with the separation’656 
and that, secondly, ‘every effort should be made to encourage good post-divorce 
relationships’.657  
 
As the Law Commission highlighted the current law often fails to satisfy either of 
these aims. The adversarial nature of the process has a predisposition to create stress 
and conflict, which could have a negative effect on any children.658 Meanwhile, as 
discussed above, it is liable to create BDH, which is unlikely to bode well for post-
divorce relationships.659 Whilst the Law Commission also mentions residence 
disputes and the occupation of the home as potential sources of conflict,660 the focus 
of this thesis is strictly on the divorce process itself. 
 
Fundamentally, one may conclude with the straightforward observation that if the 
divorce process has a predisposition towards creating BDH then this may affect any 
children. Consequently, it would appear that removing the aspects of the process that 
may cause BDH, might contribute towards a reduction of any negative impact upon 	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on any children. Whilst this is a simplistic explanation of a complex problem, an 
investigation into the impact of divorce upon children, outside of the conclusion 
above, would be beyond of the remit of this thesis.  
 
5. The Aims For Modern Divorce Law 
 
Following the previous chapters, the thesis suggested two themes. Firstly, that a no-
fault model could be adopted and, secondly, that voluntary mediation may provide a 
beneficial procedure. In the third chapter it was discussed that Part I of the Family 
Law Act 1996 provided a broadly divided theoretical approach, between no-fault 
divorce and protecting sanctity of marriage, causing practical problems. This chapter 
has put forward the thesis’ third theme - that the current law is often not fair to the 
respondent either with regard to principle or economics, does not buttress the stability 
of marriage and that rather than reduce BDH, may actually exacerbate problems. 
Linked to this, the thesis highlighted the interests of the children, which may be 
affected by the provisions pertaining to reducing BDH. In contrast to these negative 
conclusions, the economic provisions for the protection of a weaker spouse were 
deemed to be capable of working.  
 
Considering the culmination of these conclusions, it must be asked - what could the 
aims of a modern divorce law be? This is the fourth, and central, focus of the thesis. 
Three areas may be highlighted as imperative. Firstly, one of the clearest lessons, and 
one of the central points of this thesis, is that convoluted aims are likely to have a 
negative impact upon the parties. The sanctity of marriage and the protections granted 
to uphold it, such as fault, are evidently frequently in direct conflict with providing a 
fair divorce process with minimal BDH. As discussed in both the current and previous 
chapters, there are few justifications for using divorce law to protect the sanctity of 
marriage and any attempt to do so may lead to practical problems. This leads the 
thesis to conclude that this aspiration, and its protections, could be questioned as an 
objective of the law. Rather, the focus could be solely on providing a fair process with 
the nominal occurrence of BDH. However, it is important that the law take a neutral 
stance with regard to marriage, rather than attempting to promote or undermine the 
institution.   
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The second concerns economics. As discussed with regard to ‘fairness’, the current 
law favours the economically stronger of the parties involved. It would therefore seem 
logical that a divorce law should not overtly impact upon the finances of either the 
respondent or petitioner. Naturally, there will always be a cost to the process. 
Following from both of these, a third consideration is that if the process does not 
overtly impact upon the party’s ability to finance a divorce or cause BDH, thus also 
limiting adverse impacts on any children.  
 
With the above analysis it would seem that the strongest overriding factor must be 
that the aim of the law should not be convoluted, specifically, the law must not tread a 
half-way house between supporting the institution of marriage and providing for a 
divorce with minimum BDH. Indeed, this thesis argues the two concepts are, in many 
respects, irreconcilable. This is further demonstrated in the analysis of the previous 
chapter, concerning the Family Law Act 1996 which, on a practical level, failed to 
combine the two. With regard to future reforms, it would appear from the above 
analysis that the strongest path for the law would be to assume a neutral position, 
providing a process solely for the dissolution of marriage with minimum BDH. The 
chapter shall now go on to question and apply this thesis, where relevant, to the Pre-
Application Protocol for Mediation Information and Assessment and the Family 
Justice Review. 
 
6. The Current Reforms  
 
The thesis has now provided four themes: firstly, that a no-fault model could be 
adopted, secondly, that voluntary mediation may have significant advantages, thirdly, 
that the current law has failed to meet its prescribed aims and, fourthly, that the law 
should now be focussed solely on providing an economically acceptable process 
concerned with creating minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation.  
 
Given this, it is possible to apply these concepts to the current reform attempts, 
outlined in the first chapter, specifically the Pre-Application Protocol for Mediation 
Information and Assessment 2011 and the Family Justice Review 2011. As the Pre-
Application Protocol impacts upon the use of mediation and the Review has the 
potential to digitalise the special procedure, further emphasising its administrative 
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nature, the need for an analysis is pressing. The chapter shall analyse each with regard 
to the proposed conclusions.  
 
6.1. The Family Justice Review 2011 
 
The Review was outlined in the initial chapter. It proposes that the procedure be 
automated, allowing individuals to complete their petition online.661 Whilst it still 
allows for a petition to be challenged, on the basis of current evidence, the majority of 
cases would be carried out online. This would effectively digitalise the special 
procedure, perhaps enhancing its administrative nature even further.   
 
6.1.1. The Interim Report – A Critique 
 
It is difficult to provide an in depth critique of the Review considering that so little 
has been released concerning the proposed changes. As a result, only a general 
analysis may be undertaken.  
 
What is initially clear is that substantial changes to the law are not being considered. 
This would appear to be a proposal to reform procedure, effectively digitalising the 
special procedure, albeit with some minor administrative changes. Of note, the 
petition may be submitted jointly. This echoes the conclusions of the Booth 
Committee, outlined earlier.662  
 
Perhaps one substantial change, mentioned above, is the removal of the courts. As 
stated, on plain reading it would seem to advocate judicial supervision of a contested 
petition rather than a court case. However, given the bare number of contested cases 
the relative effect of this would appear to be minimal.  
 
What is most important to underline and then query, is the failure to suggest a 
removal of fault. Given the conclusions of this chapter and the previous chapter, fault 
can be argued as an unnecessary facet, perhaps even a relic, of English and Welsh 
divorce law. Hypothetically, if the Review’s proposals were implemented, then the 	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special procedure would be made more accessible. Why then, considering this, have 
the Review not suggested the removal of fault? Given the ease of the suggested 
process, the credibility of any arguments for the retention of fault, which largely relate 
to making divorce more difficult, seem to be reduced, if not non-existent.  
 
Furthermore, one may question how the Review’s preliminary Report integrates with 
the Pre-Application Protocol for Mediation Information and Assessment. Practically, 
the Review seems to be emphasising that the process should be digitalised. Yet, the 
Protocol appears to require that a Family Mediation Information and Assessment 
Form be completed and signed by the mediator. The Report makes no mention of the 
Form being completed at the beginning of the ‘online hub’. Arguably these issues 
could be digitalised. However, it would appear to demonstrate that they do not seem 
to have been designed with integration in mind. With the release of the final Report in 
autumn 2011, this may naturally change.  
 
Lastly, the notion of an ‘information hub’ is noteworthy. This was discussed in the 
first chapter. It is the idea that an online portal, with information concerning divorce, 
be made available. One of the main criticisms of the Family Law Act 1996 
Information Meetings was that it was rigid and bureaucratic. In the build up to the Act 
there was debate over whether the Meetings would end up giving advice. Arguably, to 
avoid this, the Meetings went too far the other way, becoming administrative and 
unresponsive. On the other hand, the idea of an information hub could act as a good 
response to this. If designed correctly a website can offer a plethora of differing 
information for the parties in a simple and accessible fashion. Yet, equally, it may 
also end up being inaccessible, offering little valuable information. Naturally this is 
speculation, but the information portal would seem as a modern day interpretation of 
Walker’s suggestion of providing an information DVD or booklet.663  
 
As this is a preliminary report, any conclusions are liable to change. Despite this, one 
may draw several positives and negatives from the proposals. On a constructive note, 
the concept of an online information hub could successfully provide a method for 
imparting relevant information without patronising the parties. Meanwhile, by placing 	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the process online the process will become simplified, potentially saving legal costs 
too.  
 
With the support of this thesis’ analysis, the following is suggested. Firstly, in line 
with its first theme - that no-fault could be adopted, why not remove fault? Retaining 
it whilst implementing the proposals would appear to provide an unnecessary and 
destructive part of what would be an exceptionally simple process. As has been 
demonstrated, there appears to be little justification for the retention of fault, whilst 
there is strong evidence that a no-fault system would reap benefits. Furthermore, with 
the retention of the current law, the aims of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 would 
still not be met, underlining that the third theme of this thesis is still valid – that the 
current law provides neither a fair system, nor reduces bitterness, distress and 
humiliation. Meanwhile, as the law would remain the same, the conflict between the 
sanctity of marriage and providing a divorce with minimum bitterness, distress and 
humiliation would remain. As a result neither the first, third or fourth themes of this 
thesis would be addressed by the Review.   
 
Secondly, in line with the thesis’ second theme, concerning the support of voluntary 
mediation, one must consider how the Review and the Pre-Application Protocol will 
be reconciled. As the reform process continues this will evidently be an area for 
continued analysis.   
 
6.2. The Pre-Application Protocol for Mediation Information and Assessment 
 
The Pre-Application Protocol was explained in the first chapter. It provides a system 
whereby married couples, as a necessary pre-condition to divorce, must attend a 
Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting.664  
 
6.2.1. The Aims – A Critique  
 
The Protocol prescribes three aims, which include to: 
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‘encourage and facilitate the use of alternative dispute resolution… set out 
good practice to be followed by any person who is considering making an 
application to court for an order in relevant family proceedings… ensure, as 
far as possible, that all parties have considered mediation as an alternative 
means of resolving their dispute’.665 
 
The first aim – encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADRTs)666 – 
will be analysed in respect of the rationale behind the Protocol. Initially it is possible 
to highlight that there is a difference between mediation and ADRTs. Mediation is a 
type of ADRT; it is not synonymous with the term. It is unclear whether the Protocol 
is encouraging ADRTs in general or just mediation. As it only refers to mediation, 
one may assume that it is the latter.  
 
The second aim – setting out good practice – is incumbent upon the first. If there is a 
strong rationale behind encouraging ADRTs then it is only logical that there should be 
a ‘good practice’ to exercise this facilitation.  
 
The third aim, which refers to ensuring parties consider mediation ‘as far as possible’, 
is open to criticism. Initially one can argue, what is ‘as far as possible’? This is an 
ambiguous and practically challenging phrase. How can a judge or administrator 
know when ‘as far as possible’ has been reached? It would seem to be at odds with 
the Information and Assessment Meeting, which is a specified and attainable target.  
 
There is also a conflict between the first and third aims. The first aim seeks to 
‘encourage’ the use of ADRTs, however, the third aim aspires to ‘ensure’ that parties 
consider mediation, providing a convoluted message. Whilst there is a difference 
between ‘using’ and ‘considering’, one may wonder whether the Protocol is treading 
the fine line between coercion and promotion. When seen in the light of the fact that 
applicants will be ‘expected’ to have followed the steps set out and that the court 
‘will’ take into account any failure to do so, it would seem that the process is more 
coercive than promotional.    	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666 For grammatical purposes, this shall be referred to as alternative dispute resolution 
techniques (ADRTs). 
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If the mediation is coercive, then this could provide a new tension to divorce law. 
This thesis has argued that there is a conflict between the provisions protecting 
sanctity of marriage and ensuring minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. If the 
substantive law remains the same then the Protocol may add a further dimension to 
this. Given the negative conclusions concerning involuntary mediation reached in the 
previous chapter, the extra dimension to the law may add to the present confusion. 
But, as the reform is so recent this remains speculation.  
 
It is also possible to inquire into the prospect of there being ulterior aims. The 
Protocol makes no mention of costs within its aims. Under its rationale it states that ‘it 
is likely to save court time and expense if the parties take steps to resolve their dispute 
without pursuing court proceedings’. Therefore, it is only appropriate to consider 
costs as one of the unspoken aims.  This would seem to reflect the approach of the 
Family Law Act 1996, which included within its principles that a divorce should be 
attainable ‘without costs being unreasonably incurred in connection with the 
procedures to be followed in bringing the marriage to an end’. Given the thesis has 
outlined that an economically acceptable process should be one of the main aims, this 
is a welcome development.  
 
6.2.2. The Rationale – A Critique 
 
The rationale behind the Protocol includes several elements that may be assessed 
separately. At the outset, the Protocol proposes that there is a ‘general 
acknowledgement that an adversarial court process is not always best suited to the 
resolution of family disputes’.667 It is important to realise that this statement is 
referring to a court process. As discussed in length during this thesis, there has been 
support for the removal of adversarial court proceedings; the Law Commission’s 1988 
Discussion Paper outlined in detail why the court process is flawed, arguing that the 
current law fell well short of its two objectives of: buttressing the stability of marriage 
and, when a marriage has broken down, enabling its empty shell to be destroyed with 
maximum fairness, and the minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. Yet, as has 
equally been emphasised, the majority of divorces are processed through the special 	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procedure and are not court based, aside from judicial approval of the documents. It 
seems strange that this is not therefore addressed.  
 
With the debate on mediation outlined above, it would seem that there are benefits to 
voluntary mediation. Studies have shown that voluntary mediation can have high rates 
of a reduction in conflict and an increase in communication and agreement 
longevity.668 Beyond this it may prove better fiscally and also provide a useful 
process in cases of power imbalance.669 However, as concluded, this is the case with 
voluntary mediation, not compulsory mediation. As a result, it is crucial to question 
whether the Protocol will coerce the parties into mediation. Given that there is already 
a conflicted approach in regards to the aims of the Protocol, between encouragement 
and coercion, one may have to wait for evidence relating to this to accumulate, 
allowing an informed conclusion.  
 
One may analyse the economics of the meetings prior to the accumulation of 
evidence. As previously concluded, mediation may cost less than solicitors, however, 
this is mostly in circumstances of not-for-profit mediations. It is possible to question 
whether for profit mediators will cause the estimated cost to rise. At the same time, 
one must factor in the cost of the ‘Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting’. 
Media reports have suggested that the Assessment Meeting will cost up to £140.670 
The cost of this meeting must be attached to the entire expense of the process. 
Therefore, simply via its existence it may raise the cost of a divorce process. 
Arguably, it is an unnecessary hurdle for divorcees who have already decided to 
mediate or not to mediate and, if there is a similar lack of uptake regarding mediation 
then the cost is unlikely to be justified.  
 
Given the above discussion concerning the attempted Information Meetings of the 
Family Law Act 1996, one may also question the Protocol’s statement that ‘there is 
growing recognition of the benefits of early information and advice about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
668 See chapter 5 subsection 6.4. and 6.5.  
669 See chapter 5 subsection 6.6. and 6.8. 
670 Guardian Life & Style, ‘Divorcing Couples to Face Compulsory Marriage Mediation’ 
(Guardian, 23 February 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/feb/23/divorcing-couples-marriage-mediation> 
accessed 25 February 2011.  
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mediation’.671 Arguably, this statement can be seen from two perspectives. The first 
view is that that there is a benefit to divorcees being able to ‘consider alternative 
means of resolving their disputes’672 as a substitute for solicitor-led negotiation. This 
view has foundations in the sense that, if the divorcees are paying for their divorce, 
they should be able to choose the course of the process themselves. Common sense 
also dictates that they are more likely to know which process will suit them best. This 
is open to the criticism that divorcees should not be forced to go through a formal 
process of coerced consideration as they will already have, potentially, come to a 
conclusion. Equally, it is possible that they could be informed of the benefits of 
mediation through a cheaper and more accessible medium than a face-to-face 
meeting.  
 
The second perspective is that the divorcees should be given information and advice, 
so that they will choose mediation. This would seem to be a more accurate 
interpretation of the Protocol given its emphasis on encouraging ADRTs. This is, 
however, open to the criticism that it is overpriced and may be seen as an inaccessible 
medium for encouraging ADRTs. If the divorcees are paying for the divorce, then 
why should they be encouraged to choose a specific path, especially when Davis has 
demonstrated that this is the less preferred route?  
 
The Information and Assessment Meeting bares a direct resemblance to the 
aforementioned Information Meetings of the Family Law Act 1996 outlined in Part II 
Section 8. In regards to the Family Law Act 1996, concerns were raised about the 
danger of information-giving spilling over into advice giving.673 However, as 
observed, it did seem that the concept of providing information was received 
positively. One may hypothesise that if the process were reformed to provide 
information in a style that avoided the rigid and bureaucratic nature of the Family 
Law Act 1996 Information and Assessment Meetings; instead providing a situation 
where the parties may access relevant information, then the process may be 
successful.    	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Despite this, perhaps the most forceful criticism of the rationale is provided by 
Walker’s aforementioned research. Within this Walker demonstrated that 39% of 
those attending the information meetings ‘described themselves as more likely to go 
to see a solicitor’.674 At the same time, only 7% of attendees went on to use mediation 
and, most tellingly, within this figure there were those who only had one mediation 
session.675 One may question the value of resuscitating such a similar process given 
that it is unlikely to increase mediation uptake and increase the demand for solicitor-
led negotiation. It seems to largely conflict with the aims of the Protocol.  
 
With regard to the thesis’ second theme, and given the success of voluntary 
mediation, if the meetings can tread a fine line, avoiding coercion, then the process 
may be received positively. Ultimately, this will depend upon whether the meetings 
will strike the right balance between coercion and advice giving; and providing a 
flexible opportunity for the parties to acquire information without overtly pressuring 
them to choose a process that will not be suitable. To push the parties towards a 
system that may be inappropriate for their needs is comparable to using fault to 
protect marriage and is unlikely to produce successful results.  
 
As has been discussed, the law is clearly divided between protecting the sanctity of 
marriage and providing a divorce with minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation – 
this division has been identified as a crucial problem within the law. If the mediation 
is coercive, then this will add another dimension to the law, potentially complicating 
it further, adding to the present problems. Without any evidence it is impossible to 
provide accurate analysis. However, one may speculate that, by providing this 
additional aspect, the law would be further convoluted. Indeed, perhaps the most 
worrying aspect would be the prospect of situations where mediation failed and the 
divorcees had to then resort to the traditional route of solicitors, increasing their costs. 
Nevertheless it provides an area of concern and a topic for further research. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter suggested, in conjunction with previous chapters, five main themes for 
the thesis. Firstly, it argues that future reforms could adopt a no-fault model. This 
conclusion was reached following the theoretical investigations undertaken in 
previous chapters. It was proposed that the arguments in favour of fault are limited; 
the socio-economic argument imposing objective moral standards into a private 
domain; whilst the contractual and justice-based arguments pertaining to practical 
flaws and misplaced foundations; and any plausible psychological benefits fail to 
justify wholesale retention. This chapter combined the theoretical debates with a 
practical investigation into the aim’s of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. It was 
proposed that the fault provisions might actually contribute towards creating further 
BDH. It would appear that there is little justification for retaining fault both 
practically and theoretically. It does not protect marriage and is therefore not relevant 
to the first aim; meanwhile, there appears to be little strength in substitute arguments 
that would justify its retention. The conclusions regarding fault are not new, being the 
conviction of the Law Commission since 1988. It has been over two decades since the 
Law Commission Discussion Paper; however, their conclusions still stand up to 
modern day analysis.  
 
Secondly, with regard to the third chapter, it proposes that voluntary mediation may 
provide certain benefits. Evidence demonstrates that, where mediation is voluntarily 
accepted and successfully carried out, there may be increased rates of cooperation and 
communication, whilst also providing greater agreement longevity with the potential 
for a lower cost.  
 
The third concept relates to the analysis undertaken within this chapter relating to the 
aims of the current law. It was demonstrated that the sanctity of marriage has not been 
buttressed. On the evidence investigated, with the introduction of the current law 
there was a rapid and sustained increase in the number of divorces, meanwhile, the 
provisions for the protection of marriage were found ineffectual and underused. From 
a social perspective, support for the concept that divorce law should protect marriage 
appears to be waning. Clearly, the first aim is not being met. It would also appear that 
neither is the second aim. As was initially established, the provisions are not 
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completely ‘fair’. There is an initial advantage given to whoever submits the petition 
and following this the decision is based, partially, upon the subjective beliefs of one 
party, frequently untested due to special procedure. This is exacerbated by the 
alternative higher cost of not using the special procedure, which naturally favours 
those in a stronger financial position. Furthermore, with regard to the second part of 
the second aim, through empirical and theoretical evidence, it was recognised that the 
fault provisions within the current law frequently create, rather than reduce, BDH. 
Evidently, the second aim has not been met either – allowing the thesis to firmly 
outline its third theme – that the current law has not met its aims.   
 
The fourth and central argument of the thesis, demonstrated, both within the current 
and previous chapter, was that the provisions for protecting sanctity of marriage have 
conflicted with those seeking to provide a divorce with minimum BDH. Given that 
the law does not buttress the stability of marriage and the attempts to do so may 
actually create BDH, future reforms may seek to avoid attempting to reconcile the 
two concepts and focus solely on providing a fair process concerned solely with 
reducing BDH. This was supplemented by concerns for the fiscal fairness of the 
process, where it was highlighted that the law favours the economically stronger party 
and that reforms may seek to provide a less fiscally demanding process. Fourthly, it 
made the straightforward acknowledgement that any improvement with regard to 
divorcing parents is likely to impact upon the children.  
  
Given these conclusions, it would seem correct to put forward the fourth argument of 
this thesis - that the law could aim to provide a process that is economically 
accessible, fair and with minimal bitterness, distress and humiliation. Having 
convoluted aims has little justification both due to the waning strength of the 
arguments for protecting the sanctity of marriage and the practical implications of 
fault which may cause bitterness, distress and humiliation, and holds the potential to 
frequently produce unfair results both objectively and to the parties themselves, 
impacting upon not only the parties, but also any children of the marriage.   
 
The fifth and final theme of the thesis concerns the ongoing reforms, suggesting that 
they may have disregarded the factors that contributed to the failure of the Family 
Law Act 1996. Whilst the Family Justice Review has the potential to utilise the 
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lessons learnt regarding the information meetings, its continued retention of the 
current law and support of fault-based divorce is questionable. It is also difficult to 
see how the Review will be reconciled with the Protocol. In regards to the Protocol 
itself, the authors seem to have overlooked the dangers of compulsory mediation. 
Ultimately, time will tell whether the Protocol will coerce parties into mediation or 
simply encourage them, however, on the bare facts provided it would seem to be 
leaning towards coercion. Given the fourth theme and central tenet of this thesis - that 
a divorce law could provide a neutral process focussed solely on the dissolution of the 
marriage – this would seem to be misguided. To overtly coerce divorcing parties into 
mediation is the liberal equivalent of using divorce law to protect marriage and is 
unlikely to be met positively. It also runs the risk of adding another dimension to the 
law, further complicating it.  
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Conclusion 
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To conclude, this thesis has put forward five main themes. Firstly, that no-fault 
divorce could be adopted. Secondly, that voluntary mediation may provide a 
beneficial procedure. Thirdly, that the aims of the current law have not been met. 
Given this, the thesis suggested its fourth theme – that the law should be based on an 
economically acceptable procedure, focused solely on providing a fair divorce with 
minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. Finally, the fifth theme concerned the 
application of these arguments to the current reform attempts, tentatively asking 
whether the thesis may provide a relevant lesson, as depending on their approach to 
mediation, reformers may be repeating the mistakes of previous laws, albeit from a 
different perspective.  
 
These observations were reached through several stages. Initially, it was demonstrated 
that, once divorce on popular demand was sanctioned through the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857, the importance of religious arguments have diminished over time, 
whilst the momentum of socio-economic concerns have increased. This was evident 
within the changing relevance of socio-economic motivations at each stage of reform. 
Specifically, the thesis highlighted the emerging relevancy of socio-economic 
arguments with regard to the attempts to reform the 1857 Act and then the changing 
dimensions between the religious arguments of the Gorell Commission, which 
arguably restricted reform, and the strength of socio-economic arguments with regard 
to the 1937 Matrimonial Causes Act. Equally this dichotomy may be seen within the 
provisions of the current law, which frequently pertain examples of attempts to 
encourage reconciliation.    
 
Following this, the differing arguments relating to divorce law and, specifically, the 
use of fault, were analysed. These justifications included traditional, socio-economic, 
contractual, psychological and tort-based arguments. None of which, aside from 
certain psychological arguments, were found to be strong enough to warrant the 
retention of fault to bring about an alternative aim outside of the dissolution of 
marriage. On the evidence discussed, each justification pertained practical and 
theoretical flaws, lacking a strong social rationalization. Given this, it appeared 
logical to propose that future reforms may seek to abandon fault.  
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Following this indictment of fault, the third chapter set out to assess no-fault reforms 
through an analysis of the Family Law Act 1996 and the preceding investigations into 
the law, including the Booth Committee and the Law Commission Discussion Paper 
and Report. It was proposed that the Act was theoretically convoluted in Part I, which 
subsequently influenced the practicalities of Part II and III – specifically within the 
period for consideration and reflection and the information meetings. Meanwhile, the 
poor results of the pilot schemes further damaged the Act. However, again these can 
be linked to the lack of direction assigned to the information meetings. This allowed 
the thesis to establish the foundations of its fourth and central hypothesis – that a 
conflicted law may be unlikely to provide positive results. Despite the failure of the 
Family Law Act 1996, the chapter maintained that no-fault divorce still has 
significant value and could be the model for future reforms, outlining it’s first theme. 
With regard to mediation, the second theme of the thesis was proposed, that where it 
was undertaken voluntarily, there was evidence that mediation increased 
communication and cooperation whilst extending the longevity of agreements.  
 
Subsequent to these two conclusions, an investigation within the fourth chapter was 
undertaken to explore whether the current law has met its initial aims and what the 
aims of a modern divorce law could now be. It was found that there was little support 
that the law has not buttressed marriage, given that the number of divorces are much 
higher now than they were previous to the Divorce Reform Act 1969, and due to the 
fact that there is little evidence that the provisions targeted at reconciliation expressly 
work or are even implemented correctly.  At the same time, with regard to the second 
aim of the law, it was proposed that the current system is not fair – heavily favouring 
the petitioner and those without the economic capacity to challenge a petition in court. 
Furthermore, it suggested that the use of fault is prone to creating bitterness, distress 
and humiliation. This allowed the thesis to outline its third theme – that the current 
law has not met its aims of buttressing the stability of marriage and providing a fair 
process, with minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. Given that the use of fault 
may lack theoretical and practical justifications, the thesis consequently proposed its 
fourth and central argument - that future reforms may seek to avoid conflicted aims 
and provide an economically acceptable, objectively fair process, focussed solely on 
providing a divorce with minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. 
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It then set out to fulfil its fifth theme and apply all of the analysis carried out during 
the thesis to the current reforms, specifically the Pre-Application Protocol for 
Mediation Information and Assessment 2011 and the Family Justice Review 2011. 
Through an analysis of these movements, it argued that, despite some improvements, 
the reform proposals may be repeating some previous mistakes. The Family Justice 
Review may further simplify the procedure and provide easy access information – a 
welcome reform. However, it does not appear to engage with the debates concerning 
fault or seek to alter the aims of the law, which is disappointing. With regard to the 
Pre-Application Protocol, if the provisions for mediation are coercive, which is a 
possibility, it may be providing the liberal equivalent to the conservative sanctity of 
marriage justifications for influencing divorce law. The result of this is that the 
reforms may fail to remove many of the problems with the current law, whilst 
potentially adding further issues to the law, which may have a negative impact.  
 
Overall the summation of the observations reached throughout the thesis is that a 
divorce law with conflicted aims, such as protecting sanctity of marriage and 
providing a humane process, is unlikely to provide positive practical results. Future 
reforms could possibly be based on a no-fault system and may choose to focus solely 
upon providing an economically acceptable, fair process with minimum bitterness, 
distress and humiliation.  	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